MIGRATION
from Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Content

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Foreword

The publication in front of you is a collection of presentation texts, given at the "*Research Workshop on Migration from Bosnia and Herzegovina*" international scientific gathering held on 10-11 September 2012 in Sarajevo. The initiative to organize this type of thematic workshop came from the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees (Department for Diaspora), and it was implemented in partnership with the Institute for Social Science Research at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo, which has recognized the social relevance of this topic and accepted the offer for cooperation without hesitation. The importance of the project was also affirmed through the commitment of the Government of Switzerland and the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument of the Directorate-General for Enlargement of the European Commission (TAIEX) to provide financial support for its implementation.

Justification for such a workshop is manifold, and is primarily reflected in the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a traditionally emigrant country, experienced a particular exodus of its population during the war (1992-1995), which, in proportion to its population, places BiH among the countries with the largest emigrant population. Emigration, mainly caused by the socio-economic reasons, continued in the post-war period as well. According to the estimates from the World Bank, BiH is ranked second in Europe - after Albania - based on the scope of emigration of the total population, with 1,471,594 emigrants, accounting for 38.9% of the total population of BiH. Additionally, with a high rate of emigration of highly educated population and physicians, 23.9% and 11.1% respectively, BiH also occupies one of the leading positions in Europe and the world.[1] According to the estimates of the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, total number of emigrants from BiH and their descendants - second and third generations - is around 1,700,000. Most of them live in European countries: around 240,000 live in Germany, around 150,000 in Austria, around 150,000 in Slovenia, around 80,000 in Sweden, around 60,000 in Switzerland, as well as around 350,000 in the USA, around 50,000 in Canada and around 60,000 in Australia.

Organization of this workshop was imposed as an imperative without alternative, as well as because of the lack of courses studying migration and migrants in the academic curricula in BiH, nonexistence of the network of researchers, and the general lack of information regarding the conducted research, as well as because of the lack of reliable statistics on emigration. In the Migration and Asylum Strategy of BiH for the period 2008-2011, the following gaps were identified: lack of data on the entire diaspora, lack of information on citizens who left the country as highly skilled emigrants, lack of data on how many members of the diaspora hold dual citizenship, lack of data on how many migrants are employed outside of BiH and how many are still registered as unemployed with the Employment Agency of BiH, lack of data on the educational profile of the diaspora, etc. Although this Strategy concludes that

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[1] World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook, 2011

the lack of data on emigration from BiH is one of the main problems for the development of appropriate policies in this field, the Action Plan of the Strategy did not develop actions to mitigate the identified shortcomings. This is partially corrected in the new Migration and Asylum Strategy of BiH.

Under its jurisdictions regarding the diaspora, the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees participated in the drafting of the Migration and Asylum Strategy of BiH for 2012-2015 which, once again, highlighted the lack of statistical data and research on migration, diaspora and its developmental resources, and which provides specific solutions for this problem in its Action Plan. The proposed activities are as follows: to support the development of academic research in the field of emigration, to organize international research meetings in order to establish a network of researchers for further research, to promote the importance of migrations for development through workshops and seminars for institutional representatives in BiH, to raise awareness on the importance of migrations for development of private, academic, and non-governmental sector, and the media, as well as other activities. This workshop represents the implementation of one part of the activities of the Migration and Asylum Strategy.

Panel workshops were designed to cover the most important aspects of migrations and migrants from BiH, such as demographic, social, economic, cultural-anthropological, politological, legal, gender, and other aspects in host countries.

During the workshop, the following researchers presented their research papers on the topic of migration and diaspora from BiH: Marko Valenta, Žan Štrabac (Norway), Branka Likić-Brborić, Li Bennich-Björkman, Roland Kostić (Sweden), Samuel Behloul, Bashkim Iseni (Switzerland), Tanja Pavlov, Jelena Predojević-Despić (Serbia), Vedran Džihić, Damir Hamzić (Austria), Hariz Halilovich (Australia), Ana Marić (Germany), Mojca Pajnik (Slovenia); Marina Glamotchak (France), Snježana Gregurović, Dragutin Babić, Filip Škiljan (Croatia), Mirza Emirhafizović, Saša Madacki, Aida Spahić (Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Introductory presentation titled *Why this workshop?* was held by Ruzmira Tihić-Kadrić, Assistant Minister in the Department for Diaspora, and the workshop was moderated by: Srebrenka Viđen, PhD, Lejla Turčilo, PhD, assistant Amer Osmić, senior assistant Mirza Emirhafizović, MSc at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo, director of the Center for Human Rights of the University of Sarajevo, Saša Madacki, MSc, and Roland Kostić, PhD, director of research in Holocaust and Genocide Studies / Balkan Studies at the Centre Hugo Valentin, University of Uppsala.

The panelists presented papers on the following host countries - destinations of many immigrants of BiH origin: Australia, Austria, France, Croatia, Norway, Germany, United States of America, Slovenia, Serbia, Sweden, and Switzerland, although some authors presented a general review of the diaspora.

The concept of the workshop has even greater significance as it shifted from the conventional reductionist concept of migration from BiH as the movement of refugees, which caused a very lengthy and utterly complex phenomenon to be limited to the war period (1992-1995) and reduced to emigration caused by the tragic events of that period. Accepting the fact that seventeen years have passed since the end of the war - the years during which the refugees from BiH not only changed their status, but the diaspora became the stabilizing force of the economic situation in the country through the remittances they send to their families - emphasizes the wider context of consideration and, thus, a better understanding of the position of this population. In this regard, several important facts should be noted:

- A significant percentage of the emigrant population from BiH are individuals who grew up or were born in the host country.
- People who were educated and gained experience abroad are seldom recognized in BiH as the great intellectual potential.
- Economically active immigrants are aging, i.e. transitioning into the post-working contingent, which reduces their solvency.
- Poor economic situation and lack of opportunities in BiH generally discourages the return of persons of working age, but it is unclear whether there is interest among the retired migrants for return on a larger scale.

Many of the issues arising out of the above arguments, such as identity, integration, and status in the immigrant societies, ability to return, relations with the country of origin, achievement of the *brain gain* effect, negative repercussions which may be caused by the decline in cash transfers in the foreseeable future, as well many others, were discussed during the presentations, but were also elaborated in the papers written by the authors published in this book. This conference can, therefore, be characterized as a pioneer project as the multidisciplinary approach to the issue of migrations from BiH enabled the defining of the innovative research agenda which specifically emphasized the perspective of Bosnian diaspora. By emphasizing the issues that deserve to be explored in the future due to their importance, one of the main objectives of the project - to identify priority research topics - was fulfilled.

All conclusions and recommendations arising from the workshop emphasize the importance of further and continuous cooperation which should yield results in the following segments:

- establishment of a database of researchers in the field of migration, a virtual library and open repository, as well as the creation of a separate link on the website of the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees of BiH, in order to store all relevant information in one place (implemented projects, research papers, calls for delivery of project proposals, invitations to conferences, exchange of academic staff, etc.)
- establishment of the "supra network" and associations of researchers working on the issue of migrations from BiH;
- development of partnerships in projects of interest for BiH;
- institutional cooperation in the design and implementation of postgraduate and doctoral study programs in the field of migrations;
- organization of thematic meetings / research forums, summer schools of the international character;
- founding of an academic journal for publishing scientific and technical papers in the field of migrations (modelled on similar journals from the region);
- methodological harmonization which would enable the comparison of results, and affirmation of the multidisciplinary approach in order to include the greatest number of researchers;
- planning of the next meeting in two years, when the focus of the *brain gain* and *brain drain*, once more under the leadership of the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees.

The workshop was inaugurated by Deputy Minister for Human Rights and Refugees, Radmila Mitrović, Head of the Operations Section for Justice and Home Affairs and Public Administration Reform of the EU Delegation to BiH, Severin Strohal, and Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo, Šaćir Filandra, PhD, while the director of Swiss Cooperation Office in BiH, Joseph Guntern, addressed the participants towards the end of the workshop.

The workshop program attracted the interest and attention of the representatives from the academia, media, government institutions, governmental and non-governmental organizations, who followed its course and actively participated in the discussions.

Panelists and discussion participants greatly contributed to shedding light on the lives of Bosnian emigrants. The real picture, as it was shown, is quite different from the stereotypes prevalent in the local public discourse.

Publishing of this book represents the best way to document the two-day program of the *Research workshop on migration from BiH*, and the book is intended for anyone with an interest in this subject, primarily researchers, students, and teaching staff. Necessary actions were undertaken for this purpose (collection of texts, editing, bilingual translation and proofreading, design and DTP), and it took many months of work by a team of editors and professionals in their field for this publication to see the light of day.

The book was printed in the official languages of BiH, while the English version will be published in electronic form in March 2013 on the websites of the workshop organizers and donors, and will be printed at a later date.

The order of texts in this book corresponds to the original schedule of presentation within specific panels, and is not indicative of any gradation according to the importance. Unfortunately, readers will not have the privilege of access to the content of presentations of all panelists, as some presentations were not adapted for publication, primarily due to the authors' lack of time during the call for papers. Their workshop presentations are available on the website of the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees www.mhrr.gov.ba (Iseljeništvo).

We believe that this book will supplement the very frugal domestic bibliography of migrations and migrants from BiH, and we hope that the academic audience will be receive it as a valid source, and that it will be met with positive reactions from the wider reading audience.

On behalf of the project partners,

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Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Austria

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to quantitatively and qualitatively present the demographic and socio-economic profile of migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Austria. For this purpose, their number and territorial distribution, fertility, family characteristics and partial structures, including biological, educational, and economic structures, were examined. Based on data available from most relevant sources (population census and register, vital statistics, labour force survey, administrative documents and publications), and on the findings of several studies, this analysis highlighted certain characteristics of migrants of BiH origin compared to other immigrant groups living in Austria.

Keywords: *BiH migrants, demographic characteristics, educational and economic structure, Austria*

Introduction

Austria is one of the countries which received the largest number of refugees from the war-stricken Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).[1] These former *de facto* refugees constitute a significant portion of the total number of BiH migrants who are among the most numerous foreign nationals or residents of foreign origin in this country. However, Austria is highly rated as one of the most attractive destinations for workers and students from BiH, both in peacetime and in the post-war period.

While migration from BiH, particularly intense during the war (1992-1995), caused depopulation effects with immediate and long-term consequences for the demographic development of the country, on the other hand, it had a positive impact on the size and composition of the population in the host country such as Austria. Alongside the *transfer* of (pro)creative potential into another country, emigration of people (particularly those in the working-age group) at the same time implies the loss of human capital[2] (acquired knowledge, skills, abilities) which becomes involved in the host society in accordance with the needs and opportunities of the labour market. Therefore, in addition to quantitative, it is necessary to consider the qualitative aspect of structural characteristics of BiH migrants in Austria.

The number and territorial distribution of BH migrants in Austria

As this is a very dynamic category, the size of migrant population is subject to variation if the quantitative changes are observed during a mid-term period. The number of immigrants, as well as the size of the total population, depends on the correlation between the components of natural (birth rate and mortality) and mechanical growth, i.e. external migration (immigration and emigration), at the level of that particular population. However, tracking the number of immigrants from certain country of origin is somewhat hindered by the acquisition of (Austrian) citizenship through naturalization. But, the actual number of representatives of a particular

immigrant group can be reconstructed on the basis of data on the number of persons by country of birth as an unalterable fact. In this regard, the question arises of whether and how the statistics of a State (in this case, Austria) recognizes the descendants of (im)migrants, given the fact that they were born on the territory of the host country. The relations with the native country of the parents of second-generation immigrants, in terms of statistical records, is not completely severed because they belong to the category of the population with a *migrant background* based precisely on the fact that their parents are persons of foreign origin, regardless of their citizenship.

Finding the (more) precise size of one immigrant group in a country is further complicated by the fact that possession of citizenship from one country does not have to coincide with the country of birth (e.g., citizens of Croatia or Serbia who are born in Bosnia and now live in Austria, BiH citizens born in third countries and now living abroad, etc).

According to the results of the 2001 population census, the number of BiH citizens was 108,047 or 15.2% of all foreigners residing in Austria at the time of the census implementation; of this number, every sixth BiH citizen was born in Austria (16.4%) (Statistik Austria, 2002). The number of persons born in BiH, including those who have Croatian or Austrian citizenship, was 134,402 (Statistik Austria, 2007).

Table 1. BiH migrants by country of birth, citizenship, and sex, 2001

	Born in BiH	Citizenship		
		Austrian citizens	Citizens of BiH or another country	
			Absolute amount	%
Total	134.402	18.342	116.060	86,4
Women	65.392	10.771	54.621	83,5

Source: Statistik Austria, 2007. (*Volkszählung 2001*)

In 2001, migrants born in Bosnia constituted the third largest immigrant group (after those from Serbia and Montenegro, and Germany); the most numerous immigrant group from Serbia and Montenegro had less than 9,000 people more than the BiH immigrant group.

At the beginning of 2012, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina (85,173) were at the fourth place with regards to the size of the group, while the top three positions were occupied by citizens of Germany (153,491), Serbia together with Montenegro and Kosovo (136,081), and Turkey (114,011) (Statistik Austria, 2012).

When the Labour Force Survey was implemented in 2008, a large number of Croatian citizens living and working in Austria responded that they were born in BiH, which clearly indicates that the number of people of BiH origin in Austria is much higher than if we consider only the (former) citizens of BiH. If, based on the criterion of the migrants' country of birth, we observe the entire population of foreign origin, and not just the persons without Austrian citizenship, Bosnia and Herzegovina with 146,000 immigrants is in third place, behind Germany and Turkey (Statistik Austria, 2009).

Table 2. Population of BiH origin (January 1, 2012)

Total	Citizens of BiH		Citizens of Austria born in BiH
	Born in BiH	Born in Austria	
132.661	68.894	16.279	47.488

Source: Statistik Austria, 2012a. (*Statistik des Bevölkerungsstandes*)

From the presented data, it is evident that this number does not include the citizens of Austria who were born in the territory of Austria, but whose parents came from BiH.

Accordingly, in order to provide the number of BiH migrants and, in general, migrants of foreign origin in Austria, the criteria used to obtain that information (citizenship or country of birth/origin) needs to be further refined.

In statistical publications, generally present is a dichotomous division into Austrian and non-Austrian (foreign) nationals, which are grouped by countries or regions. Thus, the data for nationals of the former Yugoslavia's successor countries or for people who originate from this region are often summarized in one section labelled as *the former Yugoslavia without Slovenia*.

Although obtaining citizenship does not objectively void the migration background and experience (Mesić, 2002), it does entail a number of status-related implications. By obtaining citizenship through naturalization, BiH and other migrants are statistically treated as Austrians[3] despite the fact that they represent a *population of foreign origin*, or *persons with an immigrant background*. In comparative examination, Austria stands out among other host countries in terms of the number of BiH migrants who obtained the citizenship of a host country through naturalization (cf. Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2011). In the period from 1998 to 2011, more than 53,000 BiH citizens were naturalized. They were given the highest number of citizenships in 2004 (8,664), followed by 2003 (8,275), and 2005 (7,033) (Statistik Austria, 2012c).[4]

Even though BiH migrants have settled in all federal provinces of Austria, as opposed to many other immigrant groups (Statistik Austria, 2009), their regional distribution is still characterized by a significant disproportion.

Table 3. Number of migrants born in BiH at the level of federal provinces (January 1, 2012)

Country of Birth	Austria total	Burgenland	Carinthia	Lower Austria	Upper Austria	Salzburg	Styria	Tyrol	Vorarlberg	Vienna
BiH	135.406	1.704	10.575	15.347	29.368	13.716	16.000	8.880	5.102	34.714

Source: Statistik Austria, 2012a.

More than two thirds of migrants from BiH live in four federal provinces of Vienna, Upper Austria, Styria, and Lower Austria, while approximately one fourth of them live in Salzburg, Carinthia, and Tyrol.

Since migration is an urban phenomenon, BiH migrants do not represent an exception in that sense because they mainly reside in the urban type of settlements, predominantly (cca. 60%) in medium and large cities in Austria, which is a significant determinant of the character of their social life.

Fertility and family characteristics

Recent development of the Austrian population, as well as the population development of the majority of EU member states, is determined by the following demographic phenomena and trends: *birth deficit*, *zero or negative natural growth* (equal or lower number of live births in comparison to the number of deaths), *positive net migration*

(higher number of immigrants than of emigrants), and *progressive aging of the population* caused by long-term decrease in fertility and extended life expectancy. Immigration mitigates the consequences of negative demographic trends to some extent, since immigrants mostly arrive in their younger years,[5] contributing not only to mechanical growth, but also to rejuvenation of the age structure of the population as a whole. In addition, female immigrants or foreign nationals, on average, continuously have a higher total fertility rate than their Austrian counterparts.

Almost 12% of children born in 2005 in Austria were born to foreign mothers. This proportion would be much higher, probably close to one fifth, if births to naturalized immigrant women were included as well (Prskawetz et al., 2008: 315), as confirmed by the data from 2009 given in the following Table.

Table 4. Proportion of live births by mothers' native country, 2009

Native Country	Share (%)
Austria	70,7
Turkey	5,6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	**3,2**
Germany	2,9
Serbia	2,1
Romania	1,6
Russia	1,3
Kosovo	1,3
Poland	1,1
Slovakia	0,7
Other	9,5

Source: Zeman et al., 2011a.

Depending on the mother's nationality/country of birth, the values of total fertility rates show noticeable differences. After Turkish female migrants, whose fertility levels are commonly above the average of foreign-born women in general, women born in Bosnia and Herzegovina came second, with a 3.2% share of all births in Austria in 2009.

In 2010, BiH female migrants gave birth to an average of 1.84 children (Zeman et al., 2011b), i.e. that was the total fertility rate (TFR), which is approximately 12% below the level necessary for simple reproduction (an average of 2.1 children per woman of reproductive age). However, the total fertility rate of female migrants born in BiH is by 0.51 higher in relation to Austrian females, and by 0.57 compared with the same indicator in the land of their origin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the specified year. Such differential fertility is likely determined by a combination of specific circumstances: the socio-economic conditions of life[6] in Austria are favourable for maintaining the continuity of the reproductive pattern of the pre-war period in BiH.

Findings of the study titled "Demographic Trends, Socio-Economic Impacts and Policy Implications in the European Union" have shown that the "fertility of migrant women who have resided in the receiving country for a longer period [from childhood - A/N] such as second generation migrants, tends to be lower than of first generation migrants. The convergence of

the fertility of migrant groups to the national average can be regarded as a dimension of integration" (Van Nimwegen and van der Erf, 2010: 16), as well as of assimilation.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the achieved fertility of BiH migrant women in Austria, although not reaching the weighted average of 2.1 children per woman of reproductive age (15-49 years), is at a relatively satisfactory level considering their age structure, as well as the environment characterized by the problem of insufficient number of births. However, it is quite certain that the actual reproductive behaviour of BiH migrants, both male and female, will not be able to be trans-generationally *perpetuated*, especially taking into account the exposure of the members of the second and subsequent generations to the influence of contextual and institutional agents of socialization outside the family framework (educational institutions, mass media, peer groups, membership in various organizations and sports clubs, etc). Extrafamilial (secondary) socialization of immigrant descendants certainly has a strong influence on the formation or modification of their values in accordance with the dominant paradigm of the immigrant society, which will eventually be reflected in the attitudes towards marriage, family, and offspring (fertility motivation) (cf. Bernhardt et al., 2007; Huschek et al., 2010).

In 2010, the average age of mothers of BiH origin was 28.28, and the average age of *primigravidae* (women giving birth for the first time) was 25.94 years. In the same year, the share of children born out of wedlock to mothers of BiH origin was 11% of the total number, while it was even higher in *primigravidae* - 15% (Zeman et al., 2011b).

When it comes to family characteristics of BiH migrants, six out of ten households (68,500 = 100%) house two generations - parents and children (41,600 or 60.8%); only the Turkish immigrant households have even more numerous nuclear families. The average household size of the persons of BiH origin in 2008 amounted to 2.97 members. Of 58,000 families with a referent member from BiH, slightly more than one fifth (22.9%) had no children, 28.6% had one child, while more than one third (35.5%) had two children (Statistik Austria, 2009).

Biological (age and sex) structure

Numerical ratio between male and female BiH migrants in Austria is not perfectly equal due to somewhat larger number of males[7] who, in the past, were more likely to migrate (sex selective migration). However, the asymmetry between the sexes in its entirety is minimal; it is even more favourable in comparison with Austrian nationals, and is only slightly more pronounced in the older age groups. Many factors and processes such as family reunification, child birth, the absence of selective migration during the war, as well as the trend of "feminization of migration" (term by Castles and Miller, in Giddens, 2006), contributed to a more balanced number of male and female migrants from BiH.

According to the 2001 population census in Austria, young (pre-working age) contingent (0-14 years) accounted for one quarter (24.89%) of the total population of BiH citizens. If we consider the parallel higher age limit for the determination of the young population, as given in the current literature and including the persons in the 15-19 age group, the number of young people increases to 34,823 (32.23%) or nearly one third of the total number of BiH citizens at the time of the census, which is a relatively high proportion for European demographic conditions. However, if we consider the current age structure of the total migrant population of BiH origin, and not just the citizens of BiH, the proportion of young people is lower, and therefore, the spatial projection of the age pyramid[8] takes on the form of a haystack or a beehive, due to the prevalence of middle-age generation.

Thus, the age structure of the BiH migrant population in Austria shows characteristics of a mature (stationary) type in terms of the ratio of young and old, the level of fertility, the stage of demographic aging, etc.

Educational structure

It is essential to provide insight into the educational composition of BiH migrants in Austria for several reasons:
- education is the key factor in the formation of human capital (Keely, 2010: 5);
- in the context of the social origin of children of BiH migrants and their "educational destiny" (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990), as a large number of them come from working families;
- educational achievements/qualifications are in close correlation with the (future) professional status of migrants and their descendants;
- due to the importance of educational function, not only in the design of one of the alternative trends: the socio-economic reproduction or upward social mobility of second generation migrants (cf. Waters, 1997; Haralambos and Holbron, 2002; Kirszbaum et al., 2009), but also in the process of integration.

Despite the consistent opinions among the OECD member states on the desirability and benefits of recruiting highly skilled migrants, their percentage varies greatly from country to country in the total number of immigrants aged 15 and over. With approximately 11% of highly educated immigrants (data from 2001), Austria falls into the group of host countries with a low share of this immigrant category (OECD, 2008). The most numerous immigrants in Austria, originating from traditionally emigrant countries of Turkey and the former Yugoslavia,9 have notable lower level of education when compared to Austrian nationals, but also in comparison to immigrants from the countries of the EU-15, and especially from Germany. Thus, based on the educational structure of certain migrant groups, we note the differentiation between highly educated and less-educated foreign work force.

According to the 2001 census data, the number of migrants born in BiH aged 15 years and over included in the census - based on the highest level of education obtained at the time or previously - totalled 119,016 (=100%) (61,057 males and 57,959 females).

More than half of people born in BiH (55% or 64,935, of which 28,327 males and 36,608 females) had a complete or incomplete elementary education10 or compulsory general education [ISCED[11] 1/2]. The total of 37,768 people of BiH origin (or 32%) had completed a vocational education (craftsmanship) [ISCED 3B]; as expected, this type of education was mostly pursued by men (25,697). 6,013 BiH migrants reported having completed vocational high school [ISCED 3B] (2,074 males and 3,939 females), which corresponds to the relative amount of 5.1%. 3,535 people had completed their education at an academic high school (grammar school) [ISCED 3A], of which 2,140 (60.54%) were women, while the vocational college [ISCED 4A] was completed by 3,620 BiH migrants, with an almost equal number of men (1,802) and women (1,818). Academy or pedagogical vocational diploma was acquired by 366 persons born in BiH, and 221 obtained a college diploma [ISCED 5B]. Tertiary (university) level of education, including the successful completion of technical vocational studies [ISCED 5A], was reached by only 2.15% of BiH migrants (1,507 men and 1,051 women) (Statistik Austria, 2005).

In order to obtain a more complete picture of the educational structure of BiH migrants, it is necessary to have information on where the economically active persons were educated - in BiH, Austria, or combination of the two - as this data indicates differences in

linguistic competence, as well as the causes of dequalification. This phenomenon is, in fact, possibly related to the unequal value of Austrian diplomas and those obtained in the country of origin, which require a very complicated and expensive administrative procedure in order to be recognized. If the recognition of equal value of educational qualifications is lacking, their holders are practically eliminated from the competition and thus brought to an inferior position in the labour market.

Bearing in mind that education is a process which takes multiple years to complete, classification of the population according to the characteristics of *previously completed school/education achieved* suggests that the actual status of education of the observed population paints a more favourable picture than the one presented through statistics. Therefore, by applying the above principles, registered educational level of people who are studying at a university or attending high school is degraded in a certain sense, as they are still in the process of acquiring a higher level of education.

According to data from the recent school statistics on elementary and secondary education (academic year 2010/2011), of the total 109,316 male and female students with a foreign nationality, 11.73% of them (12,824) are citizens of BiH.

Table 5. Distribution of students with BiH citizenship by type of school in academic year 2010/2011.

Total	Primary school	Lower secondary school	Special needs school	Polytechnic school	New secondary school	(AHS) Secondary Academic school	Vocational school for apprentices	(BMS) Secondary tech. and vocational school	(BHS) Upper-level sec. tech. and vocational colleges
				Selected types of schools					
12.824	3.792	3.056	195	374	675	1.200	1.260	830	1.442
				Female students					
6.064	1.777	1.410	67	144	332	680	401	452	801

Source: Statistik Austria, 2012b.

Focusing on the number of students at general high schools (1,200), as they have to pass the graduation exam which is a prerequisite for admission to colleges, institutions of higher education, academies, and universities, we can safely assume that they will continue to further their education at one of the universities and thereby realize their educational aspirations.[12] Similarly, for students of vocational schools, which are more frequently attended by children of foreign nationals, one possibility is to take the exam of professional maturity, should they opt to study at an institution of higher education.

In the winter semester of the academic year 2010/2011, there were 2,523 BiH nationals at public universities in Austria (4.3% of all full-time students), of which 63% (1,606) studied in Vienna, and 28% (708) in Graz. Among the countries of the former Yugoslavia, the most numerous student body is comprised of BiH students.[13] German students comprise the majority of all foreign students in Austria, followed by students from Italy and Turkey (Statistik Austria, 2012b).

This trend of expansion of academic education among migrants from BiH creates solid preconditions for their better positioning on the Austrian labour market upon completion of their studies, provided that there is no discrimination or extreme dequalification. Furthermore, the increase in the number of highly educated people of BiH origin, together with a simultaneous decrease in the number of people who acquired lower (secondary) level of education, will affect the qualitative restructuring of the educational structure in the foreseeable future.

Economic structure

The economic structure of BiH immigrants will be discussed in narrower terms, and will include the following features: economic activity, employment sectors, occupation, and position modalities within a profession.

Position of BiH migrants in the Austrian labour market should not be viewed independently from the broader socio-economic context, because focusing solely on BiH emigrant community carries with it an increased risk of drawing erroneous conclusions as a consequence of misinterpretation of the available data.

(Un)employment, as one of the key indicators of structural integration and social inclusion of immigrants in the host country, generates, in terms of status, a marked division between the immigrants who have a higher standard of living (and generally better quality of life) thanks to being employed, and those immigrants who are not only socially disadvantaged due to unemployment, but are also socially marginalized. On the other hand, the types of jobs which almost exclusively employ the foreign labour force, due to poor working conditions and low wages, often have a negative connotation and are labelled as low-ranking and undesirable, due to being heavy, uncertain, risky for health, under-appreciated, and, in some cases, humiliating. The situation in which migrants are "(...) distributed in the society to perform low-ranking social activities (...)" (*Leksikon migracijskoga i etničkoga nazivlja*, 1998: 55) in relation to the domestic labour force, could be labelled as the most blatant form of ethnic stratification.

Following the introductory remarks, further text will provide a summary of active migrants, primarily of BiH origin, according to the above mentioned features.

The employment rate of persons born outside of Austria is permanently below average. However, BiH migrants are an exception as they had the highest proportion of employment in the second quarter of 2008; at least eight out of ten people of BiH origin (79.3% or 110,800) were employed during the referent period. Although unemployment primarily affects foreign nationals, this is not the case with BiH citizens living and working in Austria. German nationals, who account for nearly three quarters of employees in the countries of the EU-15, are followed by citizens of BiH with a slightly lower employment rate (76.5% or 52,900 employees, data from 2008), which is still higher than the employment rate of Austrian nationals (by 3.3 percentage points). It is important to emphasize the fact that, among the countries of origin of female immigrants, women born in BiH lead the way as their employment rate of 73.5% is well above the average, and is even higher than the employment rate of Austrian women (Statistik Austria, 2009).

The above-average employment rates of men (85.1%) and women (73.5%) born in BiH, which are also the highest employment rates when compared with the overall active population of Austria, indicate the absence of gender-specific disparity in terms of participation in the labour market.

Differences in the degree of integration into the Austrian labour market have been noted among migrant groups. The analysis of the results of the Labour Force Survey conducted in 2008 reported that BiH immigrants, alongside those from Germany, are relatively well integrated into the Austrian labour market.

In the second quarter of 2008, an enormously high percentage (91.2%) of all immigrants were employed by a third party, i.e. they generally worked for private employers; less than 4% of people from BiH were self-employed. Predominant part of this already very low rate of self-employed BiH migrants, and other migrants as well, is associated with the so-called ethnic entrepreneurship, primarily in the areas of catering and commerce (Aigner, 2011).

In addition to administrative obstacles standing in the way of starting a business, another reason for the extremely low percentage of self-employed BiH migrants is the lack of entrepreneurial spirit, which can be attributed to the habits from the socialist period.

Apart from the manufacturing sector, foreign-born males are particularly concentrated in the construction sector; four out of ten migrants were employed in these two branches (41.4%). There is a high percentage of men with BiH origin in the construction sector: more than one third of employed BiH nationals (35.2%) were employed in this industry. More than a quarter of BiH migrants (26.2%) were employed in one of the "blue-collar" jobs, with nearly every other male immigrant (45.6%) performing crafts or craft-related jobs. At the same time, there is an extremely low percentage of BiH migrants, and foreign citizens in general, working in civil service and public administration. The percentage of BiH migrants employed in the tertiary (service) sector was 58%, while the remaining 42% worked in the secondary sector (industry, construction, and manufacture) (Statistik Austria, 2009).

Presence of large numbers of BiH and other migrants in the tertiary sector confirms the statement that the "(...) foreign labour force has infiltrated into other sectors and not just into the secondary sector, again with a clear tendency to claim low-status jobs and a feedback - jobs for which immigrants are (more easily) employed precisely obtain (or reinforce) their lower market and social value" (Mesić, 2002: 107).

In 2008, more than one quarter (28%) of employees born abroad were overqualified. In contrast, 10% of those born in Austria believed that they are not employed at the position that matches their education.[14] A particularly high proportion of dequalified employees was recorded for female and male migrants from BiH (35.7%), with female migrants being more affected by this negative phenomenon (Statistik Austria, 2009).

The Austrian labour market places strong importance on formal qualifications, which poses particular challenges for immigrants. However, the qualifications acquired abroad (in the country of migrants' origin) cannot be adequately valuated by getting a job in their professional field (Krause and Liebig, 2011).

From the data presented, the ambivalence of the position of BiH migrants in the Austrian labour market is noted: the respectable level of employment does not show on a qualitative level, given that a significant percentage of BiH migrants are employed in less prestigious positions which are generally not attractive to the native population.

As the intergenerational upward mobility - from manual labourer to white-collar workers (Giddens, 2006) - occurs only sporadically, the attention of future research should be focused on intergenerational mobility, comparing the professional status of BiH migrant descendants with the occupational status of their parents. Equal basic opportunities for career advancement of children with and without immigrant background,[15] provided that they meet the qualifying criteria, can play a crucial role in increasing the rate of upward social mobility in the future.

Concluding observations

BiH migrants in Austria are excluded from the unfavourable statistics when it comes to the employment rate of men and women and the trend of improvement of education structure, compared to some of the other immigrant groups, particularly those originating from countries outside the EU zone.

Since the migrants originating from BiH predominantly live in urban areas, they have potentially better socio-economic prospects, especially those migrants who grew up and acquired education in Austria. On the other hand, the urban way of life and adopting of cultural values of their host society will gradually influence the adjustment of their reproductive behaviour to the model characteristic of the local population. The possibility of decreasing fertility, which is already insufficient to replace a generation, will inevitably cause disruption in the age structure and, consequently, encourage more intensive aging of the BiH migrant population.

Even though BiH migrant group stands out among the other immigrant groups thanks to its imposing rate of employment, a significant percentage of its members are similarly faced with the negative phenomena in the labour market, such as dequalification and general overrepresentation in the low-ranking job positions. In this regard, future research should address the issue of intergenerational social mobility, together with creating a comparison between the level of education and market outcomes of first and second generation of people with BiH origin within the same family. Based on the results of such research, it would be possible to discern whether the principle of equal opportunities for professional success - and, thus, for achieving a better social position - of persons with an immigrant background and without it, is generally true in practice. Should a low rate of upward mobility be established, this type of research would help find the causes of such a trend.

Notes

[1] From 1992 to 1995, Austria accepted about 90,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were initially given a temporary residence permit. After the war, approximately one third of them returned to their homeland, while around 60,000 people were successfully integrated into the labour market and remained in Austria (Krause and Liebig, 2011).

[2] Wertheimer-Baletić points to a very significant effect of external migrations that "(...) carry away the prior investments of the society and the family into upbringing, education, health, and social protection of migrants" (Wertheimer-Baletić, 1999: 323).

[3] According to the definition used in the 2001 population census in Austria, the term "Austrian" ("Österreicher") is the basic unit of the "population" set. It comprises all persons who possess Austrian citizenship, thus including those who, in addition to Austrian, have the citizenship of another country (Statistik Austria, 2005).

[4] Even though a much lower number of Austrian citizenships were awarded in the past few years due to more rigorous requirements that came into force through amendments to the Law on Citizenship, the largest number of citizenships in 2010, and second largest in 2011, were awarded to citizens of BiH, among more than a hundred countries of applicants' origin.

[5] Age groups from adulthood to late thirties are the most prevalent among migrants, especially in cases of economic migrations. Within this age range, people in their twenties are, according to numerous studies, the *most mobile* group, because they are more flexible and able to adapt to new circumstances, and are generally more willing to respond to the challenges and seize the opportunities provided in the host society

[6] Stimulating measures of Austrian family policy are definitely among the favourable socio-economic conditions of life.

[7] Of 134,402 migrants from BiH (data from 2001), 69,010 were male and 65,392 female; masculinity ratio (the number of males per 1000 females) in the same year amounted to 1,055 (calculated based on data from the publication *Volkszählung 2001*, Statistik Austria, 2007).

[8] Graphic display of age-sex composition of the population by five-year age groups in the form of population pyramid reflects past, provides recent, and forms the basis for predicting future demographic trends.

[9] Nevertheless, in comparison with the educational composition of the most numerous migrant groups, from Serbia and Turkey, migrants born in BiH, according to 2001 population census data, had a slightly higher number of highly educated persons, as well as a slightly lower proportion of persons on the other extreme of the education scale (primary education level).

[10] Compulsory general education is the lowest level of education, from which we proceed in classifying individuals according to the criterion of *previously completed education*. Therefore, this category includes the persons who have not completed compulsory general education (four-year, upper elementary, special, or polytechnic school) (Statistik Austria, 2005).

[11] ISCED is an acronym of the *International Standard Classification of Education*.

[12]In his book "Risk Society" Ulrich Beck symbolically marked "(...) the jump to middle school or high school as the jump onto the 'safe shore' of the possible professional future" (Beck, 2001: 262).

[13]Transfer of students from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria assumed the characteristics of chain migration as the relatives, friends, and acquaintances mediate in the process of admission to Austrian universities, providing not only the essential information, but often broader logistical support (submitting enrolment documentation, providing accommodation, and other forms of concrete assistance). These social connections resulted in the establishment of a migration *scheme*, which has proved to be quite effective in the process of BiH citizens coming to study in Austria.

[14]The MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index) publication states that this is due to complicated administrative process of recognition of qualifications acquired abroad, which hinders the process of finding an appropriate job (Huddleston et al., 2011).

[15]In the yearbook "Migration & Integration" for 2011 it was pointed out that, unlike the first-generation immigrants, the second-generation immigrants are practically equal to persons without migration background in terms of employment and occupational structure (Statistik Austria, 2011).

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Bosnians in Norway: Integration of Bosnian Migrants and their Descendants into Norwegian Society*

Abstract

In this paper, we present data regarding several relevant indicators of integration of Bosnians in Norway. We argue that the relatively successful adjustment of Bosnians to life in Norway can largely be explained by three factors: first, the immigrant group's background; second, their migration patterns; and third, the context of reception they have encountered upon entering the country. The background information for our analyses is mainly provided by the large-scale survey Statistics Norway has collected among the ten largest "non-western" migrant groups in Norway. We indicate in the paper that Bosnians are not among the oldest immigrant groups in Norway. However, with regard to several integration outcomes, including the educational integration of Bosnian youth and the achieved standard of living, Bosnian migrants in Norway seem to be doing comparatively well.

Keywords: *Bosnian immigrants, descendants, integration indicators, non-western immigrants, Norway*

Introduction

In this paper, we compare the patterns of integration found among immigrants from Bosnia[1] with the trends found among immigrants from other countries. We contextualize our analysis in several ways. Primarily, we compare the reception and integration outcomes of Bosnians with the integration patterns of other refugee groups in Norway. We primarily focus on the economic integration of Bosnian immigrants and the educational integration of Bosnian youth. Secondly, we discuss background and migration patterns of Bosnians. Thirdly, inspired by Portes and Zhou (1993), we look at 'the context of reception', where we distinguish among Norwegian refugee integration policy toward Bosnians and the society's attitudes and prejudices about immigrants.

The data we present in this paper are based on the most recent large survey on the integration of immigrants which was implemented in 2005-2006. At the time, Statistics Norway distinguished between immigrants from Western and non-Western countries. According to this division, Western countries include Western Europe, the USA, Canada, and Oceania (i.e. Australia and New Zealand). Non-Western countries include: Asia with Turkey, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe including Bosnia-Herzegovina. The sample included 3,053 informants with background from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro (no longer existing), Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Somalia, and Chile. The sample

was representative of the immigrant populations in question, and the response rate for the survey was 64.2%. At that time, the immigrant population from these ten countries numbered about 145,000 people.

The information on the educational integration of Bosnian youth is provided from various quantitative studies which are based on large, nationally representative samples (Henriksen, 2007; Bjørkeng and Dzamarija, 2011; Bakken and Elstad, 2012). In the interpretation of survey data, we have used our own qualitative data on Bosnians and other migrant groups in Norway (Valenta and Berg, 2003; Valenta, 2007, 2009a, 2009b; Valenta and Bunar, 2010), as well as findings from other qualitative studies (Lien, 1997; Berg, 2002; Knudsen, 2005; Fuglerud and Engebrigtsen, 2006).

Integration outcomes

There are more than half a million immigrants in Norway. In 2012, the largest immigrant group were Poles, while Bosnians were the fourteenth largest group. When the last survey was implemented in 2005-2006, among the ten largest immigrant groups, there were 15,000 Bosnians in Norway, which made them the sixth largest immigrant group.[2] The survey from 2005-2006, indicated that integration outcomes and integration pattern found among Bosnians in Norway were in some ways different from those found among other immigrant groups. The data showed, among other, that Bosnians have achieved a higher degree of economic, residential, and educational integration compared with most of the other immigrant groups included in the survey. Although Bosnians, on average, have been living in Norway for a shorter time than the members of many other large immigrant groups (such as immigrants from Pakistan, Turkey, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, and Chile),[3] they scored better than these groups with regard to several integration indicators.

Economic integration

We choose here to focus on some of the most commonly used indicators. Information about a large number of other indicators can be found in Blom and Henriksen (2008) and in Henriksen, Østby, Ellingsen (2011). We begin with the indicators of immigrants' economic integration. Table 1 shows the median income (in NOK) after tax in 2005, for households by country of origin.[4]

Table 1: Median annual income after tax for households by country of origin (in NOK, thousands)

Whole population	Bosnia-Herz.	Serbia	Turkey	Iraq	Iran	Pakistan	Vijetnam	Sri Lanka	Somalija	Chile
239	**204**	166	166	135	171	154	190	193	128	191

Source: Blom and Henriksen (2008).

As we can see from the Table, Bosnian households have a lower income compared with the median value for the whole country.[5] However, Bosnians have a higher household income than any other of the ten immigrant groups that participated in the survey. We notice that the income differences among the ten groups of immigrants are fairly large. For instance, the difference between the immigrant group with the lowest income, Somalis, and Bosnians is about twice as large as the difference between Bosnians and native Norwegians. It seems that immigrants from Vietnam, Chile, Sri Lanka, and Bosnia-Herzegovina have considerably higher incomes than immigrants from the other six countries. Of these four groups, Bosnians are the

most successful, but differences between them and the other three groups are not very large - about five percent. The general impression is, thus, that Bosnians are slightly better off than the members of the other three "successful" groups, but are much better off than the members of the remaining six groups.

The survey indicated that Bosnians are also doing fairly well with regard to several other indicators of integration into the labour market. Firstly, Bosnian women and men have a higher employment rate and more stable jobs than the immigrant average. Secondly, they are less concentrated in parts of the labour market where we find a large proportion of immigrants, such as the hotel and restaurant industry. Thirdly, they are less involved in different kinds of "ethnic business" and are more oriented toward Norwegian employers and mainstream labour market (Henriksen, 2007; Blom and Henriksen, 2008; Henriksen, Østby and Ellingsen, 2011).[6]

Other integration outcomes

With regard to spatial and residential integration, integration patterns of Bosnians are also somewhat different from those typically found among non-Western immigrant groups. In Norway, as in several other countries, immigrant groups tend to concentrate in the capital city and its immediate environs. According to official Norwegian government statistics, 30 percent of all immigrants live in Oslo. For some immigrant groups (such as those from Pakistan, Morocco, Sri Lanka, and Eritrea) this share is between 40 and 70 percent (Henriksen, 2007; Blom and Henriksen, 2008). A large proportion of these immigrants live in overcrowded apartments in ethnic neighbourhoods characterised by segregated ethnic networks (Blom and Henriksen, 2008; Høydahl, 2009). Unlike these groups, settlement patterns of Bosnians more closely resemble the more scattered settlement pattern of ethnic Norwegians.

Among Bosnians who live in the capital, one finds a lower concentration in low income areas compared with the immigrant average. As we shall see, this scattered settlement pattern of Bosnians can largely be explained by the successful application of the "Whole Norway Strategy", i.e. of purposefully settling refugee groups in a dispersed manner throughout the whole country, including in small rural municipalities that are far away from the metropolitan centres.

Regarding social integration, in terms of "bridging with Norwegians", the results of Blom and Henriksen (2008) show that Bosnians score higher than many other comparable groups (see also Valenta, 2008). On average, Bosnians more often report to have Norwegian friends and are more likely to socialise with Norwegian co-workers in their spare time than members of other immigrant groups in the survey (Henriksen, 2007; Blom and Henriksen, 2008; Valenta, 2008).

Educational integration of Bosnian youth

We focus on the educational achievements of Bosnian youth because they are probably the best predictor of their future social mobility in the process of integration into Norwegian mainstream society. We find two major categories of individuals of Bosnian origin in the Norwegian educational system: young people who arrived in Norway as children, and those who are descendants of migrants or second generation Bosnians.[7] If we use several common indicators of educational integration, such as the average pupils' grades and drop-out rate, we can conclude that both categories of Bosnian youth seem to be doing comparatively well. For example, the recent reports on educational results of pupils in secondary schools show that Bosnian pupils have the lowest drop-out rate compared to other immigrant groups and ethnic Norwegians (Bjørkeng and Dzamarija, 2011).

Bakken and Elstad's (2012) study indicates that secondary school grades among Bosnian pupils are better than the average for students with immigrant background, but they are still scoring lower than the natives and the highest achieving minority students such as those with Sri Lankan and Vietnamese origin (Bakken and Elstad, 2012). Nevertheless, Bosnians seem to score very well when it comes to participation in higher education. The survey data show that 38 percent of Bosnian immigrants who were between 19 and 24 years old at the time the survey was implemented, were enrolled in some form of tertiary education. The corresponding numbers were 18 percent for immigrants as a whole and 31 percent for ethnic Norwegians. Thus, participation in higher education was actually higher among Bosnian immigrants than among native Norwegians.

The more recent report (Henriksen, Østbye and Ellingsen, 2011) shows that 39 percent of all Bosnian immigrants and Norwegians born to Bosnian parents, aged between 19 and 24, participated in tertiary education. Table 2 is based on figures provided in the mentioned report and shows the participation frequency of immigrant men and women in tertiary education in 2009. As we can see, almost one half of all women of Bosnian origin, aged between 19 and 24, are pursuing tertiary education.

Table 2: Immigrants and Norwegians born to immigrant parents aged 19-24 in tertiary education (%)

	N 6403	**Bosnia-Herz.**	Kosovo	Turska	Iraq	Iran	Pakistan	Vietnam	Sri Lanka	Somalija	Chile
Total	17	**39**	15	13	13	30	21	26	32	9	16
Man	15	**34**	13	14	11	26	24	25	25	8	16
Women	19	**43**	18	11	16	33	19	28	39	10	15

Source: Henriksen, Østby and Ellingsen (2011).

In all, Bosnians seem to be doing comparatively well regarding their integration into Norwegian mainstream society. Of course, Bosnian immigrants are also facing problems and difficulties, and, for the majority of welfare indicators, Bosnians are still scoring lower than the natives and immigrant groups from Western Europe and North America. However, taken into consideration that we are talking about a refugee group which has arrived in the country relatively recently, the integration of Bosnians into Norwegian society has been fairly successful. Now we turn our attention to explanations for the integration outcomes of Bosnian immigrants.

Individual characteristics

First, we look at certain features of the immigrant group's background. Most Bosnians in Norway originate from cities and middle-sized towns in Bosnia. In a previous study, we found that 30 percent of Bosnians in Norway originate from the three largest cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Valenta and Berg, 2003). Furthermore, 29 percent of Bosnians had pursued higher education abroad, which is higher than the immigrant average (24%). One might expect that, due to their urban and semi-urban middleclass background, Bosnians in Norway would have an advantage regarding the adjustment to the normative expectations of their hosts, compared to some other immigrant groups which, to a larger degree, originate from rural areas. We found a clear support for that thesis in our previous study (Valenta, 2008).

According to sociological theory, educational background does not only influence a person's success in the labour market, but also correlates with the educational outcomes of her/his children (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Boudon, 1974). It seems that the average educational background of Bosnian parents (especially the father) is considerably higher than the immigrant average. Of all immigrants in the survey (aged between 16 and 70 years at the time of the survey), 15 percent had parents with university education or higher. The corresponding number for Bosnians was 27 percent. Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that the aforementioned high participation rate of Bosnians in Norwegian tertiary education may be explained by their social background.

Migration biography, gender roles and two-income amilies

We have shown above that Bosnian women have an extremely high degree of participation in the pursuit of Norwegian tertiary education. Bosnian women also seem to be doing comparatively well in the work force. Regarding the integration into the labour market, we should take into consideration the fact that Bosnian women are more active in the work force than women in other immigrant groups. Gender difference in employment in the population as a whole (i.e. mainly among native Norwegians) was 7 percent, while the corresponding difference between Bosnian women and men was actually lower, equalling 6 percent. The largest gender difference was found among the African and Asian immigrant employees; they had a difference of 14 percent in favour of men (Daugstad and Sandnes 2008: 29). In Norway, two-income families are usually economically better off than single-income families, and that partly explains the relative success of Bosnians with regard to economic and residential integration. Since it is more common among Bosnians for both women and men to work, their household income tends to be higher than in other immigrant groups included in the survey.[8]

But why are two-income families more frequently found among Bosnians than among other immigrant groups? In most East European countries, including socialist Yugoslavia, there was a high degree of participation of women in the work force. Therefore, one possible interpretation is that the values and gender roles found among Bosnians are more compatible with the expectations found in the Norwegian labour market, where the norm is that both women and men should be active in the work force. However, it should also be noted that most Bosnians arrived as families. Immigrants in most other immigrant groups arrived as single individuals (usually men), who were later followed by their families through various family reunion schemes. Several studies indicate that the female family dependency may be reinforced through the migration process (Boyd, 1997; Lien, 1997). It seems that different migration patterns may influence the gender roles within the family and women's participation in the labour market, which in turn influence the immigrants' household income and the integration of families in general. Bosnian women arrived in Norway together with their husbands and children. They were housed together in reception centres for asylum seekers and were settled together in Norwegian municipalities where they attended various integration-related programmes that the authorities offer to refugees. Some of these women learned Norwegian language even faster than their husbands (Valenta, 2009b). In other words, migration did not weaken their position, as the case may be when the women come afterwards through family reunion schemes. We found these trends when we studied Bosnians and Iraqis in Norway (Valenta, 2008, 2009b). In the case of Iraqi women who came through family reunion scheme, their migration biography reinforced the already existing traditional gender roles where women are expected to be responsible for the domestic sphere and men for the public sphere. In the case of Bosnian women in this study who, as already noted, arrived together with

their husbands, their migration biography was compatible with their expectations about an active participation in the labour force and community life (Valenta, 2008, 2009b).

The context of reception

The segmented assimilation theory suggests that, in addition to the social background and migration pattern of immigrants, we should take into consideration the nature of the reception the migrants have encountered. According to Portes and Zhou (1993), the context of reception includes several elements, including the host government's policies toward immigrants (which range from hostile and indifferent to receptive and highly supportive policies), and society's attitudes and prejudices about immigrants.

We may argue that the context of reception that Bosnians have encountered in Norway can be defined as a 'generous governmental assistance' combined with 'low prejudiced societal reception', according to Portes and Zhou's (1993) context typology.

Governmental assistance

In Norway, refugees from Bosnia were granted a collective "temporary protection" and access to welfare systems and the labour market, but it was taken for granted that, when the war ended, they should either return to their native country or apply for asylum on an individual basis (Brekke 2001; Berg, 2002). In addition, the Norwegian authorities have provided generous integration assistance to Bosnians. Although they were still under a temporary protection regime, they also had the opportunity to participate in state-sponsored Norwegian language courses. The Norwegian authorities assisted their resettlement from the reception centres for refugees and asylum seekers to public apartments in Norwegian municipalities. In 1996, the Norwegian authorities converted the temporary protection status of Bosnians into a permanent protection which made Bosnians eligible to apply for Norwegian citizenship. But, due to the "two track policy", Bosnians already commenced their integration into the mainstream Norwegian society a long time before this "amnesty". Due to this policy, they were resettled in local municipalities and went through extensive language training. Many were also already active in the work force a few years following their arrival (Valenta and Bunar, 2010).

Bosnians benefitted from extensive support from the Norwegian authorities in the resettlement process, but they were scattered all over the country, including throughout the small rural municipalities at the outskirts of the country. In the 1990s, when large groups of Bosnians arrived, the Norwegian authorities were running out of places in large municipalities and they perceived the dispersal of Bosnian refugees not only as a way to hamper concentration in metropolitan areas, but also as a strategy to accelerate integration and discourage the emergence of ethnically segregated urban communities (Djuve and Kavli, 2000; Valenta, 2008; Valenta and Bunar, 2010).

This so-called "Whole Norway Strategy" has been applied to other refugee groups, but never before in such a large extent as in the case of Bosnians. Quite a large proportion of Bosnians settled permanently in the areas of their initial settlement, unlike other refugee groups that often migrated from the areas of their initial settlement to metropolitan centres. Some of the reasons cited in studies to explain secondary migration and the failure of rural areas to retain refugees are: lack of social integration, difficulties obtaining employment, a desire to live in a multicultural urban environment, and a desire to live in the proximity of relatives, friends, and well-established ethnic communities (Djuve and Kavli, 2000; Valenta and Bunar, 2010).

Some researchers refer to the scattered settlement pattern of Bosnians when they attempt to explain why Bosnians have achieved a higher degree of integration than most of the other immigrant groups (Henriksen, 2007). This assumption implies that scattered settlement leads to better integration. The contact hypothesis argues that increased proximity between immigrants and indigenous locals will lead to a growth of respect between them. Furthermore, it suggests that, with dispersion, the contact will increase and will lead to a faster integration of immigrants and refugees, and that dispersion will, at the same time, discourage the emergence of socially segregated ethnic communities and encourage inter-personal and inter-group contact across ethnic borders (Valenta, 2007: 284).

We cannot exclude the possibility that the scattered settlement of Bosnians accelerated their integration into the Norwegian local communities, but why were other groups not able to profit from scattered settlement in the way that Bosnians have? It should be noted that not only Bosnians were scattered in small towns and rural parts of Norway, but many other refugee groups as well. However, Bosnians mainly remained in the locations where they were initially settled, while others migrated to urban areas. Perhaps due to their European background, Bosnian immigrants were not perceived as culturally very distant by the native local population. It seems that immigrants who are seen by indigenous locals as not too dissimilar and who are able to adjust in order to gain admittance into primary local groups tend to enjoy the dense sociability of a small town. Many Bosnians experienced small Norwegian towns in this way, emphasizing the strong individualization and a de-ethnification of the self in everyday life (Valenta, 2007).

Societal reception

The attitudes of indigenous locals toward immigrants (including how they perceive certain ethnic groups and the country which they originate from) influence the integration trajectories of immigrants. Immigrant groups who are especially stigmatized, or who are, in an ethnocentric manner, defined as socially too different from their hosts, experience greater resistance from the ethnic majority than others (Portes and Zhou, 1993).

Unfortunately, the survey does not provide any data on how ethnic Norwegians perceive the members of different immigrant groups, but it does provide extensive information on the experiences of discrimination among the members of different ethnic groups. Table 3 shows an additive index for the number of reported instances of experienced discrimination by country of origin.[9]

Table 3: Experienced discrimination by country of origin (%)

	N 2053	Bosnia-Herz.	Serbia	Turska	Iraq	Iran	Pakistan	Vietnam	Sri Lanka	Somalija	Chile
0 area	56	**70**	63	49	42	36	62	67	74	34	58
1 area	26	**22**	22	26	34	32	26	25	20	28	27
2 area	12	**7**	10	18	15	18	9	6	5	25	9
3 area	5	**1**	3	7	7	10	2	2	1	9	5
4 area	2	**1**	2	1	2	4	1	0	0	4	2

Source: Blom and Henriksen (2008).

Looking at the results presented in Table 3, we notice similarities with the results regarding the household income presented in Table 1. Immigrants from Vietnam, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Sri Lanka report comparatively lower incidence of experienced discrimination, with about two thirds of the respondents from these groups not reporting any discrimination incidents. We remind that those three groups are also the groups with a comparatively high household income. On the other hand, immigrants from Somalia and Iraq, who had comparatively low income, reported fairly high levels of experienced discrimination.[10]

One should note that blatant, unambiguous acts of discrimination are relatively rare in Norway (Valenta, 2008), and that reports of discrimination incidents often depend on the interpretation of ambiguous acts (and on the willingness of the respondent to remember and report these acts) (Henriksen, 2007; Blom and Henriksen, 2008). Additionally, experiences of discrimination depend both on how active the migrants are in the areas of life dominated by the ethnic majority, and on how often they experience discrimination from Norwegians in these areas. In certain contexts, segregated ethnic environments may protect immigrants from day-to-day discrimination and racism. Due to their largely scattered settlement pattern, high activity in the work force, and a high degree of bridging with ethnic Norwegians, it is to be expected that Bosnians encounter Norwegians on a frequent basis. At the same time, most migrants from Bosnia report that they have not experienced discrimination in Norway. Table 3 shows that 70 percent of immigrants from Bosnia stated that they had not experienced discrimination, and among those who did experience it, there are only a few who have experienced discrimination in several areas. As we can see in the Table, the survey indicates that a considerably large percentage of people from several other immigrant groups (such as immigrants from Somalia, Iraq, Turkey and Iran)experienced discrimination, as well as the accumulation of discrimination. In other words, the findings in Table 3 are concordant with our previous suggestion that Bosnians encountered a more favourable context of societal reception than many other immigrant groups, or that they, at the very least, perceive this to be true. Indeed, several studies imply that Bosnians in Norway are ascribed more favourable collective identity, compared with several other immigrant groups in Norway (Brekke, 2001; Berg, 2002; Valenta, 2008).

In everyday life, people make distinctions between Western and non-Western immigrants: Europeans and non-Europeans; Christians and non-Christians, Bosnians and Iranians, etc (Alba, 2005). Each of these categories is valued differently. The collective identity of Bosnians in Norway sometimes included more than one of these categories, providing them with different opportunities for negotiation (Valenta, 2009a). In the case of Bosnians in Norway, two particular dimensions of their collective identity seem to be more important than others: their European background and their religion. Most Bosnians in Norway are of Muslim religious background. In the current political and social climate, Muslim religion and the ethnic/religious markers associated with Islam are probably highly important in everyday majority-minority interactions. Many Bosnians have easily recognisable Muslim names and they experience situations and interactions in their daily lives where they have to explain their relation to the Islamic faith to Norwegians. In these situations, Bosnian Muslims in Norway sometimes experience stigmatisation (Valenta, 2009a). However, the European/non-European dimension also matters (Valenta, 2009a; Valenta and Strabac, 2010). Our Bosnian respondents perceive that, as Europeans, they were accepted much more easily than the members of immigrant groups from the Middle East, Africa, or Asia (Valenta, 2008, 2009a).

Conclusion

Bosnians are not among the oldest immigrant groups in Norway. However, with regard to several integration outcomes and the achieved standard of living, Bosnians seem to be doing comparatively well. Although their income is still considerably lower than the income we find among native Norwegians, the upward mobility and gradual integration of Bosnians into the mainstream society is more evident, compared to most other immigrant groups in the survey. This trend is especially visible when we look at the bridging-oriented social integration of Bosnian migrants, and the extremely high participation of Bosnian younger people in higher education. In this study we argued that the trend found among Bosnians may be largely explained by their individual efforts, their socio-cultural background and the specific manner in which they were received into Norwegian society. In addition to the generous integration and resettlement assistance provided by the Norwegian authorities, Bosnians experienced a more favourable societal reception than many other immigrant groups. Indeed, the Bosnian case teaches us that the scattered settlement in small local communities of the host society may result in a high degree of social integration if the immigrants are not perceived as culturally very distant by the native local population (Valenta, 2007, 2008).

Notes:

[1]For practical reasons we use the term *Bosnia* when referring to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the term *Bosnians* when referring to individuals who originate from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[2]In 2005, the immigrants from Pakistan were the largest immigrant group. At that time, there were few immigrants from Poland in Norway. The large immigration of Polish migrants to Norway started recently (Friberg and Tyldum, 2007; Valenta and Strabac, 2010).

[3]When the survey was implemented, the majority of Bosnians had been living in Norway between 10 and 14 years, while about a half of immigrants from Pakistan, India, Turkey Vietnam, Sri Lanka, and Chile had been living in the country for more than 20 years.

[4]Source: Income statistics for households (see Blom and Henriksen, 2008).

[5]The median value for the whole country is basically the median income of the natives, since native Norwegians comprised about 90% of the population at the time of the survey.

[6]Here we refer to "ethnic businesses" such as ethnic shops, cafes and restaurants.

[7]There are 2,800 Bosnian descendants or individuals born in Norway to Bosnian parents (Henriksen, Østby and Ellingsen, 2011).

[8]If we include the fact that Bosnians in Norway also have fewer children compared with most of the other groups in the survey, this, together with the higher relative purchasing power of the households, may partly explain why they report having a higher residential standard than most of the other immigrant groups. One of the indicators for residential standard is the number of rooms per person in the household. Due to the above mentioned factors, Bosnians score high on this indicator.

[9]According to the Statistics Norway, "the index sums up the number of instances of discrimination in seven areas of life: housing, employment, workplace harassment, education, health, discrimination in pubs and clubs, and denial of financial services. Only the cases where the respondent states that he has experienced discrimination, or believes he has received poorer treatment than the rest of the population have been included in this additive index" (Blom and Henriksen, 2008: 142).

[10]Nevertheless, the experienced discrimination and income are not perfectly matched: economically comparatively successful Chileans more often report discrimination than the considerably less economically successful Pakistanis.

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Exploring Trends in Transnational Practices of Conflict-Generated Migrants:
Bosnians in Sweden and their Activities towards Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract

In the literature on the causes of civil wars, transnational activities of conflict-generated migrants are often portrayed as a challenge to peace and development in their homelands. By systematically exploring the activities of conflict-generated migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina residing in Sweden, this paper casts a new light on the transitional practices of conflict-generated migrants. The empirical findings in this paper show that, contrary to the manner in which they are portrayed in the literature from the civil war, transnational practices of conflict-generated migrants from BiH living in Sweden are conducive to peacebuilding and development in their homeland. However, the choice of their engagement strategies varies. While few engage in political activities transnationally, others report investing in business and communal projects in BiH. However, most respondents engage in sending remittances to relatives back home and in that way also contribute to economic development back home.

Keywords: *conflict-generated migrants, diaspora, transnationalism, politics, economy, culture, peace, development, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sweden*

Introduction

Until recently, there seemed to be a consensus in academia and among policy makers that conflict-generated migrants, particularly those organised in diasporic organisations,[1] are uncompromising and that, through their activities, they challenge the conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in their homelands (Andersson, 1999: 18; Bigombe, 2000: 333-334; Collier, 2000: 851; Collier, 2003: 85-86; Collier, 2007: 797; Golan, 2009: 127; Kaldor, 2001: 85; Kaldor-Robinson, 2002: 181; Lyons, 2006: 128; Lyons, 2007: 530; Newman, 2006: 96; Nyberg-Sörensen, 2002: 58). In particular, financial remittances from conflict-generated migrants active in diasporic networks are considered as an important source of revenue for parties to conflict (Byman et al., 2001). Additionally, conflict-generated migrants are viewed as propagators of the values that fuel violent conflicts by means of new social media such as internet and cable television (Anheier et al., 2003).

Some authors explain the extremism of conflict-generated diaspora as a response to the pressure to assimilate in the host society (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Other scholars argue that the conflict-promoting behaviour is caused by traumatisation and experience of violence during the conflict in their homeland (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Byman at el., 2001; Fair, 2005; Lyons, 2006; Lyons, 2007; Lischer, 2005). According to this argument, persecuted refuges have ample reasons to harbour animosities toward the state, or toward the members of other groups in their homeland that are viewed as the perpetrators of violence. Thus, it is believed that, following a peace agreement, the local population tends to favour peace while the conflict-generated migrants "preserve their own hatred" and engage in obstructing peacebuilding efforts back home (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; 575, 589).

Large N-studies associating migrant communities abroad with an increased risk of civil war reoccurrence in their homeland had a profound influence on policy thinking and academia (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Their findings were further reaffirmed by studies focusing on the links between diaspora and movements for independence of Kosovo, Kurdistan, and Tamil Eelam (Adamson, 2005; Byman et al., 2001; Fair, 2005; Wayland, 2004). However, a growing body of recent case study evidence from different parts of the world challenges the civil war literature on conflict-generated migrants. We now know that conflict-generated migrants represent diverse populations and can engage in both the "peacebuilding" and "peace-wrecking" transnational activities (Smith and Stares, 2007; Horst 2008; Cochrane, 2007; Cochrane, Baser, and Swain, 2009; Koinova, 2011; Orjuela, 2008).

Based on comparative case study of Kosovo Albanians and the Lebanese communities in the US, Koinova argues that the reason for moderation of conflict-generated migrants in the post-war peacebuilding period lies in two structural explanations. Moderate behaviour operationalised by Koinova as all non-violent actions such as lobbying, petitions, and non-violent demonstrations is explained by the ability of conflict-generated migrants to link their own pursuit of sovereignty to a global political opportunity structure of international liberalism. She also argues that an increased responsiveness of the host country towards migrant initiatives helps sustain the moderate mobilization and its transnational expansion (Koinova, 2011: 461).

In his attempt to explain moderation, Hall compared the reconciliatory attitudes of BiH migrants in Sweden and local population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This systematic micro-level study with the focus on attitudes shows that conflict-generated migrants indeed tend to be more moderate than the homeland populations in the peacebuilding phase (Hall, 2013). Hall explains this through presence of economic and socio-psychological resources in the host country that enable conflict-generated migrants to make sense of their lives and to positively cope with traumatic homeland experiences of violence and expulsion (Hall, 2013: 17). Considering all arguments, moderation of conflict-generated migrants seemingly lies in the capacity of a host country to formally promote moderate behaviour and practices, in combination with presence of resources that migrants can access on their own for the purpose of dealing with their own predicaments (for similar argument, also see Branka Likić-Brborić and Li Bennich-Björkman in this book).[2]

However, we generally have relatively little systematic knowledge about transnational practices of conflict-generated migrants toward politics and economics in their country of origin. In order to engage in the subject, this paper defines transnational practices as various forms of direct participation in the politics, social and cultural activities, and economic activities aimed towards the native country. In general, there are some empirical studies examining causes of transnationalism among contemporary migrant communities, such as the practice of economic remittance, expatriate voting, or cultural activities aimed towards the native country. Yet, very little systematic research is devoted to transnational activities of conflict-generated migrants, the very population whose activities, as it is argued, have the potential to incite conflict or promote peace in their countries of origin.[3]

This paper makes two main contributions to the existing body of literature. It presents a unique survey data on transnationalism among conflict-generated migrants from BiH residing in Sweden. Additionally, it highlights the areas for future study, showing in which political, economic, social, and cultural activities conflict-generated migrants from Bosnia are highly engaged, which activities are quite infrequent, and what this means for homeland peacebuilding and development.

Overview of conflict-generated migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sweden

The paper investigates transnational activities of conflict-generated migrants from BiH residing in Sweden, and the impacts they have on peacebuilding in post-Dayton BiH. Most of BiH migrants came to Sweden between 1992 and 1995 (Medić et al., 1996). Through a blanket decision by the Swedish government in June 1993, most of Bosnian asylum-seekers in Sweden were granted permanent residence on humanitarian grounds. The figure in 1996 approached 70.000, making it the single largest refugee group in Sweden at the time (Eastmond, 1998: 164). In the survey of 865 Bosnians and Herzegovinians in Sweden, conducted by the BiH national association in 1995, 85% reported being forcefully removed from their homes (Medić et al., 1996: 82).

Implosion of the national association of Yugoslavs in 1990, as well as the arrival of refuges from BiH after early 1992, resulted in creation of the national association of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sweden. The association was established in June 1992 in Örebro (Medić, 1995: 154). Although formally opened to all citizens of BiH, with the idea of catering for the needs of all BiH citizens in Sweden, in practice, the national association of BiH became ethnically homogenous, including primarily Bosniak members (Medić, 1995: 148). Many Bosnian Serbs and Croats apparently chose to join the already established Croatian and Serbian associations of political and labour migrants who arrived to Sweden during 1960's (Eastmond, 1998: 164). This division seems to have persisted twenty years later. According to interviews conducted in 2010 with the leading members of the national association of BiH, as well as with the members of local BiH associations, members of this network are primarily Bosniak migrants in Sweden. Reportedly, most Bosnian Croats and Serbs who are active in diasporic networks chose to do so within the existing Croatian and Serbian national associations.[4]

The official funding and support policy of the Swedish state has had a significant impact on the activities of various national associations in Sweden, including the work of the national association of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, leaders of Bosnian national associations in Sweden state that they all work in the association on a semi-professional basis, with the Swedish state providing the primary funding for their activities. However, although the BiH national association would like to focus its activities more towards BiH, the Swedish government requires that certain projects have to be based on and oriented towards Sweden, rather than towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.[5] Most of the activities take place in the areas of language and educational promotion, organization of sport and cultural events, and humanitarian projects on a smaller scale.[6] In essence, the national association has a role of preserving homeland identity in a broader Swedish context of a host country, and performing certain social services on behalf of Swedish state. Conditioned by Swedish domestic developmental priorities, transnational activities of the national association of BiH remain limited to raising awareness about voting in the elections in BiH, and organisation of smaller humanitarian actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[7] Transnational capacity of national associations is likely to receive a further blow with promulgation of a new state policy aiming to abandon altogether the state funding for national associations and, instead, to support only multicultural associations.[8] Considering that a majority of conflict-generated migrants from BiH are not actively involved in Bosnian national associations,[9] the following section of this paper discusses the trends among individual members of Bosnian migrant community in Sweden, in order to more systematically explore the scope and dynamics of Bosnian transnational practices.

Survey data from Sweden

Data in Sweden was collected in 2010 by the author and Jonathan Hall (Hall and Kostić, 2010). We used survey consisting of 71 questions to inquire about integration in Sweden, transnational activities, and reconciliation. Stratified sample was used in order to make parts of data comparable with surveys conducted in BiH by Kostić in 2005 and 2010. Census data in Sweden does not include ethnicity. Thus, the only way of creating stratified sample in Sweden was by using Bosniak, Croat, and Serb surnames.[10] A pool of 180 surnames was collected through reading newspapers and portals in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In each stratum, surnames were ordered alphabetically after which we chose every third surname on the list. Individuals were located by searching Sweden's online public listings.[11] Since these listings are geo-referenced, the survey is able to give us a fairly good geographical distribution of Bosniak, Croat, and Serb migrants in Sweden. Each surname search resulted in a list of individual names with addresses, including a map with their geographic location in Sweden. In order to control for the variable of the respondents' country of origin, a question concerning their national origin was included in the survey. In this way, we could analyse only those respondents that came from Bosnia and Herzegovina, excluding the respondents from other countries of former Yugoslavia. Additionally, in order to control for the variable of ethnic belonging of the respondents, we included an open-ended question about their ethnic identity. Respondents were selected proportionally by location (urban/rural). The survey covered the whole Sweden. It was translated into the native language of the respondents and distributed by mail. It also included a cover letter providing basic information about the aim of the project. The collection of data was finished in 2010, and response rate was 28% (N=714) (for more information on response rate, see Hall, 2013).

Transnational activities

Typology of transnational practices of migrants covers a wide range of activities such as cross-border voting, migrant rallies against injustices in the country of origin, or engagement in the projects of their national associations implemented in the homeland (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006:761). The concept of 'core' or 'narrow' transnationalism are often used to define activities that are regular, and consist an integral part of an individual's life. 'Expanded' or 'broad' transnationalism refers to practices which are more occasional (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006: 761).

The choice of indicators of transnational activities in this paper is based on the existing studies in the field (Al-Ali et al., 2001; Snel et al., 2006). According to Snel et al. (2006: 289), transnational activities are "cross-border activities in the true sense of the word, such as money transfers, or visits to and political participation in the country of origin". These are classified in four categories: everyday economic activities, professional economic activities, political activities, and social and cultural activities. Fifteen indicators are used to capture the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of transnationalism among the survey respondents.

Our survey questions address these four dimensions. Political activities include keeping up with political events in BiH, frequency of voting in state elections, being a member of a political party, and giving money to a political party. Social and cultural activities include frequency of contact with friends and family in BiH (via email, telephone, etc.), the frequency of discussing politics, the frequency of discussing the war, frequency of return visits, frequency of giving money for community projects, and being a member of a social organization in BiH. Everyday economic activities include owning a house, and frequency of sending remittances to BiH, while professional economic activities include investing in businesses, travelling to BiH for business, and conducting trade with other businesses.

Some of the key characteristics of the sample

Women consist 42.5% of respondents in our sample. The mean age is 44.6 years. High school degrees were obtained by 51.05% of respondents, while 36.75% completed one year or more of university studies. 67.65% are married. Before the war, 70.4% lived in urban settlements. In terms of ethnic representation, 28% of the respondents from BiH identify themselves as Bosniaks, 27% as Croats, 26% as Serbs, and 15% as Yugoslavs.

Our survey findings confirm the figures from the national association of BiH collected in 1995 regarding the violence being the main cause of migrations (Medić et al., 1996: 82). Namely, the majority of our respondents (82%) arrived in Sweden between 1988 and 1998. The majority (61%) describes their arrival to Sweden as caused by humanitarian reasons, and 13% cite political reasons. The majority (69%) report having lost property as the result of the war. In addition, many interviewees (42%) are missing a close family member due to the war. Some respondents were either wounded (8%) or imprisoned in a camp during the war (10%). Finally, 15% acknowledges participation in fighting units.

Exploring the transnational engagements of conflict-generated migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina

This section examines the transnational activities that directly link conflict-generated migrants in Sweden with Bosnia and Herzegovina politically, economically, socially, and culturally. Considering diversification of migrants from BiH, the data is presented by ethnic identity. As noted, 15% of survey participants identify themselves as Yugoslavs, warranting the inclusion of this group in the analysis. The data presented in Table 1 shows the percentage of respondents within each group exhibiting a high level of engagement in each cross-border activity. The data is organized in four categories: political activities, social and cultural activities, everyday economic activities, and professional economic activities.

Table 1: High level of engagement in transnational activities by national identity (percent)

	National Identity				
	Bosniaks	Serbs	Croats	Yugoslav	Total
Political activities					
Keeps up with political events daily	46	20	52	34	46
Has voted at least twice in national elections	18	9	10	3	11
Members of a political party	4	1	6	3	3
Gives money to a political party	4	3	1	0	2
Social and cultural activities					
Monthly contact by telehone, email, etc	80	86	79	70	80
Discusses politics with family at least twice year	50	35	45	24	41
Discusses war with family at least twice year	48	18	35	17	32
Vistis twice a year	8	12	12	8	10
Gives money for community projects	19	4	5	3	10
Members of a social organization	4	1	2	2	2
Everiday economic activities					
Owns a house	58	58	51	43	54
Sends remittances at least once a year	82	63	62	63	78
Professional economic activities					
Invests in businesses	28	27	23	22	25
Travel to BiH or business	25	22	28	18	24
Conducts trade with BiH businesses	9	7	10	9	9

There are numerous interesting trends noted in this data. Most common is the high level of contact via, for example, email and telephone with family and friends living in BiH. The vast majority stays in contact on a monthly basis, and the most active groups are Bosnian Serbs (86%) and Bosniaks (80%). Interestingly, while Bosnian Croats and Serbs seem to visit BiH more often (12% visit twice a year), Bosniaks are by far most active in donating money for community projects (19%).

Regarding the social exchange, i.e. the transfer of migrants' cultural and social norms on their homeland counterparts and vice versa (see Levitt, 1998), the data show that a sizeable proportion of respondents discuss both politics and the war on a monthly basis with their friends and family in BiH. Bosniaks are most engaged in these discussions, 50% of whom discuss politics and 48% the war at least twice a year. They are followed by Bosnian Croats. Bosnian Serbs and Yugoslavs seem to be least likely to discuss politics and war with their relatives back home. Thus, given that BiH migrants in Sweden are generally more moderate in comparison to their kin in BiH (Hall, 2013), Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats arguably have the greatest potential for making a normative impact on their kin in terms of issues of peace and development in BiH.

In terms of political activities, 47% of interviewees report keeping up with political events in BiH on a daily basis. Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats appear to be most informed with regards to this issue, with 46% and 52%, respectively. In terms of political participation, Bosniaks are twice as likely to have voted at least twice in BiH elections; 18% of them reported voting at least twice in national elections in BiH, in comparison to 9% of Bosnian Serbs and 10% of Bosnian Croats. Interestingly, very few respondents in any national group report being a member of or giving money to a political party; the few that do it are Bosniaks. Based on these findings we can conclude that BiH migrants in Sweden tend to be well informed about the political situation in the BiH. However, direct political participation is limited among the conflict-generated migrants from BiH. It is largely Bosniaks who have some direct influence on homeland politics through voting.

Data on the economic activities of BiH migrants in Sweden tells us more about their influence on reconstruction and development in their country of origin. The data shows that the frequency of sending remittance varies greatly between Bosniaks and other national groups. 82% of Bosniaks send remittances to friends and family in BiH at least once a year, in comparison to 63% Bosnian Serbs and 62% Bosnian Croat respondents. The percentage of those owning a house in BiH is equally high among Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs (58%), although it is also high among Bosnian Croats (51%) and Yugoslavs (43%). A rather large minority of respondents in all groups invest in businesses (25%) or report travelling to BiH for business (24%). However, only 9% of the respondents conduct business with companies in BiH.

In summary, the data indicate that the conflict-generated migrants from BiH are truly transnational. Respondents seem to be well informed about events in the homeland and engage in several transnational activities simultaneously. While engagement in some form is generally common across all groups, Bosniak migrants in Sweden are somewhat more active participating in elections in their native country, but also report contributing economically to a larger extent, through practices of personal remittances and support of communal projects.

Conclusions

According to the existing theory in the literature from the civil war, it is anticipated that conflict-generated migrants will be particularly opposed to and will act against peace and conflict resolution in their country of origin. However, systematic exploration of transnational activities in this paper shows that the engagement of conflict-generated migrants can be conducive to peacebuilding in the native country. In terms of observed trends, transnational activities, particularly the economic remittances to relatives in BiH, seem to be particularly common. Another interesting finding relates to capacities of formal national associations in terms of individual migrants promoting political and economic development in their native country. In case of Sweden, the host country funds, conditions, and directs the activities of the BiH national association towards its own developmental priorities, thus limiting the scope of transnational economic and political activities aimed towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Instead, the well-informed individual migrants seem to be true transnationals in the Bosnian case.

Although a quarter of conflict-generated migrants report investing in business in BiH, our data reveals that most common economic activity among Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serb migrants in Sweden includes personal remittances to their relatives. Considering that BiH migrants reportedly contribute approximately 13% of Bosnian GDP, the predominant money transfer pattern constitutes a long-term challenge for BiH economic development.[12] Most senders belong to the first generation migrants in Sweden with strong family connections in BiH. However, when a generational shift eventually takes place, there is a considerable risk that remittances will dwindle due to weaker connections and a lower sense of solidarity of the second-generation migrants with their family members in Bosnia. In light of these imminent challenges, BiH state institutions should more actively engage the migrant community, and provide incentives for alternative patterns of migrants' political and economic contributions towards continued peace and development at home.

Notes

[1]This paper differentiates between conflict-generated migrants and diaspora. Conflict-generated migrants are defined as migrants who were forced to flee in order to escape violence and persecution (Lischer, 2007). On the other hand, members of diaspora are those migrants who are active in organizations through which they maintain a collective memory of their homeland, and preserve a distinct identity within the host country (Brubaker, 2005: 5).

[2]The case of Bosnian conflict-generated migrants in Sweden seems to refute Koinova's sovereignty argument. In Hall's study, Bosniaks, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb migrants in Sweden are more moderate than their kin in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hall, 2013). However, if we look at the status of respective sovereignty demands during the conflict (in very simplified terms, the Bosnian Serb leadership fought for secession from BiH, the Bosnian Croat elite fought for an extensive ethno-territorial autonomy within a very decentralised BiH, while the Bosniak leadership preferred a unified state and centralised government), the Dayton peacebuilding compromise did not fully satisfy sovereignty demands of either of the three communities. Hence, one would have expected to encounter more extremism among BiH conflict-generated migrants in the peacebuilding phase, if Koinova's sovereignty argument was to hold.

[3]A partial exception to this is Snel et al. (2006), who explore a wide variety of transnational activities among a snowball sample of six diaspora populations, two of which would be considered conflict-generated: 50 respondents from Iraq, and 50 respondents from the entire former Yugoslavia.

[4]The leading members of Croatian and Serbian national associations have described this situation during the round table talk among the leaders of BiH, Croatian, and Serbian national associations in Uppsala. The discussion, sponsored by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was organised by the author, Jonathan Halla, and Ashok Swain in December 2008 in Uppsala.

[5]This view was conveyed during interviews with a number of respondents active in the BiH national association in Sweden in 2010.

[6]Opinions expressed during the workshop in Uppsala, December 2008.

[7]This information was conveyed during interviews with respondents active in the BiH national association in Sweden. Fourteen interviews were conducted during 2010 and 2011.

[8]Shift in the policy that is currently under development should be seen as a way of the current Swedish government to address failure of integration of certain immigrant communities, particularly of the Somalis, as well as the way to deal with the rise in popularity of the extreme right-wing Swedish Democrats.

[9]While national associations may have many registered members, the number of people actively working within the association is in decline. This view was corroborated in 2010 by respondents who are active in the BiH national association.

[10]According to the Swedish Statistic Bureau, there were 54.000 people originating from BiH living in Sweden in 2010 (Swedish Statistic Bureau, 2010).

[11]See www.eniro.se.

[12]For more information, see *Dijaspora spašava ekonomiju BiH i Srbije*, Buka portal, www.buka.ba, accessed on October 16, 2012.

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Swedish "Exceptionalism" Revisited:
The Case of Socio-Economic and Political Integration of Immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s

Abstract

Against the exceptional standing of the Swedish model of immigrant integration according to various indices that assess the advancement of multiculturalism and integration policies across countries of integration, the paper presents preliminary results of a study which aims to identify institutional and individual factors of socioeconomic integration and political acculturation of well-integrated migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina. It draws on a qualitative analysis of biographically oriented interviews with a selected number of well-educated informants characterized by successful economic and political integration in Sweden. By differentiating between a group of economically integrated individuals on the one hand, and a group of individuals actively integrated in the Swedish party politics on the other, it aims to identify and critically analyze different institutional conditions for, and individual strategies of integration in economic and political life, the respective extent and quality of political acculturation and sense of belonging. The main findings of the study support the argument that adequate formal integration policies have to be in place, but their impact is contingent on the implementation mode that recognizes immigrants' agency and individual goals of integration.

Key words: *Bosnia and Herzegovina refugees, political integration, Swedish integration model, welfare state, citizenship*

Introduction

Immigrant integration involves complex processes of social transformation and cultural adaptation that are set in a broader framework of migration and involve migrants' interaction with both host and home communities. This broader understanding of integration emphasizes the migrants' interaction with different, historically and culturally framed institutional contexts of host societies, specifically mediated by national welfare states and related concept of citizenship. Previous studies (Pennix and Martiniello, 2004:142; POLITIS, 2008:34) have underlined that the interaction of immigrants with the host society and its institutions is fundamentally asymmetric, and that the host society and its policy play a more important role for the integration outcome than the immigrants themselves. Integration is, however, a contested concept that has been used in the literature covering everything from 'objective' indicators focusing on the labour market, formal citizenship or housing patterns, to subjective feelings of empowerment and belonging (cf. Marshall, 1950; Brubaker, 1992). It also indicates that there is a real and important 'subjective' side to integration of which we, however, know very little thus far.

The paper addresses the Swedish policy model for integration of immigrants, scoring high according to several rankings, such as the MIPEX III ranking (Migrant Integration Policy Index) (cf. Huddleston *et al.*, 2011) and the Multiculturalism Policy Index - MPI (cf. Banting and

Kymlicka, 2012). The focus is on the socioeconomic and political integration of immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina that arrived to Sweden in the 1990s and had shown a strong integration capacity. Against the background of this integration "success", the paper presents the preliminary results of a wider research, which is set out to identify institutional and individual factors of socioeconomic integration and political acculturation of well integrated migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sweden. The paper draws on a qualitative analysis of biographically-oriented interviews with a selected number of well-educated informants characterized by successful economic and political integration. We differentiate between a group of economically integrated individuals on the one hand, and a group of individuals actively integrated in the Swedish party politics on the other. Consequently, we explore the impact of institutional conditions, integration policies, and individual strategies for integration in the economic and political life, and the respective extent and quality of political and socio-economic integration. The study is a part of a larger comparative project "Citizens at Heart" that investigates the impact of variations in welfare regimes and political institutions on the processes of migrant integration in Sweden, Germany, and Great Britain.

Following the short presentation of the Swedish integration model and its development, the paper provides a brief background on the refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the path of their asylum-seeking in Sweden. While these sections are based on previous studies (Cf. Lemaitre, 2007; Bevelander, 2011; Povrzanović Frykman, 2012), the following two sections present our research results on the economic and political integration of the selected interviewees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and their respective sense of belonging.

Swedish integration model

The Swedish "consensual social democratic welfare model" has institutionalised active integration policies early on. According to this model, the immigrants are entitled to generous universal welfare benefits and access to citizenship rights. These entitlements enable the so-called de-commodification of labour market (Esping-Andersen, 1990), as well as a high level of political integration. It is not surprising that Sweden scores extremely well in various rankings that use indices to assess the advancement of multiculturalism and integration policies across countries. For example, Swedish commitment to multiculturalist policies, equal treatment, and voluntary rights-based forms of civic integration has led to Sweden ranking first on the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), a composite measure of integration in seven different policy areas, ranging from labour market and family reunion, to political participation.

Sweden has come a long way from a guest workers model of immigration, which was put in place in the 1950s and 1960s in order to meet high labour market demands related to high pace of industrialisation in the country. In the 1970s, it became obvious that guest workers, mostly coming from Finland and Southern Europe, and particularly from the former Yugoslavia, had chosen to settle. When labour immigration decreased following the manufacturing crisis of the 1970s, it was replaced by the persistently increasing refugee immigration that peaked in the beginning of the 1990s, when 84.000 asylum seekers from war-stricken Iraq, former Yugoslavia and several African countries were received during 1992 (Lemaitre, 2007). Since 1985, the Swedish Immigration Board was given the dual responsibility for reception of refugees, processing asylum applications, and integration of immigrants who obtained the residence permit. The integration model consisted of relocation of immigrants to municipalities in line with dispersal and housing policy, and a two-year long introduction program financed by the state and administered by the municipalities. The standard

introduction program included Swedish language education (Swedish for Immigrants - SFI), preparing the immigrants for labour market integration through recognition of qualifications and vocational training, facilitated by local employment offices. After three years in Sweden, the immigrants obtain the right to vote on local and regional elections, and after five years, they are entitled to Swedish citizenship according to the liberal and voluntary model of civic integration. In 2001, by the Act of Citizenship, Sweden affirmed dual citizenship.

While immigrants with a residence permit or citizenship are awarded generous universal welfare benefits and/or citizenship rights, the administrative integration model has not been able to counter the discriminatory bureaucratic practices, nor labour market and housing segmentation and discrimination, aggravated by the economic crisis in the 1990s. A huge inflow of refugees and asylum seekers in the 1990s, in the context of the most severe economic downturn after the Second World War and rocketing unemployment, particularly among the foreign-born people, challenged almost all components of the integration model. Persistent unemployment of immigrants, ethnic discrimination in the labour market, and populist responses to migration-related emergencies caused a shift in public concerns and the policy focus to the issues of migration, multiculturalism, and labour market integration. In 1997, the Swedish government issued the bill *Sverige, framtiden och mångfalden - från invandrarpolitik till integrationspolitik [Sweden, the Future and Diversity: from Immigration Policy to Integration Policy]* (Prop. 1997/98:16) that formulated policy goals in terms of integration and multiculturalism. The shift from the immigration towards the integration policy was also reinforced by the establishment of the Swedish Integration Board, an agency responsible for pursuing the stated goals of integration and multiculturalism.

The post-1997 integration policy has had some questionable results, such as the inclusion of immigrants into political life and state institutions, creating new immigrant elites, as well as keeping the rise of xenophobia and populism in check. However, critical studies maintain that this policy has not been able to offset a discriminatory labour market and ethnic patterns of exclusion (Schierup, Hansen and Castles, 2006). In 2003, the unemployment rates of the foreign-born people in Sweden remained at 11 percent, among the highest in the OECD countries. Employers have consistently disregarded foreign education and working experience, while the recruitment practices relied on social networks and connections, especially in the private sector (Lemaitre, 2007).

The question is whether it is possible to talk about "Swedish exceptionalism", since the Swedish formal integration policy stands out as the most immigrant-friendly model in all the assessments of integration and multiculturalism policies in place, supported by positive public attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Eurobarometer, 2009). This question can be investigated by addressing another "exceptionalism", that of a relatively successful integration of refugees from war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s

Between 1990 and 1995, almost 60.000 resettled refuges and asylum seekers received permanent residence permits in Sweden. By 2008, 80.000 people of Bosnian origin lived in Sweden, and some 50.000 obtained Swedish citizenship. According to STATIV (2007) Bosnians have been relatively more successful in labour market integration. A recent study maintains that "(i)ndividuals from BosniaHerzegovina, both males and females, have the highest odds of employment, compared to the other place of birth groups or admission status" (Bevelander, 2011:43). Close to one fourth of immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina were university educated and almost half of the population had a secondary education. The case of

Bosnians thus supports the previous research on immigrant integration, which found that higher education enhances the probability of employment (Ekberg and Ohlson, 2000).

However, this overly positive integration outcome has also been questioned. Drawing on interviews with immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Maja Povrzanović Frykman (2012) claims that this rosy picture does not account for their "struggles for recognition" and insurmountable obstacles on the path of searching for a job. She points to deficiencies in the implementation of the formal integration model and the significant role of "chance" and "connections", which may both enable and hinder the possibilities of finding adequate employment. This especially applies in the case of individuals with university degrees in social sciences, law, and humanities, many of whom have lost hope of finding a job comparable to that in their homeland. Nevertheless, she also emphasizes how these people share the subjective satisfaction with their life in Sweden, in spite of the lack of occupational recognition and the downward mobility. This feeling is nurtured by a reliance on the family, pride in one's children's achievements, and a comforting socialization, primarily with people with a shared exile experience, regardless of ethnic origin and new professional standing (Povrzanović Frykman, 2012). However, these findings also need to be compared with the experiences of those individuals from Bosnia and Herzegovina who actually "made it", that is, the individuals who attained occupational recognition and found their way into the Swedish economic and political life, in spite of the institutional and structural obstacles.

Successful economic integration and beyond

In order to address this question, we use biographically oriented interviews with a selected number of well-educated informants characterized by successful economic and political integration. We selected persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina who arrived to Sweden in the 1990s and were between twenty and forty years old on arrival, having their formative period of socialization behind them. Thus far, we have interviewed twelve professionally successful individuals, four women (a dentist specialist, a construction engineer, a social worker, a biomedical engineer/agricultural studies) and eight men (a construction engineer/IT specialist, a high school teacher, an economist/warehouse supervisor, an economist/accountant, a chemical engineer/communal environment quality coordinator, an associate professor/researcher in chemistry, a doctoral student/writer, veterinarian/ agriculture/chief of sales for the department agricultural products). We also formed a focus group consisting of seven individuals (a lawyer, two university teachers, an MD, a psychologist, an architect, and an economist) in order to brainstorm their experiences and understanding of integration process.

Challenging the integration system and the struggle for professional recognition

Our interviewees had different social, educational, and ethnic backgrounds, and were initially displaced to different municipalities from the far north to the south of Sweden. They also pursued various paths of integration beyond those set by the functional, one-way integration measures provided by the state that were variably implemented across regions. However, all our informants share several common characteristics. First, they made a decision to learn Swedish and to integrate early on. Second, they were ambitious and determined to pursue professional recognition and, in that quest, they strongly challenged the integration measures whenever they felt discriminated or treated as objects of integration policy. Third, they did not take at face value the officially provided information on the rights, responsibilities, and existing supporting structure. Actually, most of our interviewees point to the weak support

and misleading information received from the Employment Service officers. They testified of being advised not to pursue the path of professional recognition and further education. Instead, they were told, or compelled, to give up and take low-skilled jobs or inadequate vocational education, which they thought of as time-wasting.

Fourth, they used social networks, both ethnic and Swedish, to gather all relevant information about available jobs, vocational training, and especially the tailored high quality educational programs and internships. In this networking process, "chance" or "luck" seems important, for example, meeting a right Swedish person or the already well-established countrymen, who provided information, advice, support, and job references when needed. They engaged in various Swedish associations, music, and sports clubs early, which were shown to be important fields of integration through socializing with the Swedish people.

Fifth, once they recognized an opportunity, they had the capacity to persuade employment and/or social service officers - and even make strong demands, if necessary - to be supported towards the chosen goal. For example, a construction engineer, who is today a highly respected business systems specialist, and whose assistant directed him to an allegedly "wonderful course that will lead you towards employment in your profession", was horrified when he found out that he was to study basic mathematics for a year in order to qualify for welfare support. When he finally located, applied to and qualified for an adequate course in programming, he was not supported by his assistant. By that time, he was armed with language skills and information on his rights, and was able to make a powerful demand. He went to the Head of the Migration Board Office and threatened to go to the "press to publish the story of the way the educated people are treated...More or less, that dialogue with them is not too important, it was about my readiness to really fight to the end, even to contact the press and do everything possible... to show that people who want to advance are prevented by certain illegitimate persons."

Last, but not least, in case of being disqualified by the administrators of the introduction program, our interviewees also decided to take advantage of the Swedish universal system of high school and university education, including educational and housing support and to utilize the welfare system and citizenship rights towards the realization of "occupational citizenship".

Political and social integration: between citizenship and belonging

In spite of the institutional obstacles fought in the process of finding a job and the path to occupational recognition, these economically integrated individuals feel politically integrated, and share the trust in the political system, although that trust has declined with time and a more in-depth knowledge of the system. Overall, all our informants appreciate the Swedish welfare and corporatist labour market regime and emphasize the need to "start working as soon as possible, to pay taxes, and to engage in this society". They are well informed and vote for parties, disregarding the ethnic profile of the party representatives. Many are members of trade unions, and some of them are active. Most of our informants pragmatically applied for Swedish citizenship as soon as possible, even if that implied a formal renouncement of the citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only two of them, claiming a strong Bosniak identity, waited until Sweden formally accepted dual citizenship. This brings us to the issue of belonging and social integration.

When asked if they feel socially integrated, our informants give varied answers. On one end, we have individuals such as the above quoted informant, who claims, "For me, integration is when you simply do not depend on anyone and that you can create, me and my

wife, naturally, normal family living conditions, and when you respect the applicable laws of the state. I am not politically engaged in any Swedish organization, and I have no time for it." This person is also actively engaged in the Association of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On the other end, we have a peculiar example of one of our "luckiest" informants, an economist who, through Swedish acquaintances, attended the "right" course, which lead him to the "right" traineeship and the "right" job. In spite of all that, he states: "I am 100 percent integrated, but I do not feel well. I don't mean in everyday life, but I'm missing something." There is also a disappointment in not being fully professionally recognized, which was shared by several of our informants. The lack of realization of "occupational citizenship" also undermines their sense of belonging to Sweden. For example, a female dentist has now experienced the "glass ceiling" in career advancement, defined by feminist researchers as a level above which you cannot rise without great difficulty, strife, and struggle. She states that "career advancement is, in a way, leading to a decline in social integration, according to my personal feeling."

Last but not least, there are also cases where being Swedish is understood as a platform for multiculturalism, Europeanism, and internationalism. One of our youngest informants, a writer and a doctoral student, stated that he was initially "totally in love with Sweden", but has come to appreciate international contacts and multiculturalism, stating that "living between two cultures (or more than two) can be very positive." When asked about his understanding of integration, he responded:

"that, in some way, it needs to be connected with some kind of, what I would call emotional integration, which means that a man finds his place in this new society, and that this new society, for example, brings about nearly the same amount of emotion as the old society; I think that most of us are struggling with that, but, in political terms, I feel as an equal citizen of this country."

Our informants confirm the study by Povrzanović Frykman (2012) with regards to socialization with predominantly fellow countrymen with whom they share similar experience of the asylum seeking, and common cultural frames originating in popular music, films, jokes, and culture from the former Yugoslavia. They all use Internet and follow politics both in Sweden and in the Balkans, and all help their families in the homeland. However, their sense of identity and belonging has developed beyond the duality between the host and home countries, towards some kind of transnationalism (see Roland Kostić in this Volume). It seems that this group is, by their own choosing, less socially integrated with Swedish people than the group of interviewees who are political activists. This issue is addressed in the next section.

Politically integrated refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina

Within the comparative study, we made an early decision to pay specific attention to individuals from Bosnia and Herzegovina who had "made it" into the official Swedish political system. We are here referring to refugees who hold positions at the national, regional, or municipal level, elected either by appearing high enough on the party lists, or by being selected as party members to represent the party in particular boards and councils at the local level. Our respondents were five men and five women, living in the south, west, and central part of Sweden. All but one came to Sweden as refugees from the war-ridden Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 90s. One is, however, born in Sweden by Bosnian parents and is, therefore, different with respect to experiences and motivations. Six of the respondents are social-democrats, two belong to the "Moderates" (the largest centre/liberal party that started out as conservative in the early 20th century), and two are "Centrists" (for a long time, the centre party was called "Rural" or "Farmers'" party, but changed its name in the 1970s).

The refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina arrived in Sweden at a time when the growing multi-ethnic character of the Swedish society was beginning to show more distinctly, also paving the way for the populist and immigration-negative party "New Democracy" in the 1991 parliamentary elections. However, Social-Democrats were voted back in government in the 1994 elections, after one of the worst economic crises that Sweden has experienced. However, in the time of need, the established political parties became all the more actively aware of the need to attract immigrant voters and to include as activists the persons with non-Swedish background. Therefore, they actively engaged in the recruitment of immigrants, both at work and through associational life, which may be a part of the explanation why, almost unanimously, the respondents fail to acknowledge any difficulties or obstacles from within the political parties as they start to move up the party career ladder. Resistance within the party system is not on the map. "I never encountered difficulties people have pushed me, elected me, and I have not experienced that someone hindered me," one female informant states. This bright picture of the problem-free character of ethnic background is, however, tainted by recollections of difficulties of another kind. One male interviewee, who is a secular Bosniak, stated that, within the refugee group, Serbs do not accept him. "They called the party and asked: why have you proposed a terrorist to the municipal council?"

Coping strategies: acceptance of loss and future orientation

If recruitment at work and associational life constitute channels into political activism, then getting a job precedes these processes. Indeed, several informants mention that getting a job was the crucial turning point in their new lives in Sweden. "When I got a job, it was a big turning point, a turning point, 100%. I stopped thinking about my home country in the way I had before", a female respondent recalls. A job comes with other things, not only that one belongs to the host society much more visibly, obtains a structure and colleagues, but also that working actually makes one contribute to the common sphere by paying taxes (as we will see, taxes are, for some, intimately related to citizenship and integration).

However, even more crucial on a psychological level seems to be the decision of *acceptance,* to accept the situation, the fate of staying on in Sweden, and the losses it causes. Almost all of the respondents, both economically and politically integrated, more or less vividly recall such mental "turning points", with a realization and an acceptance of the fact that the war had profoundly changed Bosnia and Herzegovina and their cities of Sarajevo, Banja Luka, or Mostar, leaving them to cope with a new reality. The initial belief that the war would be over quickly and that people would then be able to return, as expressed by one of our female respondents ("We thought we should stay a year or so and then be able to go back"), transformed into a mental orientation towards Sweden. If we listen to what our respondents tell us, acceptance provides mental energy to tackle the demands of living in the host society: learning a new language, finding a job, getting acquainted with social codes and norms, finding a place of one´s own in the new setting. "I thought that now I am here, now I will make the best of my life here. Many refugees have had a hard time accepting this", one of the most politically successful immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina emphasizes. Hence, the importance of psychological acceptance of a permanent, as opposed to temporary change in life trajectory and re-orientation towards (in this case) Sweden is alluded to in several of the interviews. However, whereas some of the respondents harbour sentiments towards the homeland through maintaining contacts, returning often, and maybe even through promoting political work aimed at improving the situation in Bosnia, others distance themselves from the homeland. However, suppressing the past and looking to the future when faced with turning

points is an important "coping" strategy that enables the person to live in *one* reality and not two parallel ones.

Political work, professional competence and integration issues

The "hostage" theory states that parties legitimize themselves in the eyes of the multi-cultural voters by recruiting certain number of persons of "minority background" for symbolic reasons (Rickne & Folke 2011). Does this seem to be true in the case of political activists coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina? Except for the Swedish-born Bosniak, and, again, notably so, almost all respondents describe the issues they work with as freely chosen out of interest and, in several cases, clearly related to occupational competence, not ethnic background. However, the second-generation of immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina again provides a different perspective which, to a much higher extent, supports the "hostage" theory. Being of a different ethnic background definitely puts one in an integration-and-immigration box, which "is the most important draw-back of all. It is a structural perception - not racism - but nevertheless a structural perception that people with a certain background should be preoccupied with those issues," the Swedish-born Bosniak claims. It might be that the "glass ceiling" still exists in the sense that one can move high if they, as an immigrant, accept and embrace the party´s need for "hostages" or mascots otherwise they encounter mechanisms of resistance as they start to climb.

Whom do the Bosnian activists regard as those they primarily represent? The picture is ambiguous, although most of the respondents actively reject the idea of being the representatives of Bosnians, or of immigrants in general. "I do not represent the immigrants", one respondent emphasizes, "I represent those who want cultural issues high up on the agenda I cannot just represent Bosnians in Sweden, and not pursue just the issues regarding the Bosnian culture in Sweden." There are, however, those who do think of themselves in terms of immigrant representatives: "I am representing immigrant women. I do think I represent immigrants and in some places you are allowed to say that".

What is integration?

The political activists compose a group that is actively confronted with questions of integration and policies of integration, even if they do not pursue such questions themselves. Their views on integration encompass its reciprocal character that being integrated rests on the acceptance of the new situation and the host society by the immigrant, as well as the acceptance by the majority population and the symbolic role played by employment which, in turn, allows the immigrants to economically contribute to the new country through taxes. "When you have a job or a business, you are integrated. We pay taxes and so I am Swedish," emphasized a male Bosniak politician, who also is a successful entrepreneur. For one respondent, citizenship is even equal to paying taxes. It is noticeable that a job, as a major road to integration, not only has a psychological and affective side, in that the immigrants meet people of the host society and feel themselves worthy, but also embodies a distinctly concrete aspect through taxes which makes one a part in building the public good. One moves from having rights, to also having the right to demand (for themselves and for others). This is an important transition.

Do these politically and socially integrated persons feel fully integrated? The lack of even a mild resistance and what many describe as warm support from other activists when engaging in party politics, may still be co-existing with a "glass ceiling", a career stage which

cannot easily be transcended. A single respondent who has secured a seat in the national parliament explains that "to be nominated to the parliamentary list on an "electorable" seat is not an easy thing, not everybody likes you... but I am not the sort of person who wants to see difficulties or obstacles". Interestingly, the one respondent born in Sweden definitely testifies to such a "glass ceiling" within his party, the "Moderates". He laments a party culture which fosters conformity and ethnic homogeneity. Indirectly, he confirms that the difficulties in obtaining influential posts and high-positioned assignments are fully compatible with the welcoming of persons of different ethnic background into the parties. "But then, you must look at which positions they get".

Conclusion

Although Swedish model of immigrant integration pronounces universal rights and equal treatment, our interviewees testify of a discrepancy between the policy of integration and multiculturalism and practices of their implementation that often treat migrants as policy objects. Our study supports the arguments that adequate formal integration policies have to be in place, but their impact is contingent on the implementation mode that recognizes immigrants' agency and individual goals of integration. Equipped with language skills, information on their rights, social capital, and strong belief in own skills and professional capacity, economically integrated respondents have strongly challenged integration policies whenever they felt discriminatory. They used citizenship and universal rights as an instrument to pursue professional recognition and open a field of possibilities for themselves and their children. They feel politically integrated, value the Swedish welfare model and political system, and feel obliged to contribute to the society by paying taxes. However, they do not feel socially integrated and they socialize less with Swedish colleagues and more with fellow countrymen with whom they share similar experiences of asylum seeking, common cultural frames originating in popular music, films, jokes and culture from the former Yugoslavia. They all use Internet and follow politics both in Sweden and in the Balkans, and all help their families in homeland. However, their sense of identity and belonging has developed beyond the duality between the host and home countries, towards some kind of transnationalism.

But, the political activists we interviewed feel socially integrated as well; their political work in itself is an indicator of a strong attachment to the Swedish society. What seems to unite these activists in their process of integration is an early acceptance of the permanence of staying in Sweden, and coming to terms with the loss of Bosnia, which leads to devoting energy and orientation towards the existence in Sweden. Their way into political work mostly went through the work-place and recruitment there, and, overall, the experience with political work in the parties they represent has clearly been positive, thus reinforcing their ties with the Swedish society. They do not confess to being treated as hostages or mascots, but instead work with political issues that relate to their specific competence. There does not seem to be any feelings of enforced representation of immigrants or Bosnians in particular. However, many of our respondents are not top-politicians; they are street-level politicians instead. There are some indications that a different and less inclusive logic may be at work as ones aspirations to influence and political power increases. The "honey-moon" that is described to us here may thus be replaced by the "glass-ceiling" as we come higher, the experience which is shared both by political activists and professionally successful immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Notes

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Nation-State and Diaspora in the Context of Globalization

Abstract

Disappearance of the nation-state in the process of globalization was something to be expected. However, with the analysis of the diaspora and through the indicators of spatialization, we are referring to the transformation, or, rather, an adaptation of the logic of state institutions. There are numerous indicators that, in the process of globalization, the state itself "spills over" its borders, thus linking the national interests with the groups living outside the national territory. Statehood politics, representations, voting, culture, religion, or symbolic set of identities multiply in the relations between the diaspora and the homeland.

What is the role of the diaspora in the functional and structural context, which globalization introduces to the changes in the functioning of state institutions? Which perspectives of the development can be drawn from a comparative analysis of the diaspora in the Balkans?

Key words: *Diaspora, ethnicization, globalization, transnationalism*

Introduction

Disappearance of the nation-state in the process of globalization was something to be expected.

The prevalent equation for many centuries of one territory equals one state, equals one nation (politically), equals one language, equals one culture was definitely shaken by the process of globalization.

The social phenomenon of the diaspora is a sort of a forerunner of globalization, and ergo, in direct contradiction with the logic of national institutions. Spatialization and transnationalism, as the most important provisions of the concept of the diaspora, point to a diametrical difference between the diaspora and territoriality, as an important state and national attribute (in the political sense).

However, in the analysis of the diaspora through its abovementioned provisions, one cannot avoid the paradigm of the national. Specifically, in the last twenty years, the process of "ethnicization" in the form of transnational nationalism (Kastoryano, 2006), had a significant influence on redefining the concept of the diaspora.

On the other hand, in the functional and structural context, the changes brought by globalization impact also the 'transnationalisation' of national institutions. Generally speaking, a symbolic composition of identities multiplies in the relations between the diaspora and the homeland through policies of the state, representation, voting, culture, language, religion, etc. The Ministries of the Diaspora and Migrations are established, the Laws on the Diaspora are passed, investments are made into the Diaspora Assemblies and Associations, etc. This in itself is one of the indicators that, in the process of globalization, the state "spills over" its borders, thus linking the national interests with the groups living outside the national territory.

Additionally, it remains unclear to what extent the government institutions may be "inspired" in their development through the functioning of the diaspora, in the period of globalization and the continuous adjustment to the given social context.

In any case, the limits of the state in the context of the nation-state, are surpassed by the new form of territorialization - invisible and with no established borders and boundaries - thus creating a form of a political community in which the actions are based on the premise of non-territorial i.e. transnational nationalism, which represents a new 'phase' in the history of nationalism.

This conceptual matrix was applied in the comparative analysis of the diaspora from the region of the Western Balkans, focusing on the Croatian, Bosnian, and Serbian diaspora living in France and United States of America (with particular focus on the Chicago region, as the largest center of these three diasporas). This paper will present only the theoretical part of the analysis derived from the general and common characteristics of all three diasporas. In this context, it is important to note that the area of the Western Balkans is not familiar with the political practice of nation-state but, due to its history, it was familiarized with the concept of communitarianism which will later influence the tendency to form national states. Bearing in mind the fact that the national framework does not coincide with national distribution, this review makes an essential difference between the so-called state diaspora and the national diaspora.

In addition to this complexity, it must be noted that diasporas live torn between the political legacy from their country of origin and the political legacy of the host countries that have a different code.

How should we observe the diaspora within that specific social context? What conclusion can be drawn from the comparative analysis of the diaspora from the Western Balkans in the context of globalization, focusing on the Croatian, Bosnian, and Serbian diaspora?

The concept of diaspora

Popularity of the term *diaspora* in the scientific, as well as the political and media frames, has been growing steadily since the 60s of the twentieth century.[1] In the context of economic globalization, one of the reasons for this is that the Western society, which is organized on the principle of nation-states, was faced with a wave of migrations, which, in turn, is organized on the principle of the so-called "ethnic colonies", where "ethnic networks" represent an important factor of the social mobilization of migrants.

The phenomenon of globalization has influenced, among other things, the process of redefining many social concepts including the concept of the diaspora. The change is reflected in the use of the concept, the change in its content, the symbolic relations of the policies pertaining to the territory, up to the modification of the transfer of certain national attributes on the transnational space which defines the national body outside of the state, i.e. the diaspora.

If our goal is to determine the place and role of the national diaspora in the context of globalization, it is necessary to provide a brief definition of the diaspora and to determine the operational level of the concept used in the analysis. After several centuries of the unchanged use of the term *diaspora*, the definition of the diaspora is constantly evolving since 1968. For operational definition, since we are dealing with the diaspora from the Balkans, an important distinction was made:

- between the national unity of the diaspora (ethnic, religious, political, territorial, local, familial, generational structure, etc), and
- the limits of the national diaspora which is directed towards the motherland (fictional or real) having in mind that the ethnic boundaries are not overlapping with actual state boundaries.

Definition of the diaspora (Greek *diaspeiro* - scattering, dispersion) can be divided (Tölölyan, 1996) in two major categories: traditional, which was used until 1968, and this general category used today. The traditional concept invoked the memory of the nation, the historical collectivity that could be defined, and the religious insignia, while the present-day use of the concept makes a generalization across the national definition of people living outside their home countries.

For several centuries, the concept of the diaspora was used to chronicle the dispersal of the Greeks in Asia Minor and the Mediterranean countries, in order to describe the commercial expansion related to the period between 800 and 600 BC. From the Greek translation of the Bible in the third century, it is used in a religious sense (Hughes, 1996) to indicate, primarily, the Jewish population (Cohen, 1997:118-119). In both cases, at the essence of the concept was the geographic spread of a nation which has its own organization, but has retained a form of identity and belonging to a particular nation over the centuries.

The next major period of change in the definition and in the connotation of the term diaspora in particular, is the nineteenth century, a period of the establishment of the political concept of the nation-state. We must remind that the political structure of nation-states assimilates in itself one people, one territory, one language, and a specific political system. Democracy born from this concept of the nation-state is decidedly national and, as such, excludes the positive connotation that the diaspora can have within its national body. Consequently, the diaspora, a synonym for a forcefully exiled population (Armenians, Jews in Eastern Europe, Greeks displaced by the Treaty of Lausanne[2], etc), essentially has a national definition.

The logic of the national characteristic of the diaspora will be particularly accentuated through national liberation movements (anti-colonial movements, struggle against the communist regime). It should be noted that up to the 1960, a significant distinction was made between the concepts of the diaspora and migrant waves related to the development of capitalism and the creation of new states in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Unlike other concepts of social mobility which imply migrations and more or less define the motive for leaving the country of origin (emigration, economic migration, refugees, political refugees, displaced persons, etc), the concept of the diaspora tends to encompass the overall distribution of a people living outside their country of origin. In this process of the "nationalization" of the diaspora, i.e. the creation of the "ethno-national diaspora", as labeled by Fred Riggs (2000), or providing a context of ethnic identification, ethnic minorities in border states are included in the general category of the diaspora, regardless of the specific characteristics and interstate regulations. The current trend is to use the diaspora as an "expansion of the policy of the native country" which is defined as the center of the overall diasporic discourse.

To summarize, with the development of social sciences in the second half of the 20th century, the concept of diaspora is generalized (a wide range of application of concept), secularized (strictly religious characteristics of the diaspora is abandoned) and trivialized (Passeron, 1991). Assimilated to the notion of emigration and immigration in general, for some sociologists the concept of the diaspora has been "robbed of any sociological meaning and

reintegrated into the national discourse" (Helly, 2006:17). This has become a growing trend since the 1990, when migrants and their descendants, multiply their contacts with the country of origin thanks to the technical progress of transportation and communication, and numerous governments are calling for "patriotism" and mobilizing the emigrants for voting, financial support, lobbying. However, our analysis of the Western Balkans diaspora, although relying on the analysis of the nationalism of the diaspora, seeks to understand a new social phenomenon labeled as the trans-nationalization of the state, through the ethnicized diaspora.

Nation between territory and spatiality

Since the establishment of the concept of nation-states, political sciences have linked the issue of territory with the issue of the nation. Therefore, the community becomes a geopolitical reality only with territory; it becomes a nation with its political and cultural regulations (Lacoste, 1991:1-21). The specificity to this understanding are, of course, the Roma who have never had their own state, i.e. their territorial reference, as well as the population that is defined as migrants in the scientific literature (economic and political emigrants, displaced persons, etc.).

Non-territoriality or trans-territorial space, the value of which increased through globalization, becomes the core of the current research in the study of multiculturalism.

Various communities based on ethnic, religious, or broader cultural principle, rely on transnational solidarity and represent a new national ardor. Specifically, it is the rise of the so-called communitarianism in transnational space. For the guiding principle in our work, it is important that the basis of the theory of transnational nationalism relies on the established relationship between the transnational community and nationalism, and that it is inspired by the studies of the diaspora's nationalism.

The diaspora or the transnational community, which requires militant associative factors in order to function properly, can be found in a dual, paradoxical logic:
- the struggle for egalitarianism within the new community, i.e. the host country, and
- the affirmation of the collective national identity in which the origin, language, and religion play an important role.

This raises the question of how the transnational community is constituted as a national and political community in the territory that is neither its national, nor linguistic, nor cultural territory (host country). In which way does this new type of nationalism becomes legitimate in the process of globalization, even when comes to something as small as not consenting to the cultural pattern of the host country? Let us mention that Schiller and Fouron (2001) specifically cover the experience of the migrants living simultaneously between the two social spaces (the country of origin and the host country), according to whom the essence of this new nationalism in the diaspora "is not to construct a nation-state, but to reconstruct the country of origin". Therein lies the essence of the transnational notion of the state, "reformed" in the transnational space through overall national body.

Globalism and national diaspora

We have seen that the national social movements, the constitution of nations, and national movements gave an ⸮⸮important (national) meaning to the diaspora. However, with the current weakening of the nation-state and national patriotism in the context of globalization, the national diaspora is given new features, in which the space, time, and national institutional ties, whether objective or symbolic, play a major role. However, it's not

just about the importance of the diaspora to the country of origin, but also about the importance of the diaspora for the development of democracy (or even of the concept of democracy) in host countries, which are mainly based on the political principles of the nation-state, in which the rule is the principle of citizenship (Schnapper, Hily, Costa-Lascoux, 2001:12) rather than the national representation (Bordes-Benayoun, Schnapper, 2006).

The process is contradictory. On the one hand, the devaluation of the national idea, patriotism, national unity, integration, and the anti-Western sentiment in the immigrant population has made the diaspora a model of general multiculturalism (Bordes-Benayoun, Schnapper, 2008). On the other hand, the concept of the diaspora, as an expression of a particular social form, currently hides the ideas of ethnicity, national memory, irrational belonging to a national body alienated in spatiality. This contradiction is the very essence of globalization: the parallel behavior of the same social actors is evident in the need to create the supranational and the global, at the same time strengthening the national consciousness. Therefore, it is not surprising that many authors (Vertovec, Cohen, 1999) nearly equate the concepts of the diaspora (as a type of consciousness and as a form of cultural production) and transnationalism (as a form of reconstruction of environments and locations). Of course, in the times of the so-called multiple identities (origin, ethnicity, nationality - to name just a few), it is often impossible to identify a clear border of the social phenomena of the diaspora.

In spite of this, the discourse of the diaspora articulates the alternative public spheres, forms of national consciousness and solidarity that maintain identification outside the national space related to the real or fictional home country.

National diaspora is separated from the motherland, from the borders of the country of origin, from its economy, from everything on which the nation-state rests. In this way, the diaspora creates a postmodern alternative model that is spatial, but not territorial.

Cohesion of the so-called diasporic discourse is reinforced by the presence of two essential cohesive elements:

- capital of the previous emigrant/immigrant groups, or
- a relatively new mass emigration.

Diaspora of the Western Balkans

In the process of identification, organization, and cohesion of the diaspora, two approaches are important: the history of a particular ethnic group (migration waves in a particular historical context) and historiography (i.e. the motivation or compulsion to leave the country of origin).

Western Balkans, which is located on the line of numerous demarcation lines between many different empires, cultures, and religions, is a region that has for centuries significantly contributed to migration movements and today represents a reference that numerous populations are located outside of their native countries. Migrations ranged from military pressures (changes of state borders), political (political refugees, political exiles) or economic conditions (economic migration).

With the Yugoslav wars (1991-1995) and the post-conflict period, the new migratory dynamics and 'geography' raised the question of the specificity of national structures (in terms of the state) and the diaspora, and has led to greater involvement of the state of origin, as well as to the ethnicization of the diaspora.[3]

Our study from 2009 compared the Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian diaspora in France and United States of America (Chicago area). Structurally, these are ethnic diasporas even when they come from the same home country; specifically, from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In addition to war conditions and consequences of the concept of ethnic cleansing, the role of religion and its institutions in the process of ethnicization of the diaspora, as a very strong cohesive factor, is an issue for itself.

Additionally, the fact today is that migrant groups in Western Europe, especially the members of the second and third generations, are more involved in the activities of migrant ethnic groups (the myth of return becomes reality for the members of the first generation who are retired or close to being retired, while the members of the second and third generations more often find themselves in a dual cultural code and are turning to the countries of real or fictional origin). To these highly complex social conditions, we must also add the fact that the professional and educational structure of the new migration is much higher and that the contacts with the community of origin are intensified due to the development of communications technology.

Conclusion

If we define the diaspora as an overall distribution of the members of one nation living outside their native country, and give it a national characteristic, we are left with the question of the concept of the nation from the perspective of the diaspora. Question of the nation, in the political context of the concept, was essentially related to the context of the nation-state or the national state. The diaspora relies on the definition of the nation that includes a community unified around the same ideals, gathered around the same symbols of the past, and looking towards the future with the same myth. Specifically, in the area of the Western Balkans, national space and state space do not overlap. Additionally, the constitution of new countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia caused the new so-called "frontier" diaspora, in addition to the consequences of war and ethnic cleansing. It is evident that this is not a "state" diaspora, but a national diaspora instead. Specifically, the Bosniak diaspora from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Sandžak region (Serbia and Montenegro) presents itself as nationally united in the area of the host country. This is true for both the Serbian and Croatian diaspora in which the religious institutions also have a major role in shaping the national identity. In other words, social cohesion of the national diaspora is ensured through other parameters which surpass the borders of a particular state.

On the other hand, in addition to the national cohesive factor of the ethnic diaspora that is not congruent with the "state diaspora", the analysis points to the phenomenon of the so-called transnational nationalism. Namely, the nation here is situated within the dynamic of relations between the countries of emigration (host countries), immigration, and the policy of the country of origin. In this context, it is important to note the dual cultural code: integration within the host country and the orientation towards the real or fictional country of origin. In other words, the desire to be united around the same project within the national diaspora has been replaced by the search for recognition and legitimacy of the states and/or supranational institutions (UN, European Union) in the transnational community. This is the evolution that is the result of the mobilization of transnational body and the established dynamics between the country of origin and the host country, numerous associations and their actions within different social contexts (which vary from one host country to another).

Notes

[1]It is interesting to quote the analysis of the frequency of the word "diaspora" in the French daily *Le Monde* for the period from 1990 to 2002. Stéphane Dufoix (*Les Diasporas*, PUF, collection "*Que sais-je?*", Paris, 2003) states that in the period from October 2002 to September 2003 the word diaspora appears in 89 articles, as opposed to the previous period, when the number was significantly smaller. The author states that the use of the word diaspora has been trivialized and that it no longer applies only to a single people or religious group, but is also used for social and professional groups.

[2]This Treaty acknowledged the legitimacy of Atatürk in Ankara, established the boundaries of modern Turkey, and caused a massive exchange of population: 1.6 million Greeks from the former Ottoman Empire for 385.000 Muslims from Greece.

[3]It is an "ethno-national diaspora" (Sheffer, 2003).

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(Re)Construction of Local Identities in BiH Diaspora:
Translocal communities in Australia and the United States of America

Abstract

Based on the ethnographies from two Bosnian diaspora contexts, in Australia and the USA, the author argues that translocalism, rather than transnationalism, is a better explanation for the social morphology and lived realities of the migrant groups, including the forms of their social interaction, organisational patterns, cultural practices, and various other activities and actions they engage in, in relation to their homeland as well as to their translocal compatriots in other countries. Translocalism, as practiced by the Bosnian migrant communities, exemplifies how cultural place and embodied local identities transcend geographical space and chronological time and how mobility and attachment to a location are not intrinsically contradictory, but can in fact be complementary processes.

Key words: *Bosnian diaspora, translocalism, transnationalism, zavičaj*

Introduction

Migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina1 (BiH) today represent one of the largest and most geographically widespread migrant communities from the former Yugoslavia. According to the estimates, BiH emigrant community - or BiH diaspora - includes about 1.7 million people, living in approximately 100 countries around the world (Valenta and Ramet, 2011; Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2008). The vast majority of them became migrants as the result of forced displacement during the war of 1992-1995, while the emigration trend continued in the post-war period, generally through the so-called "chain migration", up until 2003, after which the emigration from Bosnia subsided, but did not cease completely. In addition to regional, Western European, and Scandinavian countries, the largest number of Bosnians settled in the so-called "third" countries, i.e. overseas, primarily in the United States of America (USA) and Australia. This article2, based on the ethnographic study of BiH migrant communities in Australia and the USA, discusses some specific circumstances in which these communities (re)constructed themselves in the new socio-cultural environments, as well as the links these communities have established and sustained with their places of origin in BiH.

In most of the countries they migrated to during the period of 1992-1995, the citizens of BiH were treated and tolerated as temporary refuges who will, either willingly or unwillingly, "go home" as soon as the minimum necessary safety requirements to do so were met. Meanwhile, citizens of BiH arriving to Australia and the USA in that same time period perceived themselves, and were perceived by others, as immigrants looking for permanent resettlement (Halilovich, 2011a). Compared to European countries, the search for a safe haven in these overseas countries was sporadic during the war itself. However, these destinations became very appealing after 1995, i.e. after the war. One of the reasons for the change in this migration

trend was the threat of forced repatriation of BiH refugees from European countries (e.g. Germany), which, in the absence of better options, caused the BiH refugees to apply for the Australian and the USA immigration programs3. The vast majority of their applications for immigration were promptly addressed and positively resolved, and it can be said that, during the 1990s and early 2000s, BiH citizens were a particularly privileged migrant group within the American and Australian immigration programs (Franz, 2005; Halilović, 2006). An additional reason for the increase of migration to these countries in the post-war period was the presence of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons in BiH (IDPs), who were given an opportunity to emigrate only after the war ended.

As with other similar migration flows, every displacement (" deterritorialisation") from Bosnia was followed by a new emplacement ("reterritorialisation") in the host country. In the process of displacement/emplacement, an important role played - and continue to play - the pre-migration socio-cultural factors, as well as socio-political conditions in the host countries and local host communities. Immigration policy, or lack of it, as well as the cultural characteristics of the local groups, significantly affected the social morphology of BiH communities in the diaspora. On the other hand, local identities played a crucial role in establishing migration trends: in choosing the destination for the migration, in the "chain migration", and the (re)construction of local communities in the country of immigration. Over the past two decades, these (re)constructed or "transplanted" local identities resulted in the formation of distinctive translocal communities in host countries and places - both in Australia and the USA, and in many other countries (Halilovich, 2013).

Brčko in Melbourne

On a summer evening in January 2011, at a literary event in one of the migrant clubs in Melbourne, in the presence of hundreds of visitors and the author of this paper, a writer, visitor from Europe, spoke about his work and answered questions asked by the curious audience. Of all the peculiarities which might have distinguished this event from other similar events held that night in Melbourne, a keen observer might have focused on the rich food buffet complementing the literary atmosphere. The "typical ethnic dishes" arranged between the bottles of *Sarajevsko* beer, *Sarajevska* mineral water, and soft drinks "made in Bosnia and Herzegovina" would have provided the key clues about the immigrant community which hosted the event.

The very fact that the literary evening was held at the *Klub Brčaka* (Brčko-Melbourne Club) suggests a possible "background" of the audience. Namely, *Brčaci* - people originating from Brčko, a town in the region of Bosanska Posavina (the basin of the river Sava) in north-eastern Bosnia - are, in terms of numbers and the level of organisation, one of the more visible groups among the migrants from BiH in Australia. *Brčaci* in Melbourne have their local club, their website, a printed newsletter, a music band, regular social activities, and the annual meeting of *Brčaci* called "Savski cvijet" (The Flower of Sava), after the river Sava that flows through Brčko. The statute of the club states that "*the Brčko-Melbourne Club brings together all Brčaci who once lived in Brčko, regardless of their religious or ethnic background*". This statute reflects the Brčko reality by being the most ethnically mixed local club of the Bosnian4 diaspora in Australia. The multi-ethnic dimension of the Brčko community in Melbourne is a replica of the former multi-ethnic tradition of Brčko, a tradition that has been the subject of a brutal Serbian aggression during the 1992-1995, and which no longer exists in this city on the banks of the river Sava.

With only a few exceptions, all the participants at this event came originally from Brčko, including the guest - writer Bekim Sejranović, born in Brčko. In fact, although this writer refuses to declare himself as a writer from one state or one nation, as evidenced by his work and received awards, that night this "Bosnian-Croatian-Norwegian" author, who lives between Norway, Bosnia, and Croatia, was completely "adopted" and among his own people - people who have known him from childhood, were his teachers, former neighbours, relatives, fellow *Brčaci*. Thus, the author of the novels "*Nigdje niotkuda*" (Nowhere, from Nowhere) and "*Ljepši kraj*" (A Nicer Ending), found himself "at home", here, halfway around the world in a city he visited for the first time in his life, surrounded by the familiar local dialect, nicknames and stories. The whole discussion about the writer's work quickly became a re-enactment of the collective memory of a common *zavičaj* and the way of life in Brčko, of its inhabitants and their social roles, stories, and anecdotes or a collective performance of a distinct local *zavičaj*. The concept of *zavičaj*, a barely translatable term, encompasses the wholeness of person-in-place and place-in-person, which in English translates as home, homeland, community, home country, and native place, as well as village, county, region, town, and city. The sociological concept of *Gemeinschaft* comes close to *zavičaj*'s sense of community, social network and home, a social reality and lived experience for discrete groups, as well as a metaphor for modalities that go beyond conventional state or party-based modes of social organization For many people in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia - especially those who were forcibly displaced the term *zavičaj* evokes deep feelings of belonging to and nostalgia for a place that is or was the intimate and ultimate home (Halilovich, 2013b). The memories and stories about his hometown and its people have a significant place in Sejranović's literary opus. However, this evening - with 16,000 kilometres of geographical distance, and at least 16 years of chronological distance - in the Brčko-Melbourne club, the fiction and reality, past and present, here and there were brought together and mixed beyond recognition. That evening, Brčko was "here in Melbourne", and the participants of the event were "back there, in Brčko", in the city which exists, as such, only in the memories of its former residents. It was yet another embodied performance of *translocal* identity of *Brčaci*.

More than nostalgia for what has been lost

This and similar cultural and social events within the BiH diaspora in Australia are typical migrant "transnational events": namely, they include the international state borders across which people who were removed from one socio-political context, more or less compactly, resettle in another context (which sometimescan be thousands of kilometres apart), where they then establish and maintain ties with their place of origin, or imagine it in their new home. The Brčko event in Melbourne was used, in the first place, as yet another opportunity to invoke and share the memories of a common *zavičaj*, and to revive and relive a sense of belonging to a place of origin and former life. Hence, this was not a case of the reconstruction of a wider national or ethnic context. Instead, the event can only be fully understood in the *local* or *native* context. After this local context has been radically changed, as was the case in Brčko and throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, the people who find themselves in a migration situation (re)make their *zavičaj* through translocal practices with those with whom they share a sense of belonging to and memories of the local place of origin.

Local and regional *zavičaj* ties or "identities from the bottom-up" appear to be stronger than the "identities from the top-down", i.e. broader national, ethnic, and religious identities. Of course, in many cases the relationships of "identities from the bottom-up" and "identities from the top-down" are intertwined and congruent, but the former are given

priority as they are based on direct experiences and shared embodied memories, former social relations and statuses, dialect and manner of speech, sense of humor, local cuisine, and so on. To see others and be seen are the ways of maintaining the old identities and former statuses in the context of a new life in which the old social identities and roles often become redundant. When they meet, *Brčaci* living in various suburbs of Melbourne become "neighbors" once again, and the old titles and statuses from the *zavičaj* are respected regardless of their lack of actual value outside the *Brčaci* community. For example, mutual respect and addressing someone as "professor", "doctor" or "neighbour" have the full affective and social significance only among those who shared the past in which these titles were tied to a specific social position in the community. In many cases, this status is now largely symbolic because the social context has changed completely. In fact, many once prominent citizens of former Brčko now living in Melbourne are "on the dole" and depending on the Social Security benefits. Many of them often unknown outside their community, un-integrated, and marginalised in the context of the wider Australian society. It can be argued that *Brčaci* need each other not only to socialise with each other in the present and to confirm who they are now, but also to reaffirm, through shared memories, who they were in the past. The shared memories of home and *zavičaj*, back in the past, are complemented by the lived experiences of home - the new home, here and now, in the diaspora.

Scents of *zavičaj* on the streets of St. Louis

I observed very similar practices aimed at "preservation", revival, and reconstruction of local identities in the diaspora among the Bosnian communities in the U.S. city of St. Louis, "the most populous town of eastern Bosnia" in which some 75,000 Bosnian immigrants have settled over the last two decades. These are mostly Bosniaks from Podrinje (the basin of the river Drina) and Prijedor, who were forced to move from their homes during the war (Coughlan, 2011; Halilovich, 2012, 2013b). "The Little Bosnia in St. Louis" is made "visible" by numerous restaurants, shops with products imported from Bosnia, and social and sports clubs as well as the fact that the Bosnian community has its own radio programs, newspapers, and magazines, and even a television station. However, the true heterogeneity of this immigrant community can only be fully revealed when one takes a peek into the homes and neighborhoods of Bosnian migrants, or sits at a table in one of the many restaurants on Gravois Avenue in the suburb of Bevo - an area of St. Louis where entire Bosnian villages can be found in a single street, or a neighbourhood. Beneath the layers of wider collective identities - from the American and White to the Bosniak and Bosnian - embodied, intimate identities lived by the Bosnians in St. Louis are primarily local, i.e. translocal. A careful listener will recognise a number of local dialects spoken by Bosnian immigrants in St. Louis. While in the larger urban centres in BiH the local dialects of internal immigrants (and internally displaced persons) are quickly replaced with standardised language and urban slang, meanwhile, in the diaspora, in places like St. Louis, these local dialects from the old homeland are jealously preserved, maintained, and represent an important factor used for differentiating individuals and groups within the Bosnian diaspora. Other forms of embodied and sensory expressions of the local identities are displayed through various local specificities such as Kvrguša[5] pies, trademark of people from Prijedor living in St. Louis, and the traditional folk music specific to Podrinje and eastern Bosnia. Both the taste of food and the taste in music - just like the speech and a number of other local customs, stories, and memories - are part of a range of local identities of displaced Bosnians. The performance of these local identities occurs in a variety of ways, both in the public spaces and in the privacy of their homes.

Everyday life within the translocal communities includes a number of other activities involving relatives, former neighbors, acquaintances, and friends in St. Louis and other cities in the United States, as well as with those who have migrated to other countries or stayed in BiH. That this is not just the nostalgia for the lost *zavičaj* but a matter of reconstructed native identities in a different context is confirmed by the almost prevalent - and certainly desirable - local endogamy; young people are encouraged to marry "their own kind", thereby referring to people of the same local origin. This trend of marriage between members of the same local groups of Bosnians displaced around the world further strengthens and confirms the translocal identities in a very embodied manner. For instance, the ties of their Podrinje *zavičaj* brought together a young couple, Zumra and Samir. With help from their relatives, acquaintances, and the internet, the distance between Melbourne, where Zumra migrated and lived, and St. Louis, Samir's adopted city, was not an obstacle for these two young people to meet and start living together in Samir's city, bound by the stories of a common *zavičaj* which they could barely recall. These and similar connections not only symbolically link the translocal migrant groups in different countries, making them *poly*-local, but also create the new forms of translocal families in a transnational context.

Transnationality vs. translocality in the cross-border region

Based on these ethnographic insights from two different migration contexts, it seems that, in their interpretation, we cannot simply describe and analyse the events from the perspective of transnationalism, the dominant theoretical framework, which has become the dominant paradigm in immigration studies during the last two decades (Basch et al, 1994; Glick Schiller et al, 1992, 1999; Kearney, 1995; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). While studying transnational connections that individuals and groups in the context of migration establish and maintain *across* the boundaries of nation-states, the researchers often get trapped within (ethno)national patterns thinking and representation because they rely on the analyses of national/ethnic groups by considering them primarily in terms of their ethnic homeland/national state and their national identification. The dominant *ethno-gaze* (ethnicised view, Glick Schiller, 2005) or reliance on the ethnic group/nation as a unit of analysis (Glick Schiller, 2008), applied by the researchers of transnational social fields of migration, implies that migrants are primarily determined by some form of ethno-cultural identity bound by a territorialised nation-state (Glick Schiller, 2005). Such an approach reproduces a national model of thinking and writing, or, paradoxically, taken into consideration the fact that the researchers are interested in transnational phenomena, remains trapped in the methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003; Glick Schiller, 2005, 2006) or methodological ethnicity (Glick Schiller, 2008). Methodological nationalism explains the behavior of migrants - both within the host country and in their transnational practices - through the assumption of their ethnicity, presupposing and assuming that the entire migratory population belongs to a community of a certain ethnicity, culture, and identity delimited by the boundaries of the nation-state of their origin. Therefore, such analyses in the transnational space treat migrants primarily as dislocated members of their nation or nation-state.

By privileging the ethnic/national prism in transnational studies, the parallel forms of migrant identification - from professional, gender, family, generational, class and social, to narrow territorial and local - are overlooked, and migratory populations are viewed as uniform, homogeneous communities without internal differentiation, defined primarily through their

belonging to a particular nation/ethnic group. At the level of practice and action, that prism ignores those migrant activities that transcend the boundaries of ethnic organisations and ethno-national identities, i.e. the non-ethnic forms of integration into the host community and the participation in transnational social fields - family and friends, business, political, religious and local identities (Glick Schiller, 2005, 2006, 2008; Povrzanović Frykman, 2010; Conradson and McKay, 2007; Peleikis, 2000; Velayutham and Wise, 2008; Halilovich, 2011, 2012, 2013b; Žmegač Capo, 2003).

Affiliation within transnational migration space does not necessarily have to be tied to the nation-state of origin or ethnic/national group; it can also be narrow, local, native, and disconnected from the ethnicity in daily life. This dimension of *belonging to*, in addition to *being in* a transnational space - heuristically, it seems difficult to separate the two - is prevalent in transnational practices of migrant groups. In their separate works Halilovich and Čapo Žmegač have termed this phenomenon translocality (Halilovich, 2011b, 2012, 2013; Čapo Žmegač, 2003).These authors came to the conclusion that *translocality*, rather than transnationality, better explains the social morphology and the lived reality of migrant groups, including the forms of their social interaction, organisational patterns, cultural practices, and various other activities and actions they practice in relation to their countries of origin, as well as in relation to their translocal compatriots in other countries. By choosing the term "translocality" to describe the migrant practices, as opposed to "transnationality", they wanted to emphasise that the long-term, everyday interests of migrants are not necessarily related to national or state politics (but they can become related in exceptional circumstances, as were, for example, the circumstances in the 1990s, during the formation of new states from the debris of the disintegrated Yugoslavia). Rather, they are related to quite specific local issues, especially those involving the dislocated forms of family relationships in the so-called transnational families (Čapo Žmegač, 2007b) and investments in the place of origin; thus, fostering loyalty and support for the places of origin, while simultainaosly reviving, and reconstructing local identities through the construction of "home away from home" in the places of residence.

Conceptualization of translocalism

The described forms of transnationally contextualised relationships and practices in the researched migrant groups indicate their primary translocal character, demonstrating that they are grounded by their actions at the level of the locality and *zavičaj*, mainly relating to family circumstances and investment in the narrower or wider area of origin, along with the assistance, rehabilitation, and reconstruction, or, alternatively, through imagining the lost local community within the context of forced displacement. Described ethnographies demonstrate that the everyday interest of migrants for their place of origin mostly tapers and focuses on the narrow, local *zavičaj* and family circumstances. Even when they are driven by the national interest, the cross-border practices of the migrants are localised and inscribed in the specific places of their origin.

Translocality is not exclusively a characteristic of the Bosnian war-induced emigration in the 1990s; however, it particularly seems that forced migration from ancestral homes and dramatic separation from spatial practices and identities are decisive factors in the establishment of translocal networks. Homes and places of origin of forced migrants are often irreversibly lost, physically and/or in the sense that the migrants no longer feel "at home" in their places of origin. Additional factors of this alienation are related to the new political context of their places of origin in the Republic of Srpska, a separate entity within Bosnia and

Herzegovina, established on the foundation of crimes of genocide and 'ethnic cleansing'. Since the places of origin of remain an important identity marker, forced migrants endeavour to recreate these social places in the new locations through memories, narration, enactment, and meetings with former neighbours, thus creating a "new home away from home", both similar and different from the one they had left. The attachment to the idea of the old place as home, as Ghassan Hage (1997) argues, should not be seen as a hindering factor for migrants and refugees in their new places of settlement. Rather, it provides them with a 'sense of possibility' to (re)create their new home constructed around '[the] desire to promote the feeling of being there here' (Hage 1997: 10208). After all, their *zavičaj*, or their *home back there*, no longer exists in the form they knew and remembered it, because *zavičaj* is not just a place - it is made out of people and social relationships; *zavičaj* is a familiarity and intimacy with both the physical environment, and the social and cultural environment (Halilovich, 2011b: 77). The lost community and sense of belonging can be recreated only through the memories and stories that the former residents of Brčko, Prijedor, or Podrinje indulge in during the moments of relaxation among their former neighbours in the cities they live in today. These places are no longer located in the space *back there*, but in the *previous* time and in the space *here*. Migrants, exiles, and other travellers are finding the new home in the routine, meetings with familiar people, in memories and stories of the times past, in the flavours and fragrances, or, as Leslie Van Gelder said, "people of diaspora do not root in place, but in each other" (Van Gelder, 2008: 58).

In addition to those in Australia and the USA, translocalism is practiced by BiH refugee communities in European countries (Halilovich, 2012, 2013), as well as many by voluntary emigrant populations, such as, for example, Croatian economic migrants in Germany (Čapo Žmegač, 2007b). However, as described by Jasna Čapo Žmegač (2003; 2007a; 2007b), the forms of these translocal practices somewhat differ from those of the refugees and forcibly displaced persons: they were mostly defined by the framework of transnational family arrangements, in the context of a planned return to their *zavičaj*.

Several authors have dealt with the question of the importance of distance in translocal and transnational practices (cf. Portis-Winner, 2002; Baldassare, 2007; Brickell and Datta, 2011). At first glance, distance is not unimportant, but it is not crucial. Bosnian migrants dispersed throughout Europe, America, and Australia are thousands of miles away from their *zavičaj*. In the search for intimacy and security of the familiar, these migrant groups will become intensely immersed in the translocal and will strive to create and maintain social networks among former neighbours, regardless of their present place of residence and trips to the "old country." Therefore, the distance does not appear to be a decisive factor of translocality, especially in the era of digital telecommunication technologies such as the internet, mobile phones, and satellite television (Halilovich, 2013).

Finally, translocality of the Bosnian diaspora can be realised as *bi*-locality, the relationship between two locations, and as *poly*-locality, the relationship between several locations. This difference is related to the forms of cross-border practices of these populations: separate family life, local endogamy and re-territorialization.

Conclusion

While affirming the significance of the original places for many migrant populations, this interpretation does not imply the essentialist, static view of the relationship between people, places, and identities. It does not suggest that the translocal diaspora communities are "fixed and unchanging" in their identities located in a previous time and place. Translocal practices demonstrate that the cultural place and embodied local identities transcend geographic space and chronological time, and that mobility and attachment to a place are not intrinsically contradictory but can rather be complementary processes (Halilovich, 2011, 2013b). They confirm the dynamism and fluidity of the complex relationships in which identity of place as a set of embodied practices transcends its original geographical location and becomes translocal or poly-local. In the new space of the diaspora, the migrants are *place-making* - in the sense that they adopt and appropriate it as a place of meaning and identity (Gulin Zrnić, 2009) - through the *translocal process* that involves the intervention of other locations (of origin), networks, and activities from afar. Since the sense of location in the context of migration is inevitably created and transformed within a translocal environment - which includes at least one *over here* and one *back there* - this process occurs not only in the areas of settlement, but also in the places of origin, during the visits and the return of the migrants.7 Therefore, translocality covers a wide spectrum of practices and relationships in the articulation of distinctive (trans)local identities, both in migration and the place of origin, revealing how these practices and relationships are reconstructed, adapted, and recreated in a mobile world.

Notes

[1]In addition to the full name of the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I also use the widespread abbreviation "BiH" and the colloquial name of "Bosnia", as well as the adjectives "Bosnian-Herzegovinian" and "Bosnian". All of these terms are linked to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and all the people originally from BiH, regardless of their ethnic, religious, and regional affiliation.

[2]Sections of this article, as well as the theses elaborated here, are included in the publication co-authored with Jasna Čapo (2013) La localisation du transnationalisme. Pratiques transfrontalières bosniaques et croates, *Ethnologie française*, XLIII(2): pp. 291-301.

[3]Also, Canada and New Zealand, and the requests for political asylum in the countries of Western Europe and Scandinavia.

[4]Although predominantly Bosniak, the Bosnian post-war diaspora in Australia, in proportion to the total number of people forcibly exiled from Bosnia, includes Bosnian Croats and a smaller number of Bosnian Serbs, as well as a large number of ethnically mixed families and those who identify primarily as Bosnians without any ethnic determinants.

[5]A type of pie made with pieces of chicken meat arranged over dough and covered with sour cream.

[6]Contrary to those authors who do separate them (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2007).

[7]Returnee migrations are also an interesting area for exploration of the interweaving of two or more locations and identities related to these locations, now in a dual context of relocation: the first created by emigration, the second by re-emigration.

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What Kind of Integration?
Migrant Workers from BiH in Slovenia

Abstract

Integration is currently the crown term and the crown policy of European migration regimes. EU policy documents define it as a "dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by migrants and residents"; it is supposedly all-inclusive and embraced multicultural orientations in European societies. If, on the one hand, integration appears as a logical consequence of, or even as a solution to, problems in migration, it is argued here that it appears, on the other hand, as a part of the problem of migration management of current European societies. This article analyses controversies of integration with the focus on debating specific situations of work migrants from BiH in Slovenia who represent almost one half of the entire foreign population in the country. The debate on integration is thus placed in the specific context of the social, economic, and political conditions of migrant workers from BiH. Based on the analysis of integration policies, and on the assessment of recent anti-crisis measures, the article problematises the "securitisation approach", which aims to protect the national labour market and produces, as a consequence, poor work and life conditions of a significant number of BiH work migrants in Slovenia.

Key words: *integration, labour market, migrants from BiH, migration policies, Slovenia*

Integration: Dubious prospects for a policy priority

Integration of migrants into societies appears as a common paradigm of European "migration management" (cf. Kofman, 2005). It is addressed both in literature and in policy making (Bauböck, 2001; Niessen and Huddleston, 2009; MIPEX, 2011) as an imperative, a desirable mechanism of management of diversity in multicultural societies across Europe. Also, it is commonly promoted as a solution to "problems in migration", and, in the context of debating multicultural societies, as an appropriate alternative to previous assimilationist approaches (cf. Joppke and Morawska, 2003) that sacrificed migrants for the goal of keeping the allegedly homogeneous ethnicity of the majority of the population intact.

While integration is viewed as the right solution on the one hand, it is argued in this article that it might be the case that, on the other hand, it appears as a part of the problem (and not of solution) of migration management. Integration is currently the crown term and policy of European migration regimes, and it refers to social, political, educational, linguistic, cultural, economic and other integration processes. However, the common EU agenda for integration of migrants from 2005, and the recent agenda from 2011 (European Commission, 2005, 2011) both frame integration as a migration issue only, and it appears insufficient that integration provisions do not appear in other non-migration related documents. The fact that integration is confined to migration policy area only which, in the EU context, is placed under the domain of the home affair offices - offices that devote most attention to border control, internal security,

and fight against organized crime - make us question the very potential of integration to address society at large. In other words, the potential of integration is dubious once one sees that it is primarily addressed in the context of policies that otherwise focus on organizing prevention of migration and control of borders.

The Common Basic Principles (CBP) for immigrant integration policy in the EU (Council of the European Union, 2004) established a definition of integration as a "dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by migrants and residents." The underlying problem with the assumption of integration being a two-way process that engages "migrants and the nationals" is that the dualism of "us-them" is inscribed in integration; it appears as its underlying principle. A relevant question is, therefore, how can the concept of integration go beyond the "us-them" division if this very division is the basis on which integration is conceptualized? Societies are factually transformed by migration, but how sincerely is the integration management approach willing to recognize this fact? In addition to the significant fact that integration policy is only envisioned as a part of the migration management strategy while leaving the rest of the society intact, integration largely demands adaptation-like attitudes of migrants, such as adopting the basic values of the EU and/or the specific national state, or contributing to the prosperity of the EU/national labour markets, all of which places the migrants in the "function" of solving the labour market and the aging problem of the EU (cf. Pajnik, 2012).

This paper aims to analyse such integration issues in a concrete example of migrants in Slovenia. It focuses on discussing integration through the lenses of the labour market and general life conditions and situations of migrants from third countries, with special consideration of migrants from BiH in Slovenia. The first chapter introduces some facts and figures on Bosnian migrants in Slovenia and discusses these in the context of (non-)integration. The particular focus is to analyse integration in the context of work-related conditions of migrants from BiH as the majority of people who come to Slovenia for purposes of employment. Focus group discussions and interviews with migrants (Pajnik 2012) indicate a prevalent pattern where several of our partners including, but not limited to, migrants from BiH, discussed integration predominately as the "migrants' own problem".[1] Analysing precarious labour positions of Bosnian workers in Slovenia, this chapter illuminates the reasons for such framings of migrant integration. Discussion on BiH migrants in migration trends is followed by questioning integration based on two policy frameworks, the conditions for entry of migrants in Slovenia, and the conditions for work (im)possibilities for migrants. The chapter points to "subordinated integration" that is practiced through these (and other) policy areas that leave third country migrants at the outskirts of integration. The integration policy frames discussed here regulate the positions of third country migrants in general, and, in the Slovenian context, they mostly affect migrant workers from BiH who represent the majority of migrant population in the country. In addition, policy provisions that aim at regulating particularly the situation of BiH migrants are analysed as well.

Migrants from BiH in recent migration trends in Slovenia

On January 1, 2011, of Slovenia's total population of approximately 2 million (2,050,189), 82,746 were foreign citizens, representing 4% of the total population (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2011a). The vast majority of the foreign-born population is from Europe (97%), mainly from the Yugoslavia's successor states which represent 90% of all foreigners from Europe and as much as 87% of Slovenia's total foreign population (see Table 1).

Table 1: Foreign population in Slovenia by citizenship and gender, 1 January 2011

Country citizenship	Men	Women	Total	Country citizenship	Men	Women	Total
Ukupno	**58·697**	**24·049**	**82·746**				
Europe	**57.451**	**22.807**	**80.258**	Poland	60	115	175
Austria	213	165	378	Romania	86	144	230
Belarus	14	46	60	Russian Federation	174	423	597
Bosnia - Herzegovina	**30.642**	**8.194**	**38.836**	**Serbia**	**5.356**	**2.205**	**7.561**
Bulgaria	791	293	1084	Slovakia	227	224	451
Croatia	**5.129**	**2.609**	**7.738**	Switzerland	46	35	81
Czech Republic	113	50	163	Ukraine	322	897	1.219
France	111	68	179	United Kingdom	242	149	391
Germany	375	386	761	Others countries	208	161	369
Hungary	112	89	201				
Italy	546	324	870	Africa	154	48	202
Kosovo	**6.577**	**2.457**	**9.034**	Azija	781	752	1.533
Macedonia, FRYO	**5.595**	**3.222**	**8.817**	America, South	58	97	155
Moldova	109	164	273	America, North and Central	204	361	520
Montenegro	343	266	609	Australia and Oceania	49	29	78
Netherlands	78	33	111				

Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Statistical Yearbook 2011

Male migrants, most of whom come with the purpose of work, represent 71% of all migrants, , while 29% are women whose arrival is mostly connected to family reunification processes. Migration trends show a comparable composition of migrant population during the recent years. For example, migrants from former Yugoslav states represented 92.5% of Slovenia's total foreign population in 2008, and 91% in 2009, while gender composition also remained similar in the recent years.

Nearly half of the entire foreign population is from Bosnia-Herzegovina (47%), with a further 11% from Macedonia, 9.1% from Serbia, and 9.4% from Croatia. Only 3% of migrants come from countries outside of Europe, and 62% of these are from Asia.

These data are in congruence with the official data from the Employment Service of Slovenia on valid work permits for December 2011 and June 2012. These show that 94% of valid work permits are issued to citizens of Yugoslavia's successor states, the majority being issued to citizens of BiH (17,625 or 52% of all valid work permits), with a further 13.2% from Serbia, 11% from Kosovo, 10% from Croatia, and 8% from Macedonia (see Table 2). Citizens of other countries are represented with 2,164 valid permits, representing a minority of 6.3% of all issued valid work permits.

The period from 2007 to 2010 has seen the number of work permits varying from around 65,000 to 85,000. In the period from January to December 2011, a drastic downsize in the number of work permits occurred, i.e. they experienced a decrease by 46%. The number of valid work permits in January 2011, 74,001, had decreased to merely 34,221 in December 2011. Partially, the reason for change was the adoption of the new *Law on Employment and Work of Foreigners* in April 2011, which enabled free access to the labour market to various groups of migrants. These groups do not need a work permit, as previously required, which in itself reduced the total number of permits. The decreased number is also a consequence of return migration. Namely, the current crisis produced a downsize that has seen many migrants from BiH forcefully returned to their country of birth due to bankruptcy of many firms, faulty organization, and paying disorder (cf. Medica and Lukić, 2011), often without being paid their earned salaries.

Table 2: Valid work permits by type and citizenship, December 2011

Country	Personal Work Permit	Employment Permit	Permit for Work	Total
Total	22.232	8.563	3.426	**34.221**
Yugoslavia's Successor States	21.839	7.306	2.912	**32.057**
Bosnia - Herzegovina	**13.977**	**3.054**	**594**	**17.625**
Serbia	2.276	1.639	616	4.531
Kosovo	2.168	761	769	3.698
Croatia	1.780	1.320	339	3.439
Macedonia	1.597	515	564	2.676
Montenegro	39	16	30	85
Serbia and Montenegro	2	1	0	3
Other Countrry	393	1.257	514	**2.164**
Ukraine	174	319	99	592
Rusian Federation	44	157	179	380
China	22	280	74	376
Dominican Republic	6	145	1	152
Thailand	8	94	4	106
Moldova	38	48	7	93
India	5	42	8	55
USA	18	20	15	53
Turkey	7	16	26	49
Philippines	0	35	2	37

Source: Employment Service of Slovenia, 2011, http://www.ess.gov.si/

Data show that, while the number of issued work permits has seen a decline in the recent years, the permit holders' countries of citizenship of have not seen major changes, and the share of migrants from former Yugoslavia continues to be the largest. In 2010, 93% of work permits were issued to citizens of Yugoslavia's successor states while this percentage was 89 in 2011. Citizens of BiH continue to be in the majority: 51% (19,185) of all immigrants from former Yugoslav states in 2010 were Bosnian citizens. This number declined to 39% (9,543) in 2011 which can be explained with the crisis in the construction sector where the workers from BiH are habitually known to be employed. Both in 2010 and 2011, and also in the first half of 2012, the migrants from BiH are followed in numbers by those from Croatia, Serbia, and Kosovo.

For decades, Slovenia has attracted mostly male migrants from former Yugoslav Republics to perform jobs that are on high demand, specifically in the construction sector. This was nicely demonstrated by Mežnarić in her seminal work from 1986 entitled *Bosanci, a kuda idu Slovenci nedeljom?* where she analysed life stories of migrants from BiH in Slovenia and found that their stories are interwoven with employment opportunities, socio-economic status, cultural differences, etc. Performing jobs that are known to have a low reputation, coupled with hard working conditions, unsteady work arrangements, and low payments, migrant workers from former Yugoslav countries, and especially from BiH, continue to fill in labour market shortages (Pajnik et al. 2010). In the last years, the Employment Service data show that the majority of valid work permits pertain to construction (33%), a sector that would not be able to function and operate without the cheap and hard-working migrant labour force (cf. Pajnik et al., 2010; Pajnik and Bajt, 2011; Pajnik, 2012; Medica and Lukić, 2011; Medvešek and Bešter, 2010). Construction is followed by manufacturing (12.4%) and transportation and storage (11%), which are generally seen as major sectors of migrants work.

We can notice the lack of official statistics when it comes to concrete estimates of layoffs of migrant workers, termination of work and residence permits, and return migration, all of which were reported as generally being on the rise. Migrants' own stories gathered through interviews for various research projects, and field observations in migrants' working and residential sites are a proof of these processes (Pajnik et al., 2010; Pajnik and Bajt, 2011; Pajnik, 2012; Medica and Lukić, 2011). At the general level, we see negative trends demarking the Slovenian economy: the real growth rate of GDP of the country was 1.4% in 2010, while in 2011 we saw a negative trend of -0.2%. In 2010, a yearly drop in the number of employed persons by 2.6% was registered, and in this category, the number of men decreased faster than the number of women. Data show an increase of the official unemployment rate in the country from 10.7% in 2010 to 11.8% in 2011.

In this light, it's not surprising to observe that migrant workers were hit as well: layoffs intensified and the number of unemployed persons rose in the recent years. The number of the unemployed migrants is hard to decipher from the official data as the status of many migrants does not allow them to register in case of unemployment. The existing data of the Employment Service show an increase in the number of unemployed migrants between 2009 and 2010, and the majority of the unemployed are migrants from BiH, Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Kosovo. End of 2009 saw a number of 1,606 registered unemployed migrants from BiH, while that number rose to 2,920 at the end of 2010; this increase in unemployment figures in seen for migrants coming from various countries.

According to the Labour Force Survey Results and explanations in 2010 (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2011b), faulty organisation and paying disorder, trade depression, and financial crisis severely affected construction and agriculture, forestry and fishing, as well as manufacturing, i.e. the sectors that engage most migrant workers from BiH. Annual reports of the Labour Inspectorate for the period 2010 and 2011 show that these

sectors are also among the sectors where workers are found to be working without documents, working overtime, not being paid, being denied breaks, and so on. The reports also show that the number of violations of legal provisions related to employment and work of foreigners are on the rise in the recent period of 2010-2011 (Labour Inspectorate, 2010, 2011).

Data of AJPES, Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related Services point to a rising trend in the number of companies that went bankrupt. In 2009, 332 companies declared bankruptcy and 269 were deleted from the register as bankrupt. In 2011, the former number was nearly doubled with 675 companies declaring bankruptcy, while 398 were deleted from the register. In the last three years, Slovenian economy witnessed the bankruptcy of some of the biggest companies, mostly in sectors that employ the majority of BiH migrant workers such as construction (SCT, Vegrad, Primorje, CPM, Kraški zidar) and manufacture (Mura).

Integration as the regulation of migration

Conditioning entry: Integrating "the right" migrants

When integration is discussed in the context of entry provisions, one can observe the absence of migrants' voices. Entry policies are designed as control policies with which the state separates wanted from unwanted migrants. According to the *Aliens Act* (the new act was adopted in October 2011), a foreigner who is a third country national and who wants to reside in Slovenia longer than three months for reasons other than those enabling residence based on a visa, must obtain a residence permit. To be eligible for temporary residence permit, migrants must prove sufficient funds to support themselves and must have adequate health insurance. In addition, migrants need to submit a certificate proving that they do not have a criminal record, while the body issuing the permit must establish that the person does not present a danger to public order, security, or international relations. A temporary residence permit for purposes of employment or work, family reunion, study, or other justified reasons (such as the expressed interest of Slovenia) is initially issued with the maximum duration of one year, and can later be prolonged. Residence permits for employment and work are issued to migrants based on a valid work permit. The residence permit can be prolonged for longer than two years if it is in congruence with the validity of a work permit and if the migrant has worked and lived in the country uninterruptedly for three years. Temporary residence permits for seasonal work can be issued for 6 months, on a yearly basis. Permanent residence that recognizes more rights in terms of socio-economic and political provisions may be granted to a third country national who has been residing in Slovenia for a period of five years, uninterruptedly, on the basis of a temporary residence permit.

Major changes of the 2011 Act include the introduction of the Blue card of the EU, i.e. the work and residence permit for highly qualified workers. In addition, entry is facilitated for some "wanted" groups of migrants such as sportsmen, coaches, journalists, businesspeople, foreigners who want to study, and family members of Slovene citizens. Also, entry is facilitated for those whose stay "is in the state's interest", and for other certain groups such as family reunion migrants and trafficked victims. Changes from the 2011 Act were recognized in public debates as an improvement when compared to the previous provisions, but were also critically addressed by some NGOs, trade unions, and intellectuals working on migration issues. The general reproach is the lack of a coherent and long-term strategy of migration policy that would, in contrast to the current situation, adopt a more holistic approach to migration. Consequently, it seems that some of the policies are only changed in order to transpose EU

legal orders into the national system, without any real political will, public debate and dialogue. Also, waves of protectionism in the Act visibly ease the provisions for Slovene descendents and for the expressed interests of the state, and the work migrants from BiH clearly do not fall into this category. Thus, from the start, integration has been focused to target the "right" or the "wanted" migrants by regulating the entry into the country.

"Integrating" migrants as precarious labourers

If integration is placed in the context of labour policies, its unilateral direction becomes visible, as the policies are primarily designed as responses to national labour trends of aging, profession deficits, etc., regardless of who the migrants are, and regardless of their education and aspirations. The list of officially recognised deficient professions is one of the key regulation mechanisms controlling the migrant work in Slovenia. Migrants are, thus, habitually directed into deficient professions. Also, migrant work is regulated by the *Employment and Work of Aliens Act* that foresees migrant employment "providing there are no native workers with appropriate skills who are registered as unemployed". In other words, according to this Act, employers can only employ migrant workers when no "natives" are found in the unemployment registers. Such a conditioning has proven to direct migrants to jobs that are shunned by local workers and are known as most difficult in the sectors with highest breaches of worker's rights by the employers (Pajnik et. al., 2010; Pajnik, 2012; Medica and Lukić, 2011). Another labour market regulation that highly affected migrant workers was the quota system. Until recently the number of work permits was limited yearly in quotas which were not to exceed 5% of the total number of the active Slovene population. With the new *Employment and Work of Aliens Act* from 2011, the quotas are not an obligation any longer and none have been set for the years 2011 and 2012. However, this abolition cannot be seen as a mechanism that aims at facilitating migrants' access to the labour market. Rather, the decision for abolition can be attributed to the current economic situation. Namely, in 2010-2012 many migrants have left Slovenia due to job losses which, in terms of policy making, meant that "the fear" that the number of migrants would exceed the 5% of the active native workforce was no longer "real".

Another regulation and selection mechanism are the work permits. While EU nationals can compete on the Slovene labour market on equal footing with the native citizens, a migrant from BiH as a third country needs to obtain work and residence permits before coming to work and live in Slovenia. A work permit is a prerequisite for a residence permit, which is issued for the duration of the former. The issue of permits is conditioned upon the legal status of the migrant, the type of work performed, and on the general situation on the labour market. Three main types of work permits are issued to migrants from third countries: a) personal work permit, b) employment permit, and c) permit for work. Personal work permits with a one-year validity period are issued for (self-)employment of foreigners, while personal work permits with a three-year validity period enable the migrants' access to the labour market without further restrictions and are applicable to several specific groups of migrants, such as family migrants, self-employed migrants, daily migrants, etc. Employment permits must be obtained by the employer before a migrant enters Slovenia, and are dependent on the absence of suitable registered unemployed native workforce.

Based on the employment permit, a migrant can only become employed by the employer who obtained the permit, and can only perform the work for which the permit was issued; thus, the migrants are "tied" to one particular employer. Work permits are meant for the referred or appointed workers, movement of persons within a company, education and

training in Slovene companies, and for seasonal jobs in agriculture and forestry. These permits allow a migrant to work only for the designated employer. Work permits thus strongly condition a migrant's position in the labour market. Also, they affect their general life since different types of permits bring different level of social protection. In addition, the validity of work permits conditions the residence permits, and the expiry of the former brings the termination of validity of the latter.

Permit and residence systems condition the social rights of migrants. These rights were supposed to increase for migrants from BiH due to the bilateral agreements signed by the two countries. However, the *Agreement on Social Insurance* between Slovenia and BiH, valid since 2008, recently decreased some of these rights. Namely, it prevented the majority of workers from BiH to claim unemployment benefits. To be able to receive unemployment benefits, a migrant needs to have a permanent residence permit in the country that can only be obtained after a five-year period of uninterrupted stay, which is a criterion that is seldom met by migrant workers from BiH who come to Slovenia on short-term contracts as "circular" migrants or "disposable workers". Ministers for labour from both countries signed the *Agreement Amending the Agreement on Social Insurance* in 2010, aiming to enable the citizens of BiH to obtain unemployment benefits if they qualify under the law governing the unemployment benefits and have permanent or temporary residence in Slovenia. However, this Agreement was not valid until recently, when it was ratified by both countries. Slovenia has ratified the Agreement in March of 2011 and it came into force in September of 2011. It's estimated that 1,273 BiH citizens with a temporary residence permit are now entitled to these provisions. It's worthwhile mentioning that many more migrants would have benefited from it if the Agreement was adopted earlier, as the crisis has forced many to return.

Various NGOs and trade unions have recognized the importance of some of the policy changes, such as those of the *Employment and Work of Aliens Act*, that broaden the groups of migrants[2] whose access to the labour market is free. Also, changes to this Act prolong the duration of the personal work permit for some categories of migrants to a three year period and recognize the possibility of employment with various employers (as opposed to just one) as a condition for obtaining the personal permit. Such provisions would supposedly make migrants less vulnerable and more flexible to change the employers than before, when many endured harsh work and living conditions in order not to lose the possibility to obtain a personal work permit. This much needed policy change was influenced by migrants themselves who stood up in protest against exploitation, and by both the public visibility of various research findings that have exposed the dependency of migrants, and the media pressure, i.e. the extensive media reports about the miserable working and living conditions of migrants in 2010-2011, specifically highlighting the slave-like conditions of migrants coming from former Yugoslav states and working in the construction sector.[3] Still, reports from the ground (Medica and Lukić, 2011) show that the situation has not improved for many migrants as the sectors that employ the majority of migrant workers, such as construction and manufacturing, seem to have been hit the hardest by the crisis. Although several have obtained a personal work permit that does not tie them to one employer but allows them to change jobs, it's hardly possible for many migrants to be able to get work other than on a short-term basis, and this does not allow many of them the right to claim this type of permit that offers the greatest social protection.

With the new Act, the state has also taken several much needed measures to prevent exploitation and improve payment indiscipline, which is expected to improve labour conditions of both domestic and migrant workers. Namely, the Employment Service now checks whether the employers have provided salaries to workers, i.e. whether they have

reported income taxes from work arrangements, and whether they had paid taxes and contributions stemming from employment and work. Also, the Service strengthened its control over the issuing of work permits. Among the novelties is a response to the poor living conditions of migrant workers, particularly from BiH, that have been an acute problem for a long time. The *Decree on Minimal Housing Conditions* that was prepared in 2008 finally came into force in January 2012, in order to deal with numerous cases of inadequate housing.

Some actors, such as trade unions, welcomed the changes that were, however, introduced very late, i.e. not at the moment when they were needed the most, but in the period when significant numbers of migrants have left Slovenia due to crisis and as a consequence of termination of validity of work and residence permits stemming from the crisis. Policies seem to be retroactive, regulating the previous issues in current times, when the situation has already seen dramatic changes, and would indeed require new regulations. All of this points to a lack of coherent migration and integration policies and it can also be observed that the changes are very pragmatic and are primarily a response to the actual labour market demands.

Conclusions

Although it seems that some policies have recently been "relaxed", if compared to previous periods (residence, work permits, family reunion), several problems that make it difficult for recent migrants from BiH to work and live in Slovenia still persist. Employment policies are still based on the idea of protecting the national labour force as third country migrants can only obtain work permits providing that there are no domestic workers available for the job, which points to the rationale of subordinated integration.

It can be interpreted as a positive trend that no quotas were set for 2011 and 2012, and that the new *Employment and Work of Aliens Act* from 2011 facilitated the access to the labour market for some groups of migrants, as well as the fact that personal work permits do not tie migrant workers to one specific employer, as was the situation previously. Generally, these are positive trends that should, however, be interpreted considering the wider circumstances in which they arose. Namely, it seems that the reason for not setting the quotas in recent years is not primarily related to the inclination to improve migrant integration and their rights, but is more a reaction to the current situation in which the bankruptcies of many companies and the loss of jobs made it more difficult for migrants to get a job and stay in Slovenia. Here, again, we see the adoption of a "slim" integration policy and the lack of orientation that would aim at equalizing the positions of migrants in the labour market of Slovenia.

Along these lines, the recommendation for changing the existing labour policies is to ensure the same rights and benefits for workers regardless of the type of contract they have with their employer, as well as to reconsider the differences between various types of work permits. The policies should take under consideration that tying work permits to residence permits may prolong abusive work relationships in which the employers can take advantage of BiH migrants. Such measures add to the precariousness of migrants' situation and have the effect of hindering their (self-)empowerment. Also, the inscription of the "us-them" division into integration policies could be overcome by an intensified bilateral cooperation. This should further improve the social and economic position of BiH migrants in Slovenia. Integration policies should also improve other areas, such as political participation, where they should aim at increasing migrants' political rights and public visibility.

Conceptualisation of the more coherent migration and integration policies in Slovenia is still needed. Policies would benefit if their adoption was accompanied by extensive public debates that would also include migrant workers. It is, therefore, required to take further steps towards truly recognizing integration as a process that aims at equalizing the position and opportunities of the migrants with those of Slovenian nationals. A good start to building on integration policies in the future is to consult the migrants' stories, their own accounts and experiences with integration that have been gathered by research. The needs of the migrants should be taken into account when designing future integration.

Notes

[1] Field work was conducted for PRIMTS project in 2009 in six EU states (Cyprus, Finland, Hungary, Germany, Italy, and Slovenia) (Pajnik, 2012).

[2] The groups include: 1) family members of Slovenian citizens based on temporary residence permit; 2) citizens of EU, EEA, and Swiss confederation based on their citizenship; 3) family members who are not citizens of EU, EEA, or the Swiss confederation and have a temporary residence permit of a family member or a visa for long-term residence; 4) foreigners with permanent residence permit; 5) refugees; 6) foreigners who are long-term residents of other EU member states, after one year of residing in Slovenia based on temporary residence permit; 7) foreigners of Slovenian descent based on temporary residence permit.

[3] Among the more recent and publicly most visible was the strike at the Port of Koper in 2011, organised by the trade union of crane operators, which was followed by a spontaneous rebellion of workers employed by external providers of port services. For more information, see reports of The Slovenian IWW (Invisible Workers of the World) network that is a part of the global movement of the IWW at http://www.njetwork.org/ (25 December 2012).

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Religion in the Context of Translocal and Transnational Activities in the Case of Bosniaks in Switzerland

Abstract

Using the example of Bosniak diaspora in Switzerland, this article discusses certain aspects of religion within the context of life in the diaspora. Special scrutiny was given to the role of religion within the diaspora as a factor for preservation of ethno-specific cultural and religious heritage, and maintenance of relationships with the country of origin on the one side, and the potential of religion as a generator of establishing and strengthening various communication processes with the host society on the other. In order to better understand the aforementioned aspects, the article will show the specific character of the development of Bosniak diaspora in Switzerland, within the context of the general attitude of the Swiss society with regards to the presence of Muslims and Islam in Switzerland.

Keywords: *diaspora, integration, Islam, religion*

Socio-empirical studies conducted in recent decades on the subject of migrant life point to the fact that emigration does not necessarily mean a radical break of ties and relations with the country of origin. Depending on the socio-political conditions in the country of immigration and the general conditions in the country of origin, diaspora communities within themselves can combine the diversity of social, economic, cultural, and political ties and activities, both with the country of origin and the host countries. This essential insight into the transnational character of the diaspora communities (Bash *et al.*, 1994) is important in the context of the still deeply entrenched perception of migrants' life - especially within the political discourse on migrants - as a fundamental struggle between two irreconcilable currents: the long-term process of integration into the host society on the one hand, and the process of nursing the long-term relationships with the countries of origin on the other. Namely, the transnational paradigm in the study of migrants points to the fact that these two currents are not necessarily antitheses, but rather, that they complement one another.

Recent cultural and sociological studies of life in the diaspora are increasingly demonstrating the relevance of religion as a transnational generator of continuity and establishment of new relationships towards the country of origin on the one hand, and the country of immigration on the other (Cohen, 1997; Lauser/Weissköppel, 2008). In this process, the special emphasis is placed on the role of religion as a mechanism of stabilization and articulation of the identity within the diaspora, both at the collective and individual levels, in terms of creating preconditions for a multi-layered and lasting incorporation of migrants into the host societies (Baumann, 2000; Söckefeld, 2008).

If we review the past research on migrations from the former Yugoslavia, either to Western Europe or overseas, we notice that these studies mainly focus on the socio-economic (Fijalkowski and Gillmeister, 1997) or political topics (Subotić, 1992, 1994a, 1994b; Nikolić, 1995; Hockenos, 2003). Contributions inspired by anthropological and sociological theories appeared in the recent years, and focused mainly on the phenomenon of transnationalism and group-building processes (Bock-Luna, 2007; Winland, 2007; Novinšćak, 2008; Aarburg and

Gretler, 2008; Ragazzi, 2009). Unlike these and many similar studies, the question of the role of religion among immigrants from the former Yugoslavia has, thus far, attracted little attention among migration scholars (Molina, 2005; Behloul, 2007, 2011; Porobić, 2012; Winterhagen, 2012).

This article will use the example of the Bosniak diaspora in Switzerland to look at certain aspects of religion in the context of life in the diaspora. Special scrutiny was given to the role of religion within the diaspora as a factor for preservation of ethno-specific cultural and religious heritage, and maintenance of relationships with the country of origin on the one side, and the potential of religion as a generator of establishing and strengthening various communication processes with the host society on the other. In order to overview the special organizational and infrastructural characteristics of Bosniaks in Switzerland, and the specificity of their communication with the Swiss society as a whole, we required a dual contextualization which, in comparison to other western European countries, at the same time reflects the uniqueness of the presence of Islam in Switzerland, and the structurally conditioned specificities of Swiss attitudes towards the issue of Islam and Muslims.

Muslims in Switzerland

From a statistical concept to a 'secret' Islamization

While examining the special characteristics of Islam in Switzerland, we should review the mechanism of the population census, carried out every ten years by the Federal Office for Statistics (BFS) in Switzerland. Unlike the population censuses in other European countries, the Swiss population census explicitly asks the question of religious affiliation. People of the Islamic faith in Switzerland were able to declare their religious affiliation for the first time in the 1970 census. Thus, through the mechanism of the population census, it is possible to follow the development of the number of Muslims in Switzerland in the last four decades. If it wasn't for the terrorist attacks, these figures would have been a more or less pure statistical term and would not have aroused much interest in the general public or the politics.

Similar to the rest of Western countries, terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 had a dramatic effect in Switzerland, not only on the perception of Islam as a religion, but also on the perception of immigrants from societies with a Muslim majority. This gave rise to a certain type of *alienization* and collectivization of otherwise culturally and ethnically heterogeneous migrant communities solely on the principle of religious affiliation. In the case of Switzerland, this sudden change in perception was reflected in the new perspective of the statistic data on Muslims. Previously and primarily in the area of political discourse, within the framework of various initiatives and elections at the local and federal level, ordinary figures would have been sufficient as a conclusive (mathematical) proof that a secret Islamization of the Swiss society has been underway for the past several decades. Naturally, this would be corroborated by highlighting the fact that the number of Muslims in Switzerland in 2000 was twenty times higher than in 1970, and that in just ten years, i.e. between 1990 and 2000, this number had doubled. As can be seen from the diagram below, the continuous growth in the number of immigrants from societies with a Muslim majority in Switzerland throughout the last decade is an undeniable fact. However, the numbers do not show the ethno-cultural specifics of Muslims in Switzerland, the reasons for their emigration, nor the extent or manner in which they practice Islam.

Diagram 1: Muslims in Switzerland

Islam in Switzerland as a (non-)European religion

The intense discussion of Islam and Muslims in Western societies, which, in the period following the September 11, 2001, affected almost all socially important segments (from parenting and integration, to questions of cultural and religious identity, and the topic of preserving public safety), differs from state to state by giving more attention to specific topics (burqa, minaret, ritual slaughter of animals, erection of mosques). However, the main and common characteristic of these different thematic discourses on Islam is the perception of Islam as a non-European religion, i.e. as a phenomenon that neither culturally nor historically, and especially not normatively, belongs to Europe. Therefore, it is not surprising that Muslim immigrants, unlike other non-Muslim immigrant groups in Western Europe, are exposed to certain general suspicions regarding loyalty, willingness to integrate, and acceptance of the Western European value system. Even though Switzerland does not differ from other Western countries in this respect, it stands out in terms of ethno-cultural background of its own Muslim population. For example, while most Muslims in the neighbouring France and Germany, or in the UK and the Scandinavian countries, are immigrants from non-European countries, the diagram below demonstrates that the majority of Muslims in Switzerland are, in fact, European immigrants, Muslims from the former Yugoslavia: Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Switzerland is, therefore, the only Western European country in which the majority of Muslims originate from Europe.

*Diagram 2: Muslims in Switzerland by their origin, data for 2012*

Taking into account this specific characteristic of Switzerland in the context of the discussion of Islam, we must ponder the position of, for example, Bosniaks as European Muslims in Switzerland, with regards to this perception of Islam as an essentially non-European religion.

Bosnians in Switzerland

Infrastructural specificities

Viewed from the perspective of the causes of migration processes, the Bosniak diaspora in Switzerland, unlike the other ethnic groups from the former Yugoslavia (such as the Croats and Serbs), largely represents the co-called refugee diaspora. Additionally, Bosniaks came to Switzerland as labour migrants individually in the late 1960's, and in groups in the early 1980's. However, labour migration from that time period had almost no effect on the creation of Bosniak ethno-religious structures in the diaspora. Only with the arrival of a large number of war refugees in the early 1990's, Bosniaks began creating specific organizational structures of the ethno-religious character, the so-called jamaats.1 The Islamic Community of Bosniaks in Switzerland (*Gemeinschaft der Bosniaken in der Schweiz*) is the umbrella organization of Bosniaks in Switzerland, containing approximately twenty officially registered jamaats. As the majority of Bosnians in Switzerland had settled in the economically and industrially most developed cantons, i.e. in the German-speaking areas of the country, the bulk of the jamaats are located in that area, as can be seen from the map below.

Map 1: Bosniak jamaats in Switzerland

The main characteristic of the Bosniak jamaats is reflected in their multifunctionality: jamaats are not only locations for satisfying the spiritual needs (prayer, religious education, etc), but also centres with a diverse transgenerational offer of material, social, political, and ethno-cultural character. Multifunctionality of the jamaats also corresponds with the multifunctionality of imams working in them. Unlike the imams in the home country, imams in the diaspora are faced with additional responsibilities and temptations, which go beyond the scope of religious content, but are directed against their own community and against the Swiss society as well.

Jamaats as homeland clubs: translocal and transnational character of the jamaats

Care and protection of the spiritual and cultural elements of the Bosniaks is the main priority of the jamaats, creating an inevitable connection of these institutions and their members not only with the country of origin in general, but especially with the local communities of the majority of members of a certain jamaat. Thus, there are jamaats in Switzerland which gather migrants who mainly originate from, for example, Sandžak, Bosanska Krajina, or Srebrenica. These and similar jamaats cherish the folklore heritage and cultural specificity of a local community. Transnational relations between the jamaats and the country of origin are preserved and strengthened by fostering a culture of remembrance, which is specific for the other diaspora as well, such as the Jewish and Armenian diasporas, for example. In addition to the celebration of national holidays of Bosnia and Herzegovina, jamaats actually observe the memorial day of the Srebrenica massacre, marking it through lectures and multimedia events. In recent times, the imams of certain jamaats became prominent in calling on the young generation of Bosniaks in Switzerland to actively participate in supporting their native country, not only in the form of humanitarian assistance, but also through involvement in investment projects.

Transnational characteristic of jamaats

In addition to translocal and transnational activities, representatives of Bosniak jamaats became prominent through various forms of establishing contacts with relevant actors in the Swiss society, i.e. with representatives from politics, as well as religious and cultural institutions, and through active participation in supranational umbrella organizations of Muslims in Switzerland. In his analysis of immigrant groups in the U.S.A. in terms of their voluntary engagement for the benefit of the common good of the entire society, Alex Stepick, an American sociologist of religion, mentions four main factors affecting the intensity of the aforementioned engagement: a) specificity of the community (Denomination), b) generational differences (Immigrant Generation), c) community leadership (Leadership), and d) perception of the community in the society (The Context of Reception: Immigrant's Treatment by the American Institutions and Society) (Stepick *et al.,* 2009: 7-13).

If we apply these four factors on the forms of communication and incorporation of Muslim immigrants into the Swiss society - and, naturally, the same is true for the rest of Western Europe - we can see that the most important generator of establishing closer relations with society is the factor of perception of Islam and the Muslim diasporas in

Western countries. As previously mentioned, Muslim immigrants, in contrast to other non-Muslim immigrants in Western countries, are faced with distrust and general suspicion by the majority population in terms of loyalty toward the society in which they live, and the general readiness and willingness to integrate. Their affiliation to Islam as a religion that is perceived as a non-European phenomenon, in the normative and historical-cultural sense, is used as the main criterion for this mistrust. With regards to the Bosniak diaspora in Switzerland an interesting question is raised in this context: how do the Bosniaks handle this perception, and to what extent does it affect their attitude towards the Swiss society.

Within the scope of a two-year comparative study, which I carried out on this topic using the example of Albanian Muslims and Bosniaks in Switzerland2, it was noticed that the influence of the perception of Islam as a non-European and problematic religion on the communication strategies of Muslims with the majority population was, in the case of Bosniaks, clearly manifested in their emphasis of their own European descent and, thus, a specific cultural heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an integral element of the Bosniak Islam. For example, representatives of the Bosniak jamaats in Switzerland tend to emphasize in their public statements that their own cultural heritage protects them from all forms of religious extremism, and that phenomena such as forced marriages, blood revenge, intolerance towards other religious communities and freedom of thought - i.e. the phenomena which are frequently used in the public discourse on Islam in Switzerland as paradigms of incompatibility of Islam with Western European Christian value system - are unknown in Bosnian Islam. While the representatives of the Albanian jamaats, following the strategy of deculturalization of Islam, argue that the aforementioned phenomena are incompatible with 'authentic' Islam and, accordingly, emphasize the necessity of 'authentic' Islam as a way of overcoming culturally and historically conditioned customs and forms of religious practices which are in contrast with 'authentic' Islam, Bosniak representatives highlight their own cultural heritage as a manner of protection from all forms of religious extremism (Behloul, 2011).

Through a multitude of their associations (youth, folk dance groups, women's committees, choirs, etc), Bosniak jamaats actively participate in various interreligious and intercultural activities, either as initiators or as guests of such events. These performances are mainly characterized by an interesting combination of presentation of cultural and spiritual heritage of Bosniak Islam to a wider Swiss public.

Additionally, it should be noted that the Bosniaks in Switzerland are generally perceived as unproblematic European Muslims. In scientific and political discourses of Western Europe on the possible integration of Islam and Muslims, Bosnian Islam is often mentioned as a model of the future European Islam, both in terms of its organizational structure, and in terms of the historically conditioned Bosniak experience of living under conditions of multi-religious and secular social order in the former Yugoslavia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina today.

Conclusion

The example of Bosniaks in Switzerland demonstrates that religion in the context of the diaspora has the potential of forming simultaneous connections with the country of origin and the host country. Through various forms and strategies of establishing new or intensifying the existing contacts, both with the society in which they live, and with the country from which they emigrated, diasporas may be points of creation of social and human capital.

The extents to which the aforementioned contacts may be intensified or, alternatively, become stagnant (i.e. be reduced to a minimum), depends on various factors. In addition to general social, socio-economic, and political situation in the country of origin and similar conditions in the country of immigration, the most important factor for the Muslim diaspora in Western Europe currently is the general perception of Islam in Western European societies. Stereotyping and stigmatization of migrants on the basis of their religious affiliation can lead to self-imposed isolation or even produce certain forms of religious or political extremism. If we look at the impact of the perception of Islam as a whole on the positioning of the Muslim diasporas in their societies, together with the consequences of intense debates on Islam and Muslims in Western European countries, we reach the conclusion that intense thematization of Islam has led to the intensification of communication by the Muslims with the societies in which they live.

Given the fact that the Muslim population in Western Europe is not a homogenous religious community, whether regarding their ethnicity, method of practicing Islam, or their political orientation, intense thematization of Islam has led to various forms of competitiveness among the Muslims. This is reflected not only in terms of whom the legitimate representatives of multiethnic Muslim diaspora are, or whether they are entitled to claim that position, but is also manifested in the manner in which certain diasporas handle the normative pressure from the society in which they live. The example of Bosniaks in Switzerland points to an interesting fact that the specific public perception of Islam generates more than just the strengthening of the relationships with the Swiss society. Communication strategies of Bosniaks with the Swiss society consists of emphasizing their cultural and spiritual heritage, which, at the same time, positions the Bosniaks as generally acceptable for the Swiss society, and as a role model for the other Muslim diasporas in Switzerland. In this respect, the perception of Islam in Switzerland stabilizes their ethno-specific attitude toward Islam among Bosniaks which, ultimately, further stabilizes the transnational and translocal activities of Bosniak jamaats in Switzerland. This also points to the fact that, as mentioned in the introduction, the processes of integration into the country of immigration and maintenance of long-standing relationships with the country of emigration do not necessarily represent two contradictory phenomena, but rather two complementary pillars of integration as a single long-term and multi-layered process.

In terms of further research of Bosniak diaspora, either in Switzerland or in Western Europe in general, it will be important to analyze the future direction of development of new generations of Bosniaks in diaspora. Alex Stepick emphasizes that generational differences are also one of the factors of the relationship of immigrants with the society in which they live. Given the fact that young Bosniaks in diaspora become involved in new supranational organizations of second-generation Muslims, who no longer perceive their religious profile and identity solely through belonging to a particular ethnic community, but through belonging to Islam as a universal religion, it appears logical to question whether this new form of orientation will eventually lead to a weakening of diasporic consciousness in the direction of supranational attitude towards Islam.3 In this context, Robert Cohen emphasizes not only the specific potential of religion "(to) provide additional cement to bind a diasporic consciousness (...)" (Cohen, 1997: 189), but also points to the fact that "the myth and idealization of the homeland and a return movement are (...) conspicuously absent in the case of world religions (...) and that their programmes are extraterritorial rather than territorial "(Cohen, 1997: 189).

Notes

[1]According to data from the Swiss Federal Office for Migration, there are currently around 40.000 Bosniaks living in Switzerland (www.bfs.admin.ch).

[2]For more details about the project and the results see:

 http://www.nfp58.ch/d_projekte_muslime.cfm?projekt=53 (10/18/2012).

[3]Using a model of social capital of A. Stepick, I am currently conducting research among young generations of Muslims in Switzerland. The goal of the project, funded by the Jacobs Foundation, is to explore the potential of the young Muslims organizations in Switzerland in terms of creating various forms of social capital as a precondition for integration into Swiss society. For more information about the project, see

http://www.unilu.ch/eng/muslimische-jugendgruppen_817133.html (10/18/2012).

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Social Integration of Immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniaks, Croats) in Croatia

Introduction

The national structure of Croatian society has a strong multiethnic character. In addition to the majority of Croats who, according to the Population Census of 2001, represent 89.6% of the population, the rest of the population is made up of twenty-two (22) national minorities. Between the two Population Censuses (1991-2001), the number and proportion of national minorities decreased significantly, while the number and proportion of the Croat majority increased. The war which occurred in the period between these two censuses (1991-1995) significantly influenced the change in the ethnic structure of the Republic of Croatia. The Croat majority had increased thanks to the contingent of Bosnian refugees, a substantial number of whom remained in Croatia. During the war and in the immediate post-war period, Bosniaks/Muslims experienced a certain national fragmentation, due to the change of the name. Approximately one half of all Muslims in Croatia accepted the national name Bosniak in the 2001 Population Census, while the others still identified themselves as Muslims. This creates a problem on the level of statistics, but also in the process of their integration into Croatian society and its institutional order. This paper will analyze the issue and scope of social integration of Bosniaks/Muslims from Kordun and Croats from Bosnia, who immigrated during and after the war in western Slavonia.

Using the interview technique, we obtained empirical findings on the problems in social integration of Bosniaks and Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Croatian society. While their reasons for coming to Croatia might be different ('peace-time' versus 'war-time' arrival), a common denominator in the process of integration into Croatian society can be characterized as a problem of immigrants in their new environment. However, there are specificities that need to be taken into account. In the case of Bosniaks, this is the immigration of a collective with an ethnic and religious character different from the majority of the local population. Among Bosnian Croats, the difference lies not in the nationality (immigration into a predominantly Croatian environment) or religion (Catholicism is the most prevalent religion), but lies in the fact that they are emigrating from another country, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the problem in the relations between settlers and the indigenous population.

Social integration: material and socio-psychological aspects

Community is the fundamental substrate of the human society. While society is a structured network of social relationships with many institutional forms, the community has a character of immediacy, proximity, intimate relationship. The term *community* is used in a very wide range, from the family sphere to the global community and, as such, it often contains a variety of elements, including those which are more characteristic of a society. Value system is important for the community, and it must be generally acceptable for creation of a community. This is highlighted in the *Leksikon temeljnih pojmova politike* (Lexicon of fundamental concepts of politics), which states: "It [the community] takes on the function of primary consensus, i.e. the consensus on basic values which make staying together a sensible thing to do. Consensus

also means that certain issues of common life (precisely those that comprise the content of a consensus) are withdrawn from public debate and retained in the non-debatable assumptions of the public, and the community itself". In sociological theory, there are different approaches to the concepts of community and its delimitation from the concept of society. Questions and issues related to disintegration of traditional rural communities and the creation of urban society structures are in the centre of the analytical interpretation of the first sociologists and their predecessors.

What are all the problems related to the social integration of different ethnic and local groups into Croatian society/state in the post-war period? To which degrees do the material and socio-psychological factors affect the degree and intensity of integration? In the era of ethno-national homogenisation, integration of the members of the national majority in the Croatian society/state is certainly easier and simpler than incorporating into the social environment the members of a national minority in Croatia. By comparing the social integration of Bosnian migrants, Bosniaks in Kordun and Croats in western Slavonia, it will be possible to make conclusions on the significance of differences between these two groups in terms of social integration.

Empirical research

Bosniaks

This section will attempt to address several key issues related to the life of Bosniaks/Muslims in Kordun. An attempt was made to systematically demonstrate the development and the issues of Bosniak/Muslim community in Kordun. This was done based on the statements collected during 2010 and 2011 in the villages in which Muslims/Bosniaks constitute a majority or a minority, based on archival material from the *Meshihat* of the Islamic Community in Zagreb, as well as on the news and literature.

As a reason for immigrating to Kordun in the 1960's, the majority of respondents cited the quality of land in this area. Another reason for immigration was the overpopulation of the Cazinska Krajina area where large families with many family members owned small pieces of land, which became even smaller through division and inheritance, which ultimately led to their impoverishment. Therefore, the sons who chose not to remain on their land, searched for work in countries abroad or in other parts of Yugoslavia (most frequently in Austria, Germany, or Slovenia). Once they had earned a certain amount of money, they would invest in buying a piece of land near their fatherland, but in Croatia, where the elderly Croats and Serbs sought to sell their land and move to more fertile parts of the country. Immigration of families, their first neighbours, and their friends from the home country to Kordun came after the initial arrivals and immigration of Muslims in Croatia.

Inter-ethnic relations in Kordun between 1945 and 1991 were generally very sensitive, preserved under a thin veil of the slogan of fraternity and unity. Relations between Croats and Serbs have been poisoned since the Second World War and the post-war period. However, all of these traumas were supposed to be suppressed in the name of good neighbourly interfaith and inter-ethnic relations in the multiethnic Kordun. This was impossible at times and, according to the statements of several witnesses, there were individual cases of murder resulting from the resentment caused by Muslims settling in Serb villages, even in the time of socialist Yugoslavia. Even though, on the surface, these murders were caused by interpersonal conflicts, they were essentially caused by interethnic intolerance. Serb intolerance had a very deep character, being that the Serbs guarded this border from the Turks

for at least three centuries. The term "Turks" was used to refer to Muslims on either side of the border, and is still used by Serbs and Croats in Kordun. The fact that the Muslims who settled in Kordun lived much better in the time of Yugoslavia than they do in the independent Croatia is quite sensible, since the Kordun Muslims lived in one common state with the Muslims in the Cazinska Krajina during the Yugoslav republic.

Democratic changes at the beginning of the 1990's strongly influenced the interpersonal and inter-ethnic relations in the former Yugoslavia. The area of Kordun, religiously heterogeneous since the early modern ages, became even more heterogeneous in socialist Yugoslavia through adding another religious and, later, national element in its religious and ethnic composition. As the Vojnić municipality was one of the areas with absolute Serbian majority, over 85%, and as the Vrginmost municipality had a Serbian majority above 65%, both municipalities were annexed to the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina in 1991. Following the military operations in this area, the area of Slunj became governed by Serbs in November 1991. Previous relatively good interpersonal relationships were replaced by generally poor relations that led to the emigration of Bosniaks/Muslims to neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly to the areas of Kladuša and Cazin. The events in the neighbouring western Bosnia were particularly important for this border region of Kordun. A charismatic leader Fikret Abdić founded a para-state in this region, the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (Autonomna pokrajina Zapadna Bosna). It was declared a republic in July 1995, a few days prior to its dissolution.

The events from that time strongly affected the fate of Muslims in the area of Kordun. Their life stories are related to two present-day states and two para-states that existed on the territory of Cazinska Krajina and Kordun. Their political affiliation was primarily influenced by the desire to survive the war, and not by their own personal opinion. Several respondents actively participated in the Croatian Army and lived through the war on one of Croatian battlefields. However, there are only a few of such cases. Some Muslims became involved with politics at the beginning of the war, joining the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica). Immediately following the outbreak of the war, some of the respondents crossed the border and went to Bosnia, where they had relatives or property. The other respondents who fled to Bosnia did so only after 1993, following the Operation Maslenica, when they were forced to leave by the authorities of the Republic of Srpska Krajina (RSK). A very small number of them agreed to cooperate (in any way) with the authorities of the RSK. A third specific group of Muslims/Bosniaks in Kordun consisted of those who, in fleeing to Bosnia and Herzegovina, joined the units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the Army of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. Their joining to one of these armies is explained in a single statement by a respondent who says: *I supported the winning army, thus saving the skin on my back*. Following the Operation Storm (Oluja), most of them returned to their homes within one to six months. If abandoned, their houses were inhabited by the Serbs during the war, but, in most cases, they were not badly damaged or destroyed.

Following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, Muslims/Bosniaks in Croatia found themselves in a very unfavourable position. Specifically, Bosniaks were erased from the preamble of the Croatian Constitution in 1997, together with Slovenians. Only after a stern request by the president of the Islamic Community in Croatia, Muslims were listed as one of the national minorities in the preamble of the Constitution from which they were erased. After the end of the most recent war, Croatian nationalism, which was very strong in returnee areas, was expressed not only toward Serbs, but toward Muslims/Bosniaks who played a neutral role here during the last war. Forms of discrimination against Bosniaks can be divided into two categories:

a) Inability to exercise the right to citizenship

b) Inability to exercise the right to work (often related to the first category).

One of the biggest problems of the local Muslim/Bosniak population is the inability to obtain citizenship. A large number of Bosniaks/Muslims living in Cetingrad and Slunj municipalities (as well as in Croatia in general) face this problem. This issue is related to a number of other problems that make life difficult for Kordun Bosniaks/Muslims. During the war, most Bosniaks/Muslims in the Kordun area lived in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, thus, did not have the opportunity to request Croatian documents in one of the cities in Croatia. Upon returning to Croatia, they followed regular procedures in requesting certificates of citizenship as a basic document for the enjoyment of all rights and obligations under the law. All those who applied the request for issuance of a citizenship certificate had a registered residence in Croatia for more than five years, which was one of the basic requirements for citizenship. They used the documents of the Socialist Republic of Croatia for demonstrating this minimum of uninterrupted five-year residence in Croatia. They were employed in Croatian companies or were individual farmers or entrepreneurs, which means that they filed their taxes in SR Croatia. In that regard, instead of being treated as returnees, these people were left without their basic documents, without the right to work, without social and pension insurance, credit for restoration, and even without the right to humanitarian aid. Their freedom of movement was limited, as well. The only option they had was to seek the status of permanent foreign residents, which was either denied for many people, or their status of permanent foreign residents was terminated. Lower levels of government, especially in the formerly occupied municipalities, bureaucratically obstructed the procedure, protracted the issuance of the decision, or charged high fees. Following appeals, and decisions to the contrary passed by higher instances, the obstruction continued with impunity.

There are significant problems with employment of local people in returnee areas. Due to a very low number of available jobs, it is extremely difficult to find employment. In 2011, only one Bosniak/Muslim was employed in the utility company in Vojnić, and only a few of them are employed in the public sector in the area of Topusko. Employment in the public sector is closely linked to Croatian citizenship, and many Bosniaks/Muslims are, therefore, unable to get the job from the start. When applying for publically advertised jobs at the municipal offices, national minorities should have a priority over members of the majority, provided that they have the same conditions and experience. Due to the arbitrary interpretation of the law, local governments often circumvent this article of the law so that Bosniaks/Muslims, who have the right to be employed at a particular job, are ultimately not hired.

In the newly created Republic of Croatia, Bosniaks faced a new problem. In the 2001 Population Census, 19.677 Croatian citizens declared their national identity using the previous name for Bosniaks, *Muslim*. As this category is not recognized by the Croatian Constitutional Court, these citizens are included among the "Others", and are virtually non-existent within the frameworks of all regulations in the Republic of Croatia. Our respondents had various responses to the question of their national identity. Most commonly, nationality was closely tied to the affiliation with one of the Muslim/Bosniak political options in Bosnia and Herzegovina (at least, this was the case in the last Population Census). Those who considered themselves as supporters of the so-called autonomist politics of Fikret Abdić, declared themselves as Muslims. The others, who felt they were a minority originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina (and not from AR Western Bosnia) and who supported the pro-Bosniak policy of the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije) declared themselves as Bosniaks. One respondent from Komesarac (Cetingrad) says: *If I'm not a Muslim, I am nothing. This is my*

religio-nation. Those in Sturlić [first major village across the border in Bosnia, opposite Bogovolja, A/N] *are not Bosniaks, they are Bosnians. This really bothers me. Grandpa was a Muslim when Tito said it was ok to be Muslim. We fought for the right to be Muslims, and Bosniaks existed 300 years ago in eastern Bosnia.*

Among the questions asked of the respondents, we also included the questions of current inter-ethnic relations in the villages, mixed marriages, and intra-ethnic relationships. Certainly, the international relations significantly deteriorated due to large doses of mistrust among the people following the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the recent war, but it is even more significant to note that the intra-ethnic relations in the Bosniak/Muslim community in the last decade of the twentieth century deteriorated to such an extent that there is a clear division, even today, between the so-called autonomy supporters, and those who wish for integrity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It seems that there is a far lower number of the latter.

Relations between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks/Muslims following the most recent war have been visibly lukewarm. In most cases, they are reduced to greetings, and in rare cases result in socializing and intimate friendships. Social distance toward Serbs is somewhat larger than toward Croats, but the aforementioned forms of discrimination are removing Bosniaks/Muslims away from the citizens of Croatian nationality as well. Bosniaks/Muslims in Kordun are faced with yet another problem related to the feeling of belonging to a certain country. Younger generation who are born in Croatia no longer perceive Bosnia as their homeland, instead perceiving Croatia as their native country. They feel as strangers when they go to Bosnia, yet they are victims of various forms of discrimination in Croatia.

Croats

Empirical research (interviews) in the field was conducted on the subject of social integration of Bosnian Croats (war migrants) into local communities of Western Slavonia (Okučani and the vicinity). The study was carried out on July 27th and 28th, 2012 in Okučani, Cage, Benkovac, and Nova Gradiška, in the form of interviews (a total of 19), with the population of Bosnian Croat war refugees. Questions/responses were grouped into several thematic sections which jointly problematise the questions/issues of social integration of this population into the settlements of Western Slavonia. In the following text, we will present the answers of the respondents and the comments, as per these thematic units.

War conflicts in the former Yugoslavia triggered massive war migrations, and particularly massive was the exodus from Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the interviews, the respondents were asked about their memories of the reception and acceptance in the environment, and the problems they faced, as well as about all they see as problematic in their neighbourhoods and in Croatia. Here are some of their answers:

As refugees, we first came to western Slavonia (...) we were given a house to live in and we had to invest in it quite heavily. It took us three years to finish the investment and repair of the house. I was well accepted here, there were Czechs here, Serbs, and others (...) I have three children. The house was returned to the Serbs, the APN agency had bought a house, and then I was given that house. (Male, born in 1958, Okučani, Derventa)

I came here as a small child, I went to school in Okučani. I had no problems, there were school children from everywhere (...) from Serbia, Bosnia. (Male, born in 1989, Cage, Derventa)

We lived near Požega, after which we came to Vrbovljani, and then, in 2005, to Cage. We were granted temporary use of a house here. We did not have major problems. My husband died in the meantime, I was left alone with the children. We intend to stay here. (Female, born in 1942, Cage, Foča near Doboj)

After arriving to Croatia, Bosnian Croats were faced with classic refugee problems, from housing to basic means of subsistence. It was noted that some of them changed several houses or villages until they secured permanent accommodation. Another issue particularly related to the refugee population is definitely the decline of social status. From well-off and respected citizens, they became beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance and dependents, without any social status or reputation. As one respondent vividly described, she wore 'nice shoes' in Bosnia, which speaks volumes about her status decline in relation to the pre-war life in Bosnia. Experiences of social interaction in the arrival period are varied and correlated with certain sub-identity characteristics of the interviewed population (age, gender), as well as with the neighbourhoods to which they arrived and the population they encountered there. Somewhat easier integration is noted in the younger population, especially where they were mixed with other children of a similar (refugee) fate. As observed in several interviews, there were cases of stigmatization based on origin ('Bosnian'), and the arrival to a ethnically homogenized environment, with a low number of non-Croats, did not represent (within the dimension of ethnicity) almost any problem to the newly arrived, mostly Croat, population from Bosnia.

At the time of the interviews, memories from the war, although present, were not the dominant problem/issue of the population in western Slavonia, including the Bosnian Croats. Existential questions took precedence, including the sources of income and the prospects of staying in the area of Okučani. What did the respondents say about these issues?

I have a small pension, only 2200 HRK. I work in sports, I am a football delegate, I'm also a scout for Dinamo. I'll probably stay here, but nostalgia for my land in Derventa is pulling at my heart, I'd like to build something there, so that I can show my grandchildren what is mine and where I was born. (Male, born in 1958, Okučani, Derventa)

How do I live? It's hard, there are only 'under the table' jobs, I get by, but how long will I be able to go on like this? I'm young and I have no future prospects. Most people are in a similar situation (...) a lot of them moved away from here. But it is difficult elsewhere, as well (...) the crisis, recession. Some get married in Austria, Germany, and stay there like that. I don't think I want to stay here. If the opportunity arose, I would leave, either to another part of Croatia, and I am also considering going abroad. (Male, born in 1989, Cage, Derventa)

For effective social integration into a social environment, it is important to fulfil several assumptions which can be subsumed under two fundamental assumptions: material and socio-psychological. From these interviews, it was evident that the problems of social interaction between different ethnic groups (relations between Croats and Serbs) are mostly reduced to a low intensity of communication, certain amount of mutual help, but are lacking any confrontation or ethnic incidents. War memories are not a dominant part of the socio-psychological and existential reality in Okučani and the surrounding areas. Much more important and challenging are the material aspects of social integration, which is certainly true for Bosnian Croats. In answering this question, the majority of respondents highlight the combination of different sources of income, dominated by pension and welfare. In the Okučani area, as well as in the entire Brodsko-Posavski County, the employment opportunities are few

and far between. Only a very small number of Bosnian Croats found jobs in this area, while a much larger number of them work in other Croatian regions (Zagreb, Rijeka, and other cities) and abroad (Germany, Canada, Austria). According to several respondents, family networks are of particular importance for existential survival. Kinships and family ties are more intense in the less developed areas and populations, as well as in those who find themselves in desperate trouble. Bosnian environment is paradigmatic in this regard, and Bosnian Croats partake in this collective imaginary and, consequently, in the behaviour in similar situations.

Can such social networks be rebuilt and re-established after the war in order to form the multiethnic character of local communities? In terms of inter-ethnic communication, what is the situation in Okučani and the surrounding areas like?

I coach a football team, I had Serb players. After the war, it was a bit more tense, things are pretty much normal now. Vrbovljani, Covac, Gređani, the situation is good over there. There is a café owned by a Serb, but no Serbs are going to his place! (Male, born in 1958, Okučani Derventa)

There are a very few Serbs here, good people, there are mixed marriages. (Male, born in 1949, Cage, Derventa)

There is no significant separation, people communicate with each other (...), drink coffee, help one anoter (...). (Male, born in 1988, Cage, Derventa)

I had and I have contacts with local Croats and the returnee Serbs. When I came here, I had contacts with everyone at school. But even then, you could feel the division between the children, as you can feel it among the adults now. (Male, born in 1988, Cage, Derventa)

Only a few Serbs have returned, we maintain contact with them (...) the elderly Serbs are returning (...) there are mixed marriages. (Feale, born in 1954, Cage, Derventa)

Social interaction between members of different ethnic and local groups make up the fundamental substance of local communities and the assumption of what is referred to as society. Reconstruction of primary social networks was particularly active in the post-war period, but had an uncertain outcome. The area of western Slavonia was a battlefield. Croats were the first to return in the post-war period, and Serbs followed shortly after. In addition to Bosnian Croats and Croats from Vojvodina who settled in these areas, they comprise the majority population on which the local social and inter-ethnic relations depend. In the previously conducted research on social interaction and communication between different ethnic groups (focusing on Croats and Serbs), we find that these relationships in western Slavonia (together with Banija) are somewhat better, and sometimes even much better, than in eastern Slavonia and Dalmatia. The participants in our interviews mostly confirmed these findings.

Concluding remarks

Bosnian migrants in Croatia, both those who settled in the early years of socialism (Muslims/Bosniaks in Kordun), and the war migrants who arrived during the war in western Slavonia (Bosnian Croats), face difficulties integrating into Croatian society. While in the first case (Muslims/Bosniaks) we are referring to economic motives of immigration, the fact that Kordun and Cazinska Krajina (region of origin for most of the interviewed Muslims/Bosniaks) are also former war areas has made the socio-political status of both Bosnian migrant groups similar, during the scope of our research. Bosniaks/Muslims migrate to Kordun from Cazinska Krajina because of socio-economic and demographic reasons (better land in Kordun, overpopulation in Cazinska Krajina). During socialism, inter-ethnic relations were controlled and ideologically shaped. However, even at that time, in spite of living together and developing networks of primary social relations between the members of different ethnicities (Bosniaks/Muslims, Serbs, and Croats), there were cases of individual murders caused by inter-ethnic intolerance. The war in the 1990's presented the Muslims/Bosniaks with new challenges and different affiliations. One part of Kordun Muslims/Bosniaks joined the Croatian side, a smaller number of them were mobilized into the Serbian forces, and of those who returned to Bosnia, one part joined the BiH Army, while the other part supported the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. Our sources explain some of these choices as 'saving your own skin' in difficult and turbulent times of war. A particular problem this population is facing is the national fragmentation into Bosniaks and Muslims, leading to the question of the identity of this ethnic community. Nearly twenty years after the war, Bosniaks/Muslims are dealing with integration problems and several forms of discrimination are present, such as the inability to exercise the right to citizenship and the right to work.

Bosnian Croats moved to the area of western Slavonia (Okučani and the surrounding areas) due to persecution and forced removal from Bosnia and Herzegovina, mostly by the Bosnian Serbs. Most of them emigrated from Bosanska Posavina and the wider region of Banja Luka. In the post-war social environment, they are facing problems with social integration into Croatian socio-political, economic, and cultural space. The local communities in western Slavonia are inhabited by the members of formerly warring ethnic groups (Croats and Serbs), and a certain social distance and mild animosity were evident in the Croat population, especially immediately after the war, between the local Croats and Croat immigrants from other countries of former Yugoslavia, and particularly those from Bosnia and Herzegovina (due to their number). Over time, national and regional problems transform and manifest themselves as economic and existential. In this study, Bosnian Croats expressed some of their observations and views on social integration into Croatian society. Their memories of the old country are varied. While the middle and older generations highlight their existential achievements in Bosnia, as well as certain benefits of living there ('neighbours', family connections, landscape), younger respondents were unable to compare Bosnia and Croatia. As an advantage of Croatia, the respondents cited the organized society and larger existential benefits. Most of them are on social welfare or retired, and they supplement this modest income by working for daily wages and helping each other. Family networks are important for facilitating their existential issues. Young people have mostly left or plan to leave the western Slavonia, and the European recession is making things difficult for those who wish to emigrate. The majority of middle-aged and elderly people say that they will remain where they currently are, and perceive the return to Bosnia only at the level of maintaining the memory of the old country and not as a permanent solution.

This research demonstrates how difficult it is to be perceived as a 'foreigner' in a certain place, even when the members of a certain group have been involved in the social environment of a particular area for decades (Bosniaks/Muslims in Kordun), or if we refer to persons who belong to the majority national group (Bosnian Croats). At the same time, even though their arrivals were variedly motivated (Bosniaks/Muslims arrived in times of peace, Bosnian Croats came during the war), their Otherness in relation to the indigenous population, especially in turbulent times, makes them similar in terms of construction of their status within the society.

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Bosniaks in Croatia:
Immigration and Transnational Social Spaces

Abstract

The paper presents a segment of the social relations of Bosniaks in Croatia that is relevant for the contemporary debates in the social sciences - their transnational social spaces. Transnational ties of Bosniaks in Croatia are exceptionally developed and present a relevant case with many specificities, which can be used for comparative study of the emergence of transnational social spaces. Unlike other migrant groups included in contemporary research, Bosniaks mostly immigrated during the time when there were no administrative and political obstacles for the development of pluri-local ties, in the form of international borders. Also, they have the status of a national minority, their immigration is additionally generated by the existing social ties at the meso-level, and, following the dispersion of Bosniaks during the 1992-1995 war and their forced migration, the emergence of international borders and stronger transnational linking of Bosniak migrants took place. The conditions for maintaining transnational ties of Bosniaks in Croatia, their legal and political status, the proximity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the mobilization of the second generation, will certainly help the sustainability of specific transnational social spaces that should be included in future comparative studies aiming to create valid empirical generalizations, if not to generate theory itself.

Keywords: *Bosniaks, Croatia, diaspora, ethnic minorities, migration, transnational social spaces*

Introduction

Immigration of Bosniaks to Croatia should have received a significant amount of attention from the social scientists, particularly the sociologists and historians who study the manners and types of migrations (such as "internal", "external", forced, labor, etc.), creation and maintenance of the diaspora as a social form, construction and alteration of ethnic and national identities, emergence of new ethnic minorities, development of new, intensive social ties and relationships across the boundaries of nation-states, etc., as this case connects all of these social phenomena and processes. "Free migration" (Petersen, 1958) of the Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia, among other countries, occurs at the inception of the constructs of nations and national identities in southeastern Europe and, thus, the exploration of the development of ethnic identity among Muslim immigrants would provide important insights into the processes of the building of the Bosniak nation and national identity from the 19th century to the present day, as well as into the process of transformation of social identity in general. Given the deep divisions still existing between the primordialists and the modernists among the social scientists, this would also represent a major contribution to the debate about the origins of nations (Smith, 2002) because the identities of migrants were the most important source for the evaluation of the national identity development (Connor, 1990). Furthermore,

recent comparative studies of the diaspora demonstrate up to thirty factors that influence the alterations in the representation of the homeland, but even these are not sufficient for a valid historical generalization (Morawska, 2011: 1045). Due to the frequent changes in the administrative and state format of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as of the collective identity of Bosnian Muslims, study of the formation of the Bosniak diaspora and their own representation of their homeland through history would provide a valuable contribution for further research of the regularity of diasporan practices and representations.

Despite the empirical and scientific relevance of the case of Bosniaks in Croatia, only a small number of empirically and scientifically relevant studies on Bosniaks were published in Croatia thus far. This is why we decided to present at least one segment of the contemporary social activity of Bosniaks in Croatia relevant for the contemporary debates in social sciences - their transnational social spaces. Transnational social spaces (TSS's) can generally be defined as "sustained ties of persons, networks and organizations across the borders across multiple nation-states, ranging from little to highly institutionalized forms" (Faist, 2000b: 189). The main theoretical approaches consider TSS's as the pluri-local frames of reference (Pries, 2001, 2005), emphasize the unequal exchange of ideas, practices, and resources within multiple interlocking networks of social relationships (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004: 1009) and forms of transactions across the borders of the nation-states (Faist, 2000a, 2000b). Despite the disciplinary differences and paradigmatic preferences of the authors, all approaches describe TSS's as "networks of social relationships" (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004), "social and symbolic ties" (Faist, 2000b) or "social relations" (Pries, 2001) and, therefore, transnational social connections - symbolic, direct and indirect, between the individual and institutional actors[1] - are of particular interest for the empirical research of TSS's, including ours. Highly developed transnational ties of Bosniaks in Croatia, as the most relevant case with many specificities, could be used for a comparative study of the emergence of TSS's since, unlike other migrant groups included in the current research, the majority of Bosniaks immigrated during the period when there were no administrative or political obstacles for the development of pluri-local relations in the form of international borders. Additionally, they have the status of a national minority, the immigration itself was additionally generated through the existing social relationships at the meso-level, and the emergence of international borders and the more powerful transnational ties of Bosniak migrants followed the dispersal of Bosniaks during the war and the forced migration in the period of 1992-1995. Therefore, we will describe the immigration of Bosniaks to Croatia and the forms of their TSS's, thus providing a specific case for future comparative analyses of TSS's.

Immigration of Bosniaks to Croatia

Bosniaks in Croatia are not just a "migrant population" but also the second largest of the 22 minorities listed in the Constitution. According to the 2001 census data, 20,755 members of the Bosniak national minority were recorded in Croatia, and 19,677 people identified themselves as Muslim. Taken into consideration the option of dual declaration, the Bosniak community was split into two groups - Muslims and Bosniaks. Should these two categories merge together, as proposed by the Bosniak National Association in Croatia, the total number of Bosniaks in Croatia registered in the 2001 census would amount to 40,432.[2] According to data of the latest 2011 Population Census, there were 7,558 Muslims and 31,479 Bosniaks, which is a significant increase within this category in comparison to 2001, indicating the growing ethnic self-consciousness of Bosniaks in Croatia.

The autochthony of the Muslim or, rather, Bosniak community in Croatia is indicated by the immigration of Bosniaks - Muslims in the late 19th century, following the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia (1878), who mostly migrated to Zagreb. The reasons for the initial immigration of Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb and other Croatian cities, such as Osijek and Karlovac, were mainly education, followed by employment and military service (Čičak-Chand, 1999: 453). However, from the late 19th century until 1918, the most significant Muslim group in Zagreb were the students at the University of Zagreb, who arrived following the decision of the Croatian-Slavonian National Government in 1892 which enabled the students from the Sarajevo Sharia Law School to attend the Croatian Law School and pass the bar exam (Hasanbegović, 2007). In the early 20th century, the first academic clubs for university students were founded in Zagreb. However, there was still no permanent settlement of the Muslims in the Banate of Croatia due to the religious restrictions placed on the marriage and the right to citizenship. The presence of Muslims in Croatia has been statistically recorded since 1910, and their number grew rapidly during and immediately following the First World War. Their permanent settlement and status were strengthened by the legal recognition of Islam as an equal religion in Croatia in 1916. According to the 1931 census data, 4,750 Muslims were registered in Croatia (Kulenović 1997, in Čičak-Chand, 1999: 454). A stronger migratory wave of Muslims-Bosniaks to Zagreb as the economic and cultural center occurred during the period from 1918 to 1941. Immigration of Bosniaks to Croatia did not cease or abate during the Second World War, and it was even intensified in certain periods of WWII, mostly due to the refugee flows from BiH, and the policy of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH).

After the Second World War, during the period of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the number of Muslims in Croatia kept rising. This increase occurred within the context of labor migrations which ensued due to uneven economic and demographic development of BiH and Croatia. Economic underdevelopment of BiH on the one hand, and the growing industrialization in Croatia on the other, spurred the migration of Bosniaks to Croatia. This also demonstrated that the areas with labor force shortages and the areas of low population growth are becoming immigration areas, especially for the semi-skilled and unskilled labor force.

Even though the dominant migratory routes from Bosnia immediately following the Second World War were those toward Serbia, this trend changed after 1948 and migration towards Croatia intensified (Milojević, 1986: 13). Given the structure of the SFRY, migrations of Bosniaks to Croatia were inter-republic. Inter-republic and inter-provincial employment is defined as the employment of workers from one republic on the territory of other republics or autonomous provinces, with or without the assistance of the Employment Bureaus at the self-governing communities of interest (SCI). In fact, except for the individuals who participated in the traditional chain migration, there were also organized migrations at the level of the region and the entire country. While the information (regarding employment, housing, education, etc) from the relatives and/or locals who emigrated earlier played the key role in chain migrations, this role in organized forms of migration was supposed to be played by the self-governing communities of interest. SCIs for employment, as the sole authorized agent, were to ensure the selection in the process of employment, respecting the priorities and precedence, and should have provided certain protection for workers (accommodation, meals, travel expenses, etc.). However, migration and employment were not institutionally organized in most cases, except in the case of seasonal employment. Workers often sourced their own employment through relatives, advertisements, or agents, and reported to their local SCI only after being formally hired by the employer or organization; shortly after, they would bring their

family members to Croatia as well (Milojević, 1986: 103). It is estimated that in the period from 1976 to 1978, over 60,000 people from BiH were permanently employed in Croatia. Most of them settled in Zagreb (41.6% of all Bosnian workers employed in Croatia), followed by Rijeka, Slavonski Brod, Sisak, Dubrovnik and Split. In the period from 1977 to 1980, Croatia had the highest positive migration balance in absolute numbers, and BiH had the highest negative migration balance (Oliveira-Roca, 1981: 26-50). It must be noted that the Muslims (Bosniaks) from BiH at that time most frequently migrated to Croatia (49%), followed by Slovenia (34.8%). Most of them were skilled workers (83.9%), and every other person is reported to have been a construction worker. This is consistent with the census data on inter-republic mobility in employment which is inversely proportional to the degree of education (Milojević, 1986: 22-50).

Migration of Bosniaks to Croatia continued even after Croatian independence, during the war (1991 - 1995), as well as after it. Among the biggest refugee flows in Croatia were precisely the flows of Bosniaks during the war in Bosnia (1992 - 1995) when, according to some estimates, more than 500,000 refugees arrived in Croatia in three waves (Kostović et al., 2001). According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, the refugee flows from BiH affected one half of the total Muslim population or more than one million people, a quarter of the Croat population, and one tenth of the Serb population. According to the Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees at the Government of the Republic of Croatia, most of the refugees from BiH were Muslims - women, children, and men over the age of 55 (Zlatković Winter, 1992: 132). A number of Bosniaks remained in Croatia after the war ended, a number of them returned to BiH, and a significant number of them migrated to other countries, using Croatia only as a transit destination.

After 1995, migrations of Bosniaks to Croatia are still ongoing, mainly within the framework of labor migration. In 2010, out of the total number of immigrants in Croatia, 51.8% were from BiH. Given the extremely high unemployment rate in BiH (approximately 40%) and weak economic growth, a number of workers sought employment in the Croatian labor market, and in the period from 1994 to 2003 the highest number of work permits were issued to citizens of BiH (Migration Policy Strategy of the Republic of Croatia for 2006-2007). Increased immigration of Bosniaks to Croatia is, therefore, a result of strong push and pull factors (Lee, 1966), as well as of the pluri-local family and friendship relations, i.e. the initiation of social principles of obligation, reciprocity, and solidarity entailed in these ties (Faist, 2000b), which means that, even prior to the development of TSS's, Bosniaks began immigrating to Croatia using their (strong) social relations at a distance.

Transnational social spaces of Bosniaks in Croatia

Following the war and the dispersal of Bosniaks across nearly all continents and in a multitude of countries, Bosniaks in Croatia intensified the transnational connections and began creating sustainable TSS's. Contacts and ties of Bosniaks in Croatia who participated in our study extend across 18 nation-states.[3] Geographical distribution of the transnational networks of our interviewees is, for the most part, multi-local, i.e. it includes the actors in at least three nation-states (including BiH), although there are examples of spatially very extensive family networks:

"My family has been displaced throughout the world, or, to be precise, in eleven countries. Most of them are in Sweden, followed by Norway, Denmark, Germany, Austria, America, Australia" (interviewee, male, age 70).

Given that transnational activities and relations of Bosniaks in Croatia often include actors in third countries, research of the TSS's should modify the often exclusive bipolar focus. i.e. the relation between "country of origin" and "destination country", and should include other locales that, to an equal or greater degree, "structure everyday practices, social positions, biographical employment projects and human identities" of the actors, as per Pries' (2005: 180) definition of the TSS's.

Most of the described examples of transnational activities and ties in the conducted interviews relate to direct social relations of interviewees with family members in BiH and third countries which are maintained indirectly and directly. From the perspective of our interviewees in Croatia, the frequency with which they visit their family members in BiH varies from once a month, every two or three months, twice a year, to once a year, but it is important to emphasize that the meetings of extended members of transnational families are more common due to the fact that they also occur in Croatia or in the third countries (e.g. Norway, the U.S.A., Switzerland, etc). For example, according to one interviewee's description regarding the visits from family members in the United States:

"They come at least once a year, at least someone from the family. Just now, this year, two of my cousins came, my grandma and uncle came last year, my aunt and uncle came the year before, as did my cousin and her little daughter. So, at least one person comes every year. (...) They come for a month and they spend a little time here in Zagreb, then they go to Slovenia since we are all over the place. And, of course, they go to Bosnia. Their heart hears the call of their motherland" (interviewee, second generation, female, age 23).

Relations across the boundaries of nation-states are also maintained indirectly, and the widespread mediums of transnational communication include telephone or cell phone, mainly among the older interviewees, and Skype (calls made either to a landline or online, sometimes using a web camera), MSN, or Facebook among the youth, although there is no set rule. Also widespread is the use of e-mails and text messages as a communication method, while letters, cards, and postcards are used only in exceptional cases. The frequency with which the interviewees maintain indirect contacts with relatives and friends in Bosnia and other countries varies from daily contact, contact every few days, once a week, a few times a month, once a month, and up to a few times per year. Although indirect communication with immediate family living in other states (for example, with children) is more frequent than in the cases of transnational separation between the members of the extended family, among the interviewees' families there are examples of highly connected transnational extended families in which indirect communication is a part of everyday life. For example, describing the communication between her mother in Zagreb and family members in BiH and third countries (USA, Sweden, United Kingdom, etc.) one interviewee stated:

"My mom's phone bill is three thousand HRK, (laughter) there is no stopping her when it comes to the phone. She "touches base" on a daily basis. With everyone. (laughter) My mom is the switchboard. (...) [Researcher:] *And who does she call, for example?* Everyone. When I say everyone, I mean everyone. Her sisters, all of their kids" (interviewee, second generation, female, age 30).

Topics of conversations described by the interviewees are mostly related to family matters - the health of the elderly members of the family, conversations about children and grandchildren, or recounting the events of everyday life, particularly in cases of frequent transnational communication:

"We are constantly in touch via telephone or internet [with family and friends in Sarajevo]. The topics include all the things we would be discussing if we lived in the

same town; simply, we talk about life - from health to politics, recipes, and the weather" (interviewee, male, age 38).

Maintaining direct and indirect contacts across the borders of nation-states ensures the continuity of transnational relations that make up the transnational social spaces, and various forms of support are realized within them, from the emotional support from family members to the forms of instrumental help through direct and, in particular, indirect interactions. During the interviews we frequently encountered the examples of solidarity which is focused on the interviewee's family members (focused solidarity), and, in some cases, on the wider community (diffuse solidarity, cf. Faist, 2000a), especially due to the war situation which "condenses" the transnational social space, intensifies the ties, and temporarily localizes them. For example:

"Many of my parents' acquaintances and my closer relatives, some of them were able to come to Zagreb during the war. And they spent some time at our place. We shared everything with them until they left for another country. So, they were waiting for some kind of a visa or papers to immigrate to a third country, I don't know, the Netherlands, the U.S.A., Switzerland, Sweden, Germany" (interviewee, male, age 32).

In accordance with Faist's (2004: 4) definition of social ties as a "continuing series of personal transactions - communication between at least three actors - to which the people involved ascribe common interests, obligations, expectations and norms", many descriptions from the interviews indicate the existence and continuity of social obligations even beyond the boundaries of nation-states, related to the maintenance of direct or indirect contact with family members for the holidays and important moments in life (birth, death, marriage, etc):

"I was in Istanbul last week at the wedding of my cousin, whose great-grandfather emigrated from Bosnia to Turkey during the Austrian occupation. So I went to Turkey and they were thrilled that I came because it would be inconceivable if no one from this side of the family came for the wedding" (interviewee, second generation, male, age 44).

In some of the examples from the interviews, the maintenance of transnational relations occurs in the form of hometown gatherings of a large number of individuals who emigrated from their hometown, transcending the family groups:

"Every year, my father organizes a reunion in his native village [in Bosnia]. He and a few others started the whole thing, and at the beginning of August they organize a reunion for one part of the village. (...) Everyone who is able to come comes, and they all gather at a beach down by the river. And they have this gathering and it gets quite interesting (laughs). Anywhere from fifty to a hundred people come (...) It has now become a tradition. They already organized it five or six times and it is a chance for the people from the diaspora to come. So they all hang out, that's the goal. (...) They are all scattered all over the place, the whole thing is somehow watered down and so this kind of refreshes the friendships" (interviewee, second generation, male, age 25).

On the other hand, the establishment and maintenance of contacts motivated by the homeland does not occur only directly, i.e. through physical presence of the actors, but it is also possible thanks to modern communication technologies which surpass the boundaries of physical space and connect the actors in distant locations in multiple nation-states.[4]

The second form of TSS's of Bosniaks in Croatia refers to the institutionalization of relations, which is often described by the representatives of Bosniak associations in Croatia. Bosniaks in Croatia have the status of a national minority, which further motivates the active Bosniaks to form associations and to represent the group in Croatia and towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as towards the institutions in other countries, and Bosniak organizations

and networks throughout the world. This type of engagement requires networking, followed by the formalization of relations with other Bosniak associations which ultimately structures the everyday life, not only for the leaders but also for all active members of the association. Mental reference frames and everyday practices of engaged Bosniaks are, therefore, focused not only on the people and the relationships in places of residence, but also on the members of the network, regardless of their location. Social spaces of engaged Bosniaks are decidedly pluri-local and transnational, and sustainable due to the continuity of institutionalized cooperation. Additionally, maintaining long-distance networks and relationships requires spatial mobility, resulting in further consolidation of connections and strengthening of solidarity following the intensive interaction rituals (Collins, 2004) in the form of meetings, events, and informal socializing. One association leader stated:

> "We attend events and represent our cultural association abroad relatively frequently. Regardless of whether I participate in the program directly, I have to be there as the president, I always have to represent the association in some way. It would happen that it would take us days to travel to Novi Pazar (laughs) and back. We went to Montenegro a few times recently, we come to Bosnia quite often, and, of course, throughout Croatia, to all towns where there are somewhat organized communities of Bosniaks and Muslims" (interviewee, second generation, male, age 44).

The same association leader described the cooperation with Bosniaks from geographically distant countries, like Norway, Luxembourg, Brazil, Canada and Australia, and particularly after the additional emigration caused by the war.

Conclusion

Bosniaks in Croatia are developing strong and sustainable transnational social relations which condense into TSS's, which means that their reference frames are pluri-local, and that their everyday practices are heavily influenced by the people and events in other cities and countries which are socially and emotionally close to Bosniaks in Croatia. These relations are maintained through strong social mechanisms such as reciprocity and solidarity, and extend to the members of the second generation who are quite active in the establishment and maintenance of transnational contacts, while traveling to BiH has a strong symbolic value for the preservation of their identity. With TSS's which emerge from family and friendship ties, Bosniaks in Croatia institutionalize their formal transnational relations through forming associations and networking them transnationally, which results in greater spatial mobility of active members and strengthening of group solidarity in spite of the physical distance and dispersion.

The case of TSS's of Bosniaks in Croatia, and particularly the conditions in which they are created, also indicates the specifics which should be taken into account when investigating TSS's of other groups. The legal and political status of Bosniaks as a national minority in Croatia provides an additional legitimate category for identification and encourages engaged Bosniaks to represent the whole group in the Croatian society, especially in the media and the institutions, but also towards their country of origin and the Bosniak associations and population in many other countries. Bosniak identity can thus be constructed as an autochthonous minority identity, but also as the identity of the diaspora and transnational community. Active Bosniaks in Croatia thus connect different methods and courses of action (toward Croatian institutions, their country of origin, and other Bosniak associations worldwide) strengthening the TSS's, as well as creating new collective identity that breaks

down the contradiction between the minority's demands for the recognition of autochthony (Clifford, 1994), and the migration history, identity of the diaspora, and the transnational connections.

Another peculiarity of Bosniak TSS's in Croatia which will have to be considered in comparative studies of TSS's is the geographical distance or, rather, the proximity of the country of origin and its effect on the frequent transnational mobility. Lower travel costs significantly affect the maintenance of transnational ties between Croatia and BiH due to the fact that physical movement and direct meetings are still important, despite the alternatives, i.e. the contemporary forms of indirect communication, because "'life' on screen is rarely a substitute for physical co-presence" (Larsen, Urry and Axhausen, 2006: 46). Besides, the regime for crossing the Croatian-Bosnian border still allows for the frequent physical mobility, thus enabling the new migrant workers to establish and maintain transnational families with pluri-local survival strategies.

The aforementioned conditions for maintenance of TSS's of Bosniaks in Croatia, the legal and political status, the proximity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the mobilization of the second generation, will surely aid the sustainability of specific TSS's which certainly need to be included in future comparative studies aiming to create valid empirical generalizations, if not to generate theory itself.

Notes:

[1]Research on transnational social spaces of migrants in Croatia was conducted in the period from May 2009 to March 2010 within the project "Transnational Migration - Challenges to Croatian Society" of the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport of the Republic of Croatia, and included the representatives of the Albanian, Bosniak and Chinese migrant/minority groups. Twenty semi-structured interviews with representatives of the Bosniak migrant/minority group were carried out as a part of the research, including the exploratory phase of the research during which the interviews were conducted with experts on the Bosniak migrant/minority group - the representatives of various Bosniak associations in Croatia. The interviews were conducted in Zagreb, Pula, Split, and Zadar. The applied sampling combined the "snowball" method with the principle of maximum variation (Miles and Huberman, 1994) in order to achieve a representation of the varied experiences of the participants in terms of sex, age, education and occupation.

[2]The fundamental objection for merging these two categories lies in the assumption that there is a significant number of registered Muslims who do not want to declare themselves as Bosniaks.

[3]List of countries: Australia, Austria, Brazil, BiH, Montenegro, Denmark, Canada, Kosovo, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, U.S.A., Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. We included only the active contacts and connections of the participants, and the list would have been even more extensive if we included the countries mentioned in the context of individual or family migration history.

[4]One engaged Bosniak had similar remarks: "It is easy to maintain contact today. Technology has enabled us to get together. Skype and e-mails can guarantee the survival of Bosniaks and the Muslim community in the diaspora" (interviewee, male, age 48).

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Institutional Framework in Support of Migrations:
Labour Migrations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the existing voluntary migration flows between Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Serbia, as well as the possibilities of developing institutional framework that would enable the use of the development potential of these forms of migration in the best possible manner. The paper consists of three sections: the first section points out the characteristics of voluntary migration flows from BiH into the Republic of Serbia in the last decade, based on the analysis of available statistical data on this group of migrants, and especially the labour migrants from BiH, at the same time identifying the major problems and challenges in monitoring these phenomena. The second section analyzes the legal framework governing the voluntary migrations, especially the labour migrations, while the third section points to the challenges in the implementation of institutional framework, as well as to the opportunities for improvement, in order to ensure the benefits for all stakeholders in the migration process - migrant workers and their families, countries of origin and of destination.

Key words: voluntary migrations, labour migrations, institutional framework, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia.

Introduction

In the last few decades, there has been a change in the nature of international migration trends and spatial mobility of population at the global level: the increase in the number of migrants, as well as the diversity of migration flows and patterns, with an emphasis on temporary and circular migration, but also the increasing complexity of the manners of covert, illegal forms of migration. They were also influenced by significant changes in the political scene in Europe and the world, as well as by the effects of globalization, development of telecommunications, information technology revolution and so on (Bauman, 1988; Castels, 2002; De Haas, 2008). These changes, which have not bypassed the population of the Western Balkans, together with the complex migratory context and the burden of forced migratory movements caused by the turbulent political events and the war in the former Yugoslavia, indicate the pressing need for continued study of migration from different perspectives. This is supported by the findings of demographic studies, which suggest that the unfavourable trends within the age structure of the population of the Western Balkans will open new questions in the field of migration within the region in the foreseeable future. It is believed that, in the near future, the process of aging and negative relationship between the number of the elderly and the size of the working population will lead to a large negative pressure on the economic systems of most Balkan countries. Immigration stands as one of the most realistic solutions for overcoming this problem, given that most of the immigrant population comes from the working-age population, aged between 20 and 40 years (Nikitović, 2009). This suggests that, in the near future, migrations will become one of the major questions, not just regarding the

demographics, but also regarding the overall socio-economic development of the Western Balkans.

Thus, the objective of this paper is to analyze the existing voluntary migration flows between BiH and Serbia, as well as the possibilities of developing an institutional framework that would enable the use of the development potential of these forms of migration in the best possible manner. The paper consists of three sections: the first section points out the characteristics of voluntary migration flows from BiH into the Republic of Serbia in the last decade, based on the analysis of available statistical data on this group of migrants, and especially the labour migrants from BiH, at the same time identifying the major problems and challenges in monitoring these phenomena. The second section analyzes the legal framework governing the voluntary migrations, particularly the labour migrations, while the third section, based on the interviews with migrants and representatives of the National Employment Service of the Republic of Serbia (NES), points to the challenges in the implementation of the institutional framework, as well as to the opportunities for encouragement of this type of migration in order to ensure the benefits for all stakeholders in the migration process - migrant workers and their families, countries of origin and of destination.

Statistics of monitoring the migrations between BiH and Serbia

While reviewing the statistics that deal with external migrations, it cannot be said that they provide a sufficiently solid basis for ongoing study, better understanding, and prediction of further migration flows. This, of course, also carries negative implications for the adoption of meaningful institutional solutions in order to overcome the adverse situation. It should be emphasized that the statistics of monitoring the migration flows and stocks is not only a stumbling block in Serbia or BiH, but in most countries as well, suggesting that raising the quality and methodology of monitoring is essential. Although the statistical data on external migrations can be obtained from various domestic and foreign sources, most of the available data is methodologically inconsistent, adjusted according to the definitions of the migrants and the needs of countries in which the migrations are monitored. In a number of cases, these data are not fully available, are often obtained only with the approval, their content is less comprehensive (especially when talking about the demographic and socio-economic structures of migrants), and they are often presented as an aggregate, without the possibility of regional or territorial monitoring (Penev, Predojevic-Despic, 2012). Given the nature of our work, we will point out certain limitations in the statistical monitoring of external migration flows in the two observed countries.

According to the estimates of the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees, the number of BiH nationals in Serbia is around 150.000, accounting for approximately 9% of the total number of registered persons of BiH origin worldwide. On the other hand, according to the results of the Census of Population in the Republic of Serbia in 2002, around 131.000 citizens born in BiH are currently living in Serbia.

Table 1. Number of BiH and Croatian refugees in Serbia (1996–2010)

Year	1996.	2001.	2004.	2008.	2009.	2010.
BiH	232974	242624	27541	24943	24917	21458
Croatia	290667	242624	76546	72411	72763	64695

Source: KIRS, 2008; KIRS, 2011.

According to the results of the Commissariat for Refugees of the Republic of Serbia (*Komesarijat za izbeglice Republike Srbije* - KIRS) - (Table 1), in mid-2010, there were less than 21.000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina living in Serbia, and three times as many refugees from the Republic of Croatia. In comparison to 1996, the number of refugees from BiH was reduced tenfold.

The report of the Commissariat states that this reduction is largely the result of integration in the Republic of Serbia, as more than 200.000 refugees have obtained citizenship of the Republic of Serbia. It also states that 31% of the total number of refugees returned to BiH.

Table 2. Number of migrants from BiH to Serbia, 20082010

	Total rom BiH	From FBiH	From RS	From Brčko district
2008.	924	485	421	18
2009.	680	338	327	15
2010.	689	313	356	20

Source: BiH, Federation of BiH, Federal Office of Statistics - documentation

Figure 1. Sex structure (%) of migrants from BiH to Serbia, 20082010.

Source: BiH, Federation of BiH, Federal Office of Statistics - documentation

Data on the number of emigrants from BiH to Serbia, gathered by the Federal Office of Statistics of BiH, reveals a picture of migration flows which deviates from the usual, as the migrant population largely consists of the working population contingent. Since data were available only for the period from 2008 to 2010 (Table 2), no precise analysis or firmer conclusions can be drawn. However, apart from small differences in the number of emigrants from both entities, a significantly higher number of female emigrants can be noted (see Figure 1).

Figure 2. Age and sex distribution of emigrants from BiH to Serbia in 2008 - 2010

Source: BiH, Federation of BiH, Federal Office of Statistics - documentation

Additionally, on the basis of the age-sex structure of migrants (Figure 2), it is evident that not only women, but also the elderly population, especially the persons in their 60's and 70's, are significantly participating in these migration flows in both entities, with a somewhat more pronounced emigration of older women from the Federation. Even though it is still quite low, a somewhat higher participation of the working population is noted in the migrations from Republika Srpska to the Republic of Serbia.

Table 3. Number of BiH citizens who are permanent residents, and BiH citizens temporarily residing in the Republic of Serbia in 2007 - 2009

	Permanents residents			Temporary residents			Emp.-based migrants		
Year	2007.	2008.	2009.	2007.	2008.	2009.	2007.	2008.	2009.
BiH	6	7	9	563	599	540	218	288	251
Croatia	100	114	124	446	472	489	102	147	192
Macedonia	235	327	361	1480	1575	1439	263	343	314
Total	5177	5780	6231	16249	16779	16533	6136	6660	6298

Source: Ministry of the Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia - documentation charts

According to data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia regarding the number of BiH citizens with permanent or temporary residence in Serbia (Table 3), it is evident that the majority of BiH citizens claim temporary residence in Serbia - approximately 3.5% of all granted visas for temporary residence - while the number of permanent residents in the second half of the 2000's was negligible. Also, contrary to most other countries of origin, residence permits for BiH citizens are most frequently given on the basis of employment, rather than on the basis of family reunions or marriage with Serbian citizens.

Table 4. Number of BiH students enrolled at the universities in the Republic of Serbia, for academic years 2002/2003 to 2010/2011

Academic Year	Students from BiH Total	Students from BiH Total %	Female students from BiH
2002/2003	5882	2,98	-
2003/2004	5337	2,62	2711
2004/2005	5732	2,62	2768
2005/2006	6179	2,69	2953
2006/2007	6147	2,58	3014
2007/2008	6149	2,59	2922
2008/2009	5777	2,45	2731
2009/2010	5446	2,40	2686
2010/2011	4797	2,10	2409

Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia - documentation charts

The number of students from BiH is another highly valuable indicator in observing the labour migrations (Table 4), because they are practically one step away from entering this contingent. The number of students from BiH studying at the universities in Serbia during the 2000's has mostly grown and has ranged between 5.500 and 6.200, while the sex ratio was equal. Starting from the academic year 2008/2009, their numbers began to decline, as did the percentage of their participation in the total number of students enrolled in Serbia. These data indicate that, for the adoption of more precise conclusions about the analyzed fluctuations, other statistical sources on the number of students should be more thoroughly monitored, both in BiH and other countries.

According to data from the NES regarding the number of work permits issued (Table 5), a total of 2.573 work permits were issued to foreigners, 98%of which were issued to foreigners with temporary residence. In the observed period, from 2006 to 2011, a constant increase was noted. Additionally, the number of work permits issued to BiH citizens in the same period increased significantly, and in 2011 it accounted for more than 8% of all issued work permits. However, according to the incomplete statistics from the NES, it can be concluded that these are mostly highly skilled workers employed in foreign missions, humanitarian organizations, the construction industry, as well as the entrepreneurs. Most of the work permits for foreigners were issued in Belgrade, followed by Novi Sad, and Loznica. In the majority of cases, visas were issued to men in the 31-40 age group, as well those aged between 21 and 30.

Table 5. Total number of temporary work permits issued to foreign nationals in Serbia (2006 - 2011)

	2006.	2007.	2008.	2009.	2010.	2011.
Total	1699	1721	1990	2387	2546	2573
BiH	110	155	197	213	167	210
Croatia	33	46	59	77	84	126
Macedonia	183	212	221	152	201	242

Source: National Employment Service documentation charts

According to the Law on Conditions for Employment of Foreign Citizens, the request for issuing a "work permit" shall be filed only in the case of the existing employment agreement and it is estimated that the number of foreigners working in Serbia is far greater than the number of issued work permits, as it does not apply to hiring foreigners without employment contracts, members of executive boards, etc. (KIRS, 2011).

Institutional framework of labour migrations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia

The Republic of Serbia is a signatory to international conventions that are directly or indirectly related to the protection of the rights of migrant workers and members of their families. Precisely these standards are incorporated into the internal legal system of Serbia, and their modification and refinement are regulated through bilateral agreements. Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have formed a number of bilateral agreements, which specifically regulate the areas of employment, education, social security, and the acquisition of citizenship.

A general legal framework which regulates the rights and obligations of foreigners in the Republic of Serbia is applicable for all foreign nationals, including the nationals of BiH. This area is regulated by the Law on Foreigners of the Republic of Serbia and the Law on Citizenship, which regulate the issues of temporary and permanent residence in Serbia, and the acquisition of citizenship. Similar to other legislative systems, the Serbian legal system favours Serbian nationals in the labour market. In the event that there are no Serbian nationals registered at the unemployment bureau, preconditions are created for the employment of foreigners with permanent or temporary residence in Serbia. The Law on Conditions for Employment of Foreign Citizens recognizes the situation in which it is not necessary to obtain permission to sign the employment agreement. Under this regulation, this is possible if the foreign national has been granted a temporary or permanent residence, provided that the employment is based on performing professional activities stipulated in the employment agreement and technical cooperation, long-term production cooperation, transfer of technology, and foreign investment.

The Republic of Serbia and BiH have signed a number of agreements which specifically and adequately regulate the rights of their citizens in the territory of the other country, specifically the statutory rights, and economic, social and cultural rights. The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina on temporary employment of nationals of the Republic of Serbia in Bosnia and BiH citizens in Serbia refers to migrant workers, i.e. the persons who are nationals of one party to the Agreement, who legally reside and are temporarily employed on the territory of the other party to the Agreement without seeking residence. Migrant workers are temporarily employed in the state of employment, through relevant stakeholders (National Employment Service in Serbia and the Labour and Employment Agency in Bosnia) at the request of the employer, and in accordance with this Agreement and the legislation of the country of employment. Upon termination of employment, the employer is obliged to pay all wages to the migrant worker, as he/she would any domestic employee. This agreement also applies to family members of migrant workers, regulating their residence and protecting their rights as per the special agreement on social insurance providing protection and enjoyment of rights in all aspects of social security contributions. The agreement between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the area of education, culture, and sport envisages the improvement of mutual cooperation in the area of education, referring to the exchange of students, interns, teachers, and scholars. It is

particularly important to emphasize the commitment to jointly work on the analysis of the history and geography textbooks for primary and secondary schools, as a condition for reconciliation in the Western Balkans region. Signatories of this agreement are also obliged to exchange the information and documentation concerning the recognition of qualifications and diplomas.

The agreement on dual citizenship between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and BiH stipulates that the citizenship of one signatory country may be given to a national of another signatory country, without the loss of native citizenship. Respecting the limitations in the employment of foreigners, this agreement provides for a more efficient access to the labour market through naturalization, pursuant to the provisions of the agreement.

When it comes to the treatment of citizens of Republika Srpska, there is no preferential treatment in the area of employment: citizens of Republika Srpska have the status of foreigners and are subject to the general legislative regime for foreigners, in addition to the bilateral agreements between BiH and Serbia. Different treatment of BiH nationals from Republika Srpska is evident in the field of education. The legal basis for the different treatment of citizens of Republika Srpska is based on the Agreement on Special Parallel Relations between the Republic of Serbia and Republika Srpska. This created the preconditions for cooperation of executive, legislative, and other institutions, as well as for all other political and economic cooperation. This Agreement constitutes the legal basis for the adoption of special agreements between the competent authorities of the Republic of Serbia and Republika Srpska, and was best implemented in the field of education. The Agreement on Mutual Recognition of Academic Degrees and Regulation of Student Status Issues provided the same treatment and automatic recognition of documents at all levels of education. In addition to the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Serbia on the education of members of the Serbian national minority from neighbouring countries in the Republic of Serbia, citizens of Republika Srpska were able to sign a declaration in Serbia stating that they are members of the Serbian national community, and to obtain various benefits in their countries of origin: the possibility of tuition funding from the state budget of the Republic of Serbia, the right to board at the universities, as well as the right to treatment at the Student Health Centre, which would be covered by the budget of the Republic of Serbia.

Serbia and BiH have comprehensively standardized transnational cooperation in the field of labour migrations. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Republic of Serbia and Bosnia have signed an agreement on dual citizenship, which is not the case with other states that emerged from the former Yugoslavia, representing a stumbling block in the field of regional cooperation. The biggest challenge lies in the application of agreed standards and internal legal framework, as well as defining the need for the labour force which would be the end user of the established bilateral cooperation. Therefore, it is of crucial importance that the institutions of these two countries, responsible for the implementation of agreements and internal regulations, maintain regular communication through joint meetings in order to plan future directions of cooperation, identify obstacles, and propose common solutions to problems in the implementation of agreed standards.

Challenges of the application of institutional framework

We attempted to establish possible challenges in the implementation of the institutional framework for the management of labour migrations through interviews with migrants and representatives of the NES. Eleven migrants were interviewed, six women and five men. Ten interviewees are currently living in Belgrade and one in Novi Sad. They were

selected on the basis of statistical data and insights into existing migration flows from BiH to Serbia - labour migrants, students who are potential economic migrants, as well as pensioners, who are the most reported category in the statistics from BiH. Interviewed migrants arrived in Serbia after the year 2000, unrelated to the war. Interviewees were aged between 20 and 30 (six people), between 30 and 40 (four people), and between 70 and 75 (one person). Seven people have completed secondary education, and four have university degrees. Seven migrants are currently studying at the universities in Serbia. Three people came from Brčko, and one person came from each of the following cities: Kotor Varoš, Sarajevo, Teslić, Travnik, Tuzla, Višegrad, Zvornik, and Zenica.

The first identified challenge in the management of labour migration is the application of the aforementioned Law on Conditions for Employment of Foreign Citizens. Also, the Regulation on the Issuance of Work Permits to Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons protects domestic market by the provision that a foreign national may be employed only in the case that, in the records of the NES, there are no unemployed citizens of the Republic of Serbia with the same qualifications. Immigrants of Serbian nationality from BiH surpass this requirement by seeking and obtaining dual citizenship:

"Every three months, I had to leave the country and to register myself. I had to extend my contract every three months, and pay a fee of 9.000 to 9.500 dinars. Also, my former boss had to repeatedly write in the contract that I can speak French language, and other special details, and that I have some form of specialization so that I could get hired, to show that there is no staff of my calibre at the unemployment bureau. After one year, I handed in my papers, the application for citizenship. Now I have dual citizenship, a Serbian identity card, permit, all documents, residence permit, and registered employment." 32 year old migrant from Republika Srpska.

The problem with this way of "coping" by the immigrants in the labour market is that the incentive for labour migration lies not in the demands of the labour market, but in the social networks and other factors. Unless they are motivated by the needs of the labour market, labour migrations can create difficulties for the immigrants (for example, through illegal employment on the black market and jeopardized human rights), for the country of origin which is left without a labour force, i.e. the potential for development, and for the country of destination by creating a greater competitiveness in the labour market and increasing unemployment of its own citizens.

NES representative from the Užice Branch points to the possibility of employment both due to demands of the labour market, but also due to the so-called social capital and social networks:

"BiH nationals in the Republic of Serbia are engaged in various jobs, ranging from low-skilled to highly skilled, depending on whether we are talking about family relationships with the owners of the company, or whether these are jobs for which there is a deficit in skilled employees (e.g. welders). Municipalities these workers come from are mainly the municipalities bordering with Serbia: Višegrad, Rudo, Srebrenica, Zvornik, Bratunac, etc. For example, we had information that many workers from BiH are working in the municipality of Bajina Bašta, cutting and extracting timber from the Tara Mountain. Essentially, these migrations exist because they also existed in the time of the former Yugoslavia, when this was one of country and many people from those municipalities worked in Bajina Bašta, Užice, etc."

Additionally, in practice, there are no efforts of state institutions to encourage and support labour migrations, despite the ratification of the Agreement by the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the temporary

employment of nationals of the Republic of Serbia in BiH and BiH citizens in the Republic of Serbia. According to the Chief of the Department for the Implementation of Intergovernmental Agreements and Compensation,[1] the NES of the Republic of Serbia cooperates with the Labour and Employment Agency of BiH only in the implementation of the Agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and BiH on social insurance, in the section referring to unemployment insurance, but not with regards to the organization of employment between the two countries.

Migrants from BiH also confirmed that they became employed through personal contacts and networks, rather than through the employment services:

"I came here on the basis of recommendations, I did not approach any agencies. I have relatives, friends, an uncle in Serbia. They also came here after the war because of work." 32 year old migrant from Republika Srpska

"The fact that I already had professional contacts - I was a part of a research team in Petnica, and I met people from the profession, and had created professional relationships there - made it easier for me." 30 year old immigrant from BiH

On the other hand, the representative of the National Employment Service cites an example of Croatia[2] which encourages labour migrations with the aim of satisfying the needs of the labour market by defining quotas for work permits and residence of foreign nationals. Also, the Croatian Employment Service has signed a cooperation agreement with the Labour and Employment Agency of BiH, believing that it will improve the provision of services to both the employers and the unemployed, at the same time reducing the number of workers on the black market, 83% of whom are BiH citizens. Regional cooperation in the management of labour migrations can be improved through participation in the already developed initiative - Centre of Public Employment Services of Southeast European Countries.

The second challenge is brought by the application of the Agreement on Special Parallel Relations between the Republic of Serbia and Republika Srpska, which encourages the migration of students from Republika Srpska, as it provides them with the same rights as domestic students.

"Education [motivation for migration, A/N]. If it wasn't for those "special relationships" between the Republic of Serbia and Republika Srpska, I probably would not have studied here, I would not have my education paid for and I would not be here... In my case, those special relationships were the key factor in making it possible for me to study here, as well as to obtain a dual citizenship." 30 year old immigrant from Republika Srpska

The question is, to what degree does the ability of students from Republika Srpska to study in the Republic of Serbia cause a brain drain in Republika Srpska, since numerous studies have shown that students either stay to work in the country they studied in, or migrate to another country (Salt, 1997; Vertovec, 2002; Harvey, 2009). This is also demonstrated by migrant students who participated in the study, answering the question "Where do you see yourself in five years: in Bosnia, Serbia, or some other country?":

"In another country in the EU; if I had to make a choice between Republika Srpska and here, I would rather remain in Serbia..." 25 year old student from Republika Srpska
"Probably here in Serbia." 23 year old student from Brčko

"In Europe, not in Bosnia, nor in Serbia, certainly outside of the Balkans, somewhere in Europe .... We can always come back to Serbia, if it doesn't work out..." 23 year old student from Brčko

However, students can also become a part of the brain circulation process and thus contribute to economic and social development of their communities and society as a whole. Therefore, it is necessary to identify them, monitor their development and education, and

develop transnational activities with them - social, cultural, professional, political, thus enabling their contribution through cooperation with the country of origin, if there is no opportunity to stimulate their return.

Conclusion

Analysis of statistical data on labour migrations between BiH and Serbia showed that statistics of monitoring of external migrations, both in the Republic of Serbia and in BiH, has a number of shortcomings. Most of the existing data is not publicly available; it can be obtained on demand and following the approval of the institutions that issue them, which significantly complicates the continuous monitoring of international migration flows. Available data on labour migrations are methodologically inconsistent, are not monitored over a longer period of time, which prevents reliable monitoring, detailed analysis, and better understanding of the deterministic fundamentals of migration. It is important to emphasize that, in both countries, there is a significant under-registration of international migrants who, in most cases, do not deregister residence when going to work or to reside abroad, at the same time submitting a request for a work permit only upon signing an employment contract in Serbia, for example. Therefore, it is necessary to significantly improve and harmonize the methodology of migration monitoring, both in BiH and Serbia, as well as in other countries of the region. However, in the absence of a statistical monitoring platform that could consistently record the migration processes from the point of the country of origin and the country of immigration, it is necessary to complement the substantiality of data on international migration by combining various existing statistical sources (Predojević-Despić, Penev, 2012). Analysis of the legal framework has shown that institutional framework for voluntary migration between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, including labour migrations, is well developed: it encourages labour migrations and cooperation in the fields of education, culture, and sports. At the same time, it enables the protection of the immigrants' rights - labour rights, rights to education, social and health care, and pension contributions. However, the challenges in the implementation of institutional framework have shown that there is room for improving the cooperation between the authorities responsible for employment, through exchange of data and information in accordance with the Agreement on temporary employment, and through active participation in the already developed regional initiatives, such as the Centre of Public Employment Services of Southeast European Countries. Additionally, a balanced approach and cooperation in the field of education between Serbia and BiH entities, primarily in the areas of recognition of degrees and study conditions, would contribute to the creation of a single market of knowledge and education in both countries, and would encourage transnational activities and "circulation of knowledge"[3].

Notes

[1]Sector for Unemployment Insurance, NES of the Republic of Serbia

[2]In Croatia, based on the needs of the competent bodies of the state administration and the analysis of the utilization of labour and business licenses, the analysis of the existing structure of the unemployed persons and persons who are available for work, and the ability to meet the staffing needs of the economy, the Government is proposing the adoption of the overall annual quota of work and residence permits for foreign nationals. Separate opinion and demands are also given by the Croatian Employers' Association, the Croatian Chamber of Economy and the Croatian Chamber of Commerce.

[3]Note: This paper is a result of the project "Investigation of demographic phenomena in the function of public policies in Serbia" (Nr. 47 006), funded by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technological Development of Republic of Serbia.

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Aida Spahić, MSc

Gender Dimension of Migrations:
Au Pair Migration from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United States of America

Abstract

The process of migration is a highly gendered process, and migration related to domestic labour is one of the most prominent examples of this. This paper aims to contribute to the clarification of the concept of migration of women who leave the country in order to work as au pairs in the families in the United States of America. Au pair programs and experiences of migrant women are often omitted in studies on migrations due to the fact that the au pair migrations are classed under the educational and cultural exchange programs, and because this type of migration is, in most cases, temporary. However, migrant women experience a personal transformation and empowerment during the process of migration through au pair programs, especially in the process of negotiating new positions and gender roles. The specific circumstances of domestic labour influence decisions that contribute to the improvement of their status. The decision of migrant women to return to their homeland is a result of dissatisfaction with their status and conditions of work and life. Those who choose to remain in the country of destination do so driven by the desire to improve the status they had in the country of origin, hoping that better socio-economic factors in the country of destination will help further their empowerment and independence.

Key words: *migrations, feminization of migrations, domestic labour, au pair*

Introduction

The intensity of migratory movements has never been stronger, and yet, the world has never had more borders which are omnipresent and manifold (Ponzanesi, 2002) and determine our place in time and space. For this reason, this paper presents all those elements of migrations which place individuals within a constrained world, in which a migrant becomes the other, the foreigner, and a discriminated person.

Gender relations affect migration flows, as well as the experiences of migrants (Carling, 2005). For a long time, it was believed that women migrate less frequently, or that they migrate together with their husbands and family, as opposed to migrating independently. In the last twenty years, the theory has shown that this is a misconception, and that women migrate in order to work, and that they do so perhaps even more frequently than men. Gender relations have a major influence here, both on the decision to migrate, and on the migrants themselves (Jolly and Reeves, 2005). It is assumed that, in 2005, there were 175 million international migrants throughout the world, representing about 3.5 percent of the total population in the world (Jolly and Reeves, 2005). Half of these migrants were women.

This paper is based on the research carried out within the framework of a master's thesis, and deals with au pair migrations. Au pair program was created in 1969 with the aim to increase the mobility of male and female students, and to expand their opportunities for learning a new language and getting to know a new culture. Today, it is a large program that

involves many agencies, governments, and a large network of people. This form of travel is a rare opportunity for young people to see a new country, improve their ability to express themselves in a foreign language, and to visit some new places. In most cases, these are labour migrations, especially for young people from BiH for whom this program often represents the (only) way to leave their own country, to earn money and help support the family, or to escape from family issues or other problems which are, in most cases, extremely gendered.

The paper will present the gender aspects of migration in general, domestic labour as a specific form of migration, and the results of qualitative research of au pair program and experience.

Gender aspects of migration - a theoretical approach

Migrations are not only a physical movement of an individual to other areas for a new job or family reunification, but they also represent a significant personal experience that, in most cases, completely transforms that individual (Carling, 2005). For several reasons, these transformations affect men and women differently. The reason relevant for this analysis is the difference in jobs performed by men and women during migrations. Women often perform jobs within the informal sector and, compared to men, they work in a limited number of occupations (Kawar, 2004). Until recently, studies of migration "added" women as a variable and compared them to male patterns of education and participation in the labour market (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2005). On the other hand, there were a few attempts to create an exclusively female approach, which, again, fails to provide a comprehensive picture (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2005). This leads to the conclusion that it is necessary to include gender relations in the study of migration.

Gender norms and structures are created from birth, and their disturbance requires a review of every area of life. Gender permeates all spheres of action and inevitably influences the decision to migrate (Carling, 2005). System of values that includes gender aspects and principles of gender equality in which the entity operates may potentially be *threatened* when it encounters a new set of values and gender regimes in the countries of destination. This is particularly prominent in migrations from more closed and more patriarchal societies/communities into more open societies with more equitable gender relations. Women are faced with new, emancipatory practices which are in conflict with the established, stricter regimes that rely on tradition and culture in the countries of origin. For this reason, migration often requires a review and renegotiation of family and gender roles, as immigrants face different values and requirements (Spitzer, 2003). It is inevitable that migration would have a transformative effect, whether in terms of emancipation or the unintentional political act, or in terms of confirmation and strengthening of formerly present gender roles and regimes. The entire migration process is gendered in the sense that gender shapes social relationships that lead to migration, as well as the social mechanisms such as the family and the labour market in the country of origin and the country of destination (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2005). The so-called *push* and *pull* factors are crucial in the process of deciding to migrate. *Push* factors refer to the reasons why people want to leave their country of origin, which may be of an economic, political, social, gender, and other nature. *Pull* factors, in turn, are the reasons why a particular country is an attractive destination for migration. They include answers to the *push* factors, i.e. provide employment and political stability, security and so on. Lack of employment, inclusion of women in the labour market, poverty, post-conflict situation, and transition are just some of the possible *push* factors and are all gendered in one way or another. Gender norms in the family and society do not affect only the decision to migrate, but also the

type and method of migration, by putting pressure on certain categories of people to migrate, while at the same time putting pressure on the other categories not to migrate, which of course depends on the context of the country origin (Jolly and Reeves, 2005). The further text will review social mechanisms and influences that facilitate or impede migratory tendencies. Gender is an essential factor in this regard; according to the feminists of the third phase of migration research, the emphasis is on observing gender as a key constituent element of immigration research today, and contemporary research examines the extent to which gender permeates the practices, identities, and institutions involved in migration (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2005). This approach is a novelty, because gender has been a neglected category in the study of migration for a long time, except for the attempt of quantitatively "adding women" into statistical reviews that never reflected the actual effect of gender, gender roles and regimes on the migration flows, the *push* and *pull* factors, discrimination and risks, as well as on empowerment.

Research and publications in the field of migration in the last decade, particularly in the area of feminization of migration, have shown that women are more vulnerable to risks and discrimination than men (Kawar, 2004). There are multiple reasons for this, but most relevant for this analysis is one of the most predominant reasons (in addition to human trafficking and migration for the purposes of engaging in sex work, which certainly imply a high risk, abuse, and discrimination). Women generally migrate in order to engage in low-paying jobs within the private sphere (domestic labour, provision of care, assistance for the sick, child care, etc). "There is sufficient evidence for arguing that a significant number of migrants have the skills and qualifications that are often not recognized or are not needed in the types of work they do" (Kawar, 2004). The reason for this is the demand for labour force in developed countries, where the lack of women's work in the household, which occurs due to increased participation of women in the labour market, is remedied by hiring another woman. This does not deconstruct or alter the gender roles; instead, it is transferring the "traditionally" women's jobs to another woman, and social mechanisms that should allow for equitable distribution of household chores do not exist. This institutes a system of supply and demand. On the one hand, Western women are able to pay another woman to perform tasks that were once expected of her, and on the other hand, there is a huge number of women who are willing to work in other people's homes and tend to the so-called "private sphere." Although there is a need and demand for labour force, the economic and social value of women's work is neither recognized nor acknowledged, and there is no official confirmation of that work because the cases in which a domestic worker can get a work permit or valid legal contract are very rare (Kofman, 2005). Additionally, women who migrate in order to work in a domestic setting, most often did not engage in such work in their own country (except in their own homes), but it is assumed that the skills related to provision of care are inherent to a female being and that only women can perform those jobs. However, domestic labour is a very specific activity as it does not take place within the "public" sphere as other jobs, but within the private, intimate sphere where completely different mechanisms and relationships apply.

In such circumstances, the transformative role of migration is inevitable because it leads to social processes that are in conflict with the established and learned ones. There are multiple reasons for this. Primarily, women from less developed or developing countries leave their communities in which they had a particular status (in some cases, even higher education, employment, and so on), and arrive into a new environment with new gender and social relations in which they have no status at all and little chance to build it. They move within the private sphere of "superior" employers, who expect them to show warmth, love, and genuine care, alongside a professional relationship, distance, and fulfillment of contractual obligations.

These two spheres are conflicting in nature; there is "natural" and intimate on the one hand, and business and professional on the other. Constant transforming from one to the other creates a state of tension, limitation in expressing own feelings and needs, and of pervasive anxiety.

Female migrants must be certain that they are the ones who made the decision to migrate, and they must feel confident that they can return to their community and that they will not be penalized for migrating in the first place (Oishi, 2002). Since au pair migrations are legal, organized, and relatively transparent, there is, in theory, little chance for severe forms of abuse (which is not the case for domestic workers that have migrated through suspicious agencies, illegal agents, or who illegally entered the country of destination).

Au pair migrations are rarely classified as migrations for the purpose of domestic labour, because child care and other household duties implied by the programs are considered to be casual, spontaneous "assisting" in and around the house. Precisely because it is practically impossible to measure and exactly evaluate the amount of work performed, this type of business relation is abused, and the occasional "assistance" in the house becomes the list of obligations that must not be skipped. While a problem with work permits and applicable treaties exists in classic migrations for domestic labour, au pair migration includes an agreement which sets up the framework of a relationship, and the work permit is not issued because au pair is not considered to be work, instead being classified as "being a member of the family. "

Simply put, everyone needs care on a daily basis, although it can be provided by different actors. The level and complexity of care depends on the context and situation, but it is necessary to emphasize the fact that all beings are essentially able to provide care (Sevenhuijsen, 2003). However, the activities related to care are traditionally ascribed to women, both in her own household, and in cases when providing care is her job. Similarly, domestic labour is "naturalised as being particularly suited to women who are deemed to innately possess the requisite skills, transferred from one private space to another" (Kofman, 2005). Even in countries with a higher level of gender equality, inequalities within the private sphere are not deconstructed, which leads to demand for women from less developed countries who would provide care and do housework in developed countries, where women participate more equally in the public sphere and the labour market. Altered gender regime is present only in the public sphere, in the sense of a greater presence of women, while gender equality remains unachieved because the double burden of work and home remains under women's care.

Today, women go through the so-called double socialization, as defined by German sociologist Regina Becker-Schmidt, within the family and in their career (Lutz, 2008). This is one of the reasons for the phenomenon of female immigrants providing assistance (with care and housework) to more affluent families, which is not a new phenomenon in itself. However, there has been an intensification of these processes due to "deeper economic, political, technological, cultural, legal, and other ties among the countries and communities" (Misra and Merz, 2003: 6). Worldwide, we have seen a globalization of domestic labour worldwide, and distribution and international expansion of the less developed countries which send migrants to more developed countries (Misra and Merz, 2003). Post-communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe, most of which are undergoing a process of transition, are more and more frequently becoming countries of origin for domestic workers and providers of care to children and the elderly in the countries of Western and Southern Europe (Williams and Gavanas, 2008). These movements also include men and therefore, migrations are studied as a general phenomenon of transitional countries which encourage them due to income from

remittances, but significant differences exist between the migration of men and women, both in the selection of jobs, and in the experiential sense.

Labour in households in certain cases includes living in that same household, or with the person needing care (live-in workers), which further complicates the relations between the employer and the employee due to the inevitable spending of free time at the "workplace" and limitation of privacy. An additional feature of this type of work is that activities related to provision of care and those related to house chores are often intertwined, and that the majority of migrant women engage in both types of work (Mundlak and Shamir, 2008), or even all three types if we consider the 3C definition of domestic labour (cleaning, cooking, caring) (Lutz, 2008). Both of these characteristics, the housing and the overlapping activities, characterize the au pair programs and significantly define them.

For these reasons, the formation of identity in the field of domestic labour is relational and contextual, as it depends on the specific socio-political context, as well as on other important elements: racial, religious, ethnic, gender (Cheng, 2004). Too many overlapping nuanced currents are influencing the creation of new identities and questioning the old ones, because the woman' identity shifts depending on whether she is the one who provides the service, or the one who pays for it (Carling, 2005). This makes the migration for domestic labour inevitably transformative, and research seeks to provide answers to the question of the manner in which it is transformative in cases of au pair women.

Migratory movements as a method for overcoming the current position

In a certain way, socialism institutionalized a certain form of equality between women and men because paid labour became the norm for women, even though the gendered power relations have not changed at all (Morokvasic, 2004). Neoliberal changes of economic opportunities for women in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have led to increased migration flows to Western countries with the purpose of finding a job (Gavanas and Williams, 2008). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation was further aggravated by the history of war which has deepened the poverty and significantly slowed the processes of development and transition. As the diplomas and qualifications of Bosnia and Herzegovina were not recognized as valid, a large number of women found jobs in the "traditionally female" roles and spheres.

Young women are in a position to have high level of education, but are also facing difficulties in finding or keeping a job. Many give up their career and dedicate themselves to family, discouraged by the lack of mechanisms for their inclusion into the labour market. Problems they encountered may compel them to seek employment in other markets where their skills are in demand, which makes them vulnerable to risks (UNIFEM, 2006) and discrimination. Unfortunately, very few young women have the opportunity to use their qualifications and education in the labour market of a foreign country.

Even though gender equality in the American society is at a much higher level than in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is still a low level of recognition of the importance of domestic labour in empowering families to contribute to the development of society, as well as the lack of economic valuation of such work (Chakrabarty, 2006). In the USA, the state mechanisms that support child care are minimal, which violates one of the most important links in the chain of social welfare (Gavanas and Williams, 2008). On the other hand, women often do not have a choice to stop working and dedicate themselves to their housework because their economic situation does not allow it - this means that more women enter the labour market while the number of men remains the same or is reduced (Young, 2005). All jobs that previously fell into

the "female domain" remain undone, because there is no gender reassignment of tasks and duties, and state mechanisms of child care do not exist. Since this is a capitalist society run by a market economy, child care or elderly care service is provided by the private sector. In addition to the fact that these services are expensive and can be afforded only by a small number of people, it is common that they are not compatible with other obligations and, thus, represent an incomplete solution. What a nanny or an au pair can offer is different from the classic day-care, because nannies and au pairs (especially the au pairs as they live within the household) are fully adaptable to working hours and responsibilities (Williams and Gavanas, 2008), and provide a much cheaper service. "Privileged women in the global economy are in a position to purchase care for themselves and their dependents, while other more economically vulnerable women are forced to sell their labor for low wages and to leave their own families behind to be cared for by others." (Litt and Zimmerman, 2003: 159). This creates a global system of supply and demand, which manages the migrations for domestic labour. Au pair programs have a significant share in this chain of services, especially in the case of families of middle or upper middle class, who own homes in the suburbs of large cities. In an age when we are highly exposed to the American culture and the entertainment industry, visualization of a happy and smiling American family in a dazzling home "like from a movie" represents a *pull* factor for migration.

Au pair programs: research findings

Research was conducted in the course of preparation of a master's thesis on migration of women from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United States of America through au pair exchange programs. For the purpose of this research, qualitative, in-depth interviews were carried out with women who went through the au pair program. In total, eight former au pairs who participated in the program between 2003 and 2006 were interviewed. Three interviews were conducted in the United States with women who decided to remain in the USA following the au pair program. Five interviews were conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with women from various cities (Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla, Banja Luka/Teslić). All participants completed the program successfully, i.e. have spent one to two years in the program. All joined the program with a high school degree, and nearly all of them were students at the time of leaving. Interviews in the United States were held in February of 2010 in three cities: Rochester (New York), Hatfield (Pennsylvania), and Philadelphia (Pennsylvania). Interviews in Bosnia and Herzegovina were held in Zenica and Sarajevo in March of 2010.

Research in the field of migration for domestic labour often excludes au pair from the definition of this type of engagement because of the aspect of cultural exchange that characterizes this type of migration (Hess and Puckhaber, 2004). Au pairs are migrants who work within a household, but "they are migrant domestic workers who are constructed by official discourses as neither workers nor migrants but as participants in a 'cultural exchange' programme" (Cox, 2007: 282). This is why this type of migration is seldom problematised, and there are a small number of papers that deal exclusively with this type of migration, or those that include it within broader studies of women's migrations. The original intention of the au pair program is still a major marketing strategy for the agencies which highlight the aspect of cultural exchange, even though it is actually a low-wage job of a household worker/nanny (Gavanas and Williams, 2008). Promotion of a program which is based on the concept of cultural exchange creates different expectations of the two parties involved in the program.

The specificity of domestic labour, i.e. working and living in a private sphere and intimate space of a family, has led to the necessity to modify the situation in case of problems and disagreements between the au pair and the family. They had "nowhere to run" in the area

where they lived, and were faced with the decision to change this situation. Their experience was closely linked to the socio-psychological environment of the family in which they lived, because both sides were expected to make an adjustment. Although the experiences of the participants were varied, as were their attitudes about families in which they lived, in most cases, families were willing and able to adapt which sets them apart from traditional employers in the labour market.

One of the study goals was to examine the reasons why migrants decide to stop the migration and return to their country of origin, and those reasons which made them decide to stay in the country of destination. Of the eight respondents, four decided to return, and four decided to remain, although only three of them were successful in that intent. Those who returned chose to do so due to becoming fed up with domestic labour and, in two cases, because they completed the goal they set for themselves before leaving. Their decision to leave in the first place, and then to return after the program, is in itself an act of courage and independence, and their statements that they returned with a different attitude and perception of society and relations represent a significant transformation.

Analysis of the reasons why some migrants decided to stay in the destination country has led to the conclusion that the socio-economic conditions in the country of origin have had the greatest influence on their decision, and that they believed they can always return to the same circumstances they left behind. On the other hand, they saw the country of destination as having more opportunities and prospects than BiH. Their socio-economic status prior to migration influenced their decision to leave their country.

Research has shown that both aspects of the au pair program, the aspect of cultural exchange and the aspect of domestic labour, are present and intertwined. Although learning the language and exploring the culture have an important place in the program, its primary element is the work. It was demonstrated that advertisement of the program and its representation do not always create an image that includes work as a primary element which, therefore, creates a misunderstanding or misplaced expectations. Additionally, the program offered in Bosnia and Herzegovina (although the situation is probably similar in other countries) is highly gendered, because only 4% of au pairs can be men (as requested by the agency in the USA), which supports and perpetuates the perception of women as "natural" caregivers who perform the female tasks of child care and care for the household. Research has shown that this perception is also prevalent in the USA because, within the families, only women dealt with all matters relating to the children and the household, regardless of whether they were employed or not. Men were completely absent from this sphere.

The fact that the participants migrated to the position which was "worse" than the one they had in the country of origin where they were students, graduates, or employees with a higher status, shows that migration often leads to a deterioration of status. But migration is frequently a "temporary" situation on the road to fulfilling a higher purpose, which is shown in the cases of migration of au pairs from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United States of America.

Below are the excerpts from the answers provided by the au pairs to the question regarding the reasons for participating in the program:

It was important for me to improve my English. That was the first important reason. And the second reason was that I wanted to get out of Bosnia, which was something I wasn't able to do during the entire war. (Klara)

I decided to come only for one year. To learn the language, to see America, their way of life. Experience. (Jaca)

It was the post-war time in Bosnia, and I've somehow grown in every aspect of my life except in that experiential aspect, in form of travelling. (...) On the other hand, it was

really interesting for me to go somewhere for a year or two and be absolutely free of any influence from the family, the community in which you live, tradition, and culture, and everything else, it was sort of interesting to see what kind of person I would be in circumstances that are completely different from what I was used to, I could be anyone, anything, without any expectations. (Sandra)

I saw the opportunity to master the language. Experience. Getting to know other cultures. Also, to become a bit more independent. (...) And I was always under too much pressure in Bosnia, and I sort of saw a way to gain independence, to show who I am. All decisions I make, to make for myself. (Zumra)

I had a goal which I thought was worth it for me to go through all that and to endure because I set myself a goal and there was no sense to give up half way through. I managed to make it more or less good for myself, as good as it could have been in those circumstances. (Anela)

Low-paid jobs are often seen as the stop on the way to something better, even though they are often a step backwards, because many people leave their jobs as teachers or nurses in their own country (Gavanas and Williams, 2008). Klara's case is precisely such a case because she worked as a nurse and, according to her, "had a good salary for the conditions at the time", but she decided to leave and try to improve her living conditions, hoping that she will be able to achieve more in life as she was not able to study what she wanted in her own country. She remained in the USA, married, and is currently finishing college. Aleksa also left Bosnia and Herzegovina to try to "make it" and to study, even though she failed to remain at the university she was enrolled in after her visa expired and the request for its extension was denied. Respondents felt that they live in a precarious socio-economic situation anyway, and that they can always return to the same circumstances if they do not make it.

The experience of living in another country and work at a low-paying job had the effect of empowerment on all respondents. Although this empowerment did not occur in the first half of their stay in the USA, especially while English language was an issue, all respondents indicated that they felt they were stronger, that they can fight and stand up for themselves when needed. They stated that, when they overcame the language barriers and the upbringing discipline they were brought up with, they began arguing, negotiating, and stopped being silent.

For most participants in this research, financial independence also became a new element in their lives and contributed to their empowerment. Although all of them stated during the interviews that they were poorly paid, the fact that they were independently earning money was significant for them.

In addition to their own empowerment, the participants noticed a change in the perception of gender relations. Although patriarchal structure can be easily recognized in the American families as well, the level of gender equality and respect for human rights in the United States is at a significantly higher level than in Bosnia. Klara stated that she likes the fact that families have the help of another person because, according to her, "they can devote time to themselves and their marriage." Studies have shown that women have a greater tendency than men to adopt new practices, ideas, and ideals that strive toward greater gender equality (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2005). Therefore, the emancipatory experience of the respondents is significant for spreading awareness and ideas about different ways of life and methods for construction of gender relations. In describing their experiences, the respondents demonstrated that "a female consciousness becomes a feminist consciousness" (Pessar, 2005:

9) in complex and difficult situations in which they question their current position and the position from which they originated, at the same time being unfettered by their family and the society in which they grew up, they discover on their own what it is that they truly want.

Conclusion

The process of migration is a gendered process, because women and men experience migration in different ways. Types of migration differ in relation to gender, and, until recently, global research did not focus on gender aspects of migration. Au pair migration experience, as a gender-specific experience (due to the fact that women migrate this way much more frequently than men), is often omitted from studies because it is, in most cases, a temporary migration. The conducted research confirmed that migration has a transformative effect and represents a significant personal empowerment, even when the migration experience is a negative one. This process of empowerment occurs through the clash of the new with the established and the learned. The research also showed that household tasks are still mostly performed by women, even in countries with a greater degree of gender equality and a more balanced participation of women in the labour market. Emergence of women from the private sphere opens up space for other women who take their place, which creates a global system of supply and demand.

If we look at the specific context of women from Bosnia and Herzegovina who migrated to the USA to work as an au pair in a household, the research found that the *push* factor was the socio-economic (and gender related) situation of the country of origin. The opportunities in the country of destination represented the *pull* factor. Of the eight respondents, three had decided to stay, believing that the destination country still offers more opportunities for advancement. Five of them have returned to Bosnia and continued their education there. All have migrated to positions lower than the positions they had in their country. For all of them, however, the migration represented a path to progress and empowerment.

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